| Subject: Re: news corp |
| From: "MICHAEL RILEY, BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM:" <michaelriley@bloomberg.net> |
| Date: 7/22/11, 17:08 |
Cool. what's the documentary?
------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Riley
Washington bureau/Bloomberg News
(202) 624 1982
(720) 635 8553 (cell)
Twitter: @rileybloomberg
----- Original Message -----
From: Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com>
To: MICHAEL RILEY (BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM:)
At: 7/22 17:05:22
I haven't, but at any rate from what I'm seeing they might not be releasing
them after all lest they compromise the case or some such thing. But I just
got done with a documentary crew and haven't had a chance to see what's up.
On Fri, Jul 22, 2011 at 1:03 PM, MICHAEL RILEY, BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM: <
michaelriley@bloomberg.net> wrote:
Hey, Barrett. Checking to see if you've had any luck reaching any of the
lulzsec guys about the news corp docs. I realize it's a long shot.
------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Riley
Washington bureau/Bloomberg News
(202) 624 1982
(720) 635 8553 (cell)
Twitter: @rileybloomberg
----- Original Message -----
From: Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com>
To: MICHAEL RILEY (BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM:)
At: 7/21 14:42:38
I'll try, I don't have any direct means of getting in touch with them right
now.
On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 8:35 AM, MICHAEL RILEY, BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM: <
michaelriley@bloomberg.net> wrote:
Hey, man. Here's the endgame thing. Cover of Businessweek this week.
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/cyber-weapons-the-new-arms-race-07212011.html
So, lulzsec supposedly is working with some media on news of the world
emails they have.
Is it possible for you to approach topiary or one of the others and find
out if they'd be willing to include us?
------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Riley
Washington bureau/Bloomberg News
(202) 624 1982
(720) 635 8553 (cell)
----- Original Message -----
From: Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com>
To: MICHAEL RILEY (BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM:)
At: 7/19 22:44:54
Also, a California attorney who's provided pro bono assistance to other
internet activists got in touch with me today offering to arrange some
colleagues to represent any of the 12 people who will likely be tried in
California's Northern District; I've also put him in touch with the
National
Lawyer's Guild so that they can begin coordinating.
On Tue, Jul 19, 2011 at 6:24 PM, Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com>
wrote:
One more thing - National Lawyer's Guild will be providing assistance
to
those who need it. I've just put out this statement:
http://pastebin.com/ddPgpyCP
On Tue, Jul 19, 2011 at 5:27 PM, Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com
wrote:
It's telling me that number doesn't work; you can call me now though.
On Tue, Jul 19, 2011 at 5:19 PM, MICHAEL RILEY, BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM: <
michaelriley@bloomberg.net> wrote:
Hey, give a call when you get off the phone: 202 954 1982
------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Riley
Washington bureau/Bloomberg News
(202) 624 1982
(720) 635 8553 (cell)
----- Original Message -----
From: Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com>
To: MICHAEL RILEY (BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM:)
At: 7/19 17:38:00
Cool, thanks.
On Tue, Jul 19, 2011 at 6:46 AM, MICHAEL RILEY, BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM:
<
michaelriley@bloomberg.net> wrote:
Or the week after. You never know w these guys. But yep.
---
Sent From Bloomberg Mobile MSG
---- Original Message ----
From: Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com>
At: 7/18/2011 23:56
Are you guys still bringing out a piece on Endgame?
On Thu, Jun 30, 2011 at 4:32 PM, Barrett Brown <
barriticus@gmail.com
wrote:
The e-mails that Lulzsec took from CEO of Unveillance are located
in
a
Gmail account set up by my main technical guy for easy searching.
Go
to
gmail and use this to login:
Login: karimhijazi.unveillance
Password: hbgemail
Just search Endgame and you'll find a number of discussions about
them as
well as a bit of communication between the CEO and John Farrell.
On Thu, Jun 30, 2011 at 1:31 PM, MICHAEL RILEY, BLOOMBERG/
NEWSROOM:
<
michaelriley@bloomberg.net> wrote:
202 624 1982...or after 5 pm eastern on my cell: 720 635 8553
------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Riley
Washington bureau/Bloomberg News
(202) 624 1982
(720) 635 8553 (cell)
----- Original Message -----
From: Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com>
To: MICHAEL RILEY (BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM:)
At: 6/22 22:12:38
Oh, and here's another little tidbit:
http://hbgary.anonleaks.ch/greg_hbgary_com/26795.html
On Wed, Jun 22, 2011 at 9:11 PM, Barrett Brown <
barriticus@gmail.com>
wrote:
Romas/COIN, the one I announced today. And this is the former
NSA
fellow
who went over to Pixar:
http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/press_room/2002/new_adr.shtml
On Wed, Jun 22, 2011 at 9:10 PM, MICHAEL RILEY, BLOOMBERG/
NEWSROOM: <
michaelriley@bloomberg.net> wrote:
Say it ain't so. Even Disney and Pixar?
Seriously, though. What's the connection? What project is he
talking
about
that links to pixar?
------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Riley
Washington bureau/Bloomberg News
(202) 624 1982
(720) 635 8553 (cell)
----- Original Message -----
From: Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com>
To: MICHAEL RILEY (BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM:)
At: 6/22 21:56:32
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/jun/22/hacking-anonymous
Also, you might take a look at this:
http://hbgary.anonleaks.ch/aaron_hbgary_com/8403.html
On Wed, Jun 22, 2011 at 8:55 PM, MICHAEL RILEY, BLOOMBERG/
NEWSROOM:
<
michaelriley@bloomberg.net> wrote:
thx for the heads up, Barrett.
------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Riley
Washington bureau/Bloomberg News
(202) 624 1982
(720) 635 8553 (cell)
----- Original Message -----
From: Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com>
To: ADRIENNE TOSCANO (BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM:), MICHAEL RILEY
(BLOOMBERG/
NEWSROOM:)
At: 6/21 16:08:31
Adrienne-
As I noted on the phone, an accompanying explanatory piece
will
run
in
The
Guardian tomorrow, while the document itself, which I've
pasted
below,
will
run on the wiki maintained by my group Project PM. The NYT
has
a
copy
and
is
vetting it now; the e-mails may be verified and other
details
obtained
by
way of this search engine maintained by Anonymous, which
acquired
the
71,000
e-mails in question in early February:
http://hbgary.anonleaks.ch/
Michael, I'm cc'ing you on this to give you a heads up; let
me
know
if
you
have any questions.
***
For at least two years, the U.S. has been conducting a
secretive
and
immensely sophisticated campaign of mass surveillance and
data
mining
against the Arab world, allowing the intelligence community
to
monitor
the
habits, conversations, and activity of millions of
individuals
at
once.
And
with an upgrade scheduled for later this year, the top
contender to
win
the
federal contract and thus take over the program is a team
of
about
a
dozen
companies which were brought together in large part by
Aaron
Barr -
the
same
disgraced CEO who resigned from his own firm earlier this
year
after
he
was
discovered to have planned a full-scale information war
against
political
activists at the behest of corporate clients. The new
revelation
provides
for a disturbing picture, particularly when viewed in a
wider
context.
Unprecedented surveillance capabilities are being produced
by
an
industry
that works in secret on applications that are nonetheless
funded by
the
American public – and which in some cases are used against
that
very
same
public. Their products are developed on demand for an
intelligence
community
that is not subject to Congressional oversight and which
has
been
repeatedly
shown to have misused its existing powers in ways that
violate
U.S.
law
as
well as American ideals. And with expanded intelligence
capabilities
by
which to monitor Arab populations in ways that would have
previously
been
impossible, those same intelligence agencies now have
improved
means
by
which to provide information on dissidents to those
regional
dictators
viewed by the U.S. as strategic allies.
The nature and extent of the operation, which was known as
Romas/COIN
and
which is scheduled for replacement sometime this year by a
similar
program
known as Odyssey, may be determined in part by a close
reading
of
hundreds
of e-mails among the 70,000 that were stolen in February
from
the
contracting firm HBGary Federal and its parent company
HBGary.
Other
details
may be gleaned by an examination of the various other firms
and
individuals
that are discussed as being potential partners.
Of course, there are many in the U.S. that would prefer
that
such
details
not be revealed at all; such people tend to cite the
amorphous
and
much-abused concept of “national security” as sufficient
reason
for
the
citizenry to stand idly by as an ever-expanding coalition
of
government
agencies and semi-private corporations gain greater
influence
over
U.S.
foreign policy. That the last decade of foreign policy as
practiced
by
such
individuals has been an absolute disaster even by the
admission
of
many
of
those who put it into place will not phase those who
nonetheless
believe
that the citizenry should be prevented from knowing what is
being
done
in
its name and with its tax dollars.
To the extent that the actions of a government are
divorced
from
the
informed consent of those who pay for such actions, such a
government
is
illegitimate. To the extent that power is concentrated in
the
hands
of
small
groups of men who wield such power behind the scenes, there
is
no
assurance
that such power will be used in a manner that is compatible
with
the
actual
interests of that citizenry, or populations elsewhere. The
known
history
of
the U.S. intelligence community is comprised in large part
of
murder,
assassinations, disinformation, the topping of democratic
governments,
the
abuse of the rights of U.S. citizens, and a great number of
other
things
that cannot even be defended on “national security” grounds
insomuch
as
that
many such actions have quite correctly turned entire
populations
against
the
U.S. government. This is not only my opinion, but also the
opinion
of
countless individuals who once served in the intelligence
community
and
have
since come to criticize it and even unveil many of its
secrets
in
an
effort
to alert the citizenry to what has been unleashed against
the
world
in
the
name of “security.”
Likewise, I will here provide as much information as I can
on
Romas/COIN
and its upcoming replacement.
***
Although the relatively well-known military contractor
Northrop
Grumman
had
long held the contract for Romas/COIN, such contracts are
subject
to
regular
recompetes by which other companies, or several working in
tandem,
can
apply
to take over. In early February, HBGary Federal CEO Aaron
Barr
wrote
the
following e-mail to Al Pisani, an executive at the much
larger
federal
contractor TASC, a company which until recently had been
owned
by
Northrop
and which was now looking to compete with it for lucrative
contracts:
"I met with [Mantech CEO] Bob Frisbie the other day to
catch
up.
He
is
looking to expand a capability in IO related to the COIN
re-compete
but
more
for DoD. He told me he has a few acquisitions in the works
that
will
increase his capability in this area. So just a thought
that
it
might
be
worth a phone call to see if there is any synergy and
strength
between
TASC
and ManTech in this area. I think forming a team and
response
to
compete
against SAIC will be tough but doable." IO in this context
stands
for
“information operations,” while COIN itself, as noted in an
NDA
attached
to
one of the e-mails, stands for “counter intelligence. SAIC
is
a
larger
intelligence contractor that was expected to pursue the
recompete
as
well.
Pisani agreed to the idea, and in conjunction with Barr
and
fellow
TASC
exec John Lovegrove, the growing party spent much of the
next
year
working
to create a partnership of firms capable of providing the
“client”
-
a
U.S.
agency that is never specified in the hundreds of e-mails
that
follow
–
with
capabilities that would outmatch those being provided by
Northrop,
SAIC,
or
other competitors.
Several e-mails in particular provide a great deal of
material
by
which
to
determine the scope and intent of Romas/COIN. One that Barr
wrote
to
his
own
e-mail account, likely for the purpose of adding to other
documents
later,
is entitled “Notes on COIN.” It begins with a list of
entries
for
various
facets of the program, all of which are blank and were
presumably
filled
out
later: “ISP, Operations, Language/Culture, Media
Development,
Marketing
and
Advertising, Security, MOE.” Afterwards, another list
consists
of
the
following: “Capabilities, Mobile Development, Challenges,
MOE,
Infrastructure, Security.” Finally, a list of the following
websites
is
composed, many of which represent various small companies
that
provide
niche
marketing services pursuant to mobile phones.
More helpful is a later e-mail from Lovegrove to Barr and
some
of
his
colleagues at TASC in which he announces the following:
*Our team consists of:*
*- TASC (PMO, creative services)*
*- HB Gary (Strategy, planning, PMO)*
*- Akamai (infrastructure)*
*- Archimedes Global (Specialized linguistics, strategy,
planning)*
*- Acclaim Technical Services (specialized linguistics)*
*- Mission Essential Personnel (linguistic services)*
*- Cipher (strategy, planning operations)*
*- PointAbout (rapid mobile application development, list
of
strategic*
*partners)*
*- Google (strategy, mobile application and platform
development -
long*
*list of strategic partners)*
*- Apple (mobile and desktop platform, application
assistance
-long
list*
*of strategic partners)*
*We are trying to schedule an interview with ATT plus some
other
small
app
developers.*
From these and dozens of other clues and references, the
following
may
be
determined about the nature of Romas/COIN:
1.
Mobile phone software and applications constitute a major
component
of
the program.
2.
There's discussion of bringing in a “gaming developer,”
apparently
at
the
behest of Barr, who mentions that the team could make
good
use of
“a
social
gaming company maybe like zynga, gameloft, etc.”
Lovegrove
elsewhere
notes:
“I know a couple of small gaming companies at MIT that
might
fit
the
bill.”
3.
Apple and Google were active team partners, and AT&T may
have
been
as
well. The latter is known to have provided the NSA free
reign
over
customer
communications (and was in turn protected by a bill
granting
them
retroactive immunity from lawsuits). Google itself is the
only
company
to
have received a “Hostile to Privacy” rating from Privacy
International.
Apple is currently being investigated by Congress after
the
iPhone
was
revealed to compile user location data in a way that
differs
from
other
mobile phones; the company has claimed this to have been
a
“bug.”
4.
The program makes use of several providers of “linguistic
services.”
At
one point, the team discusses hiring a military-trained
Arabic
linguist.
Elsewhere, Barr writes: “I feel confident I can get you a
ringer
for
Farsi
if they are still interested in Farsi (we need to find
that
out).
These
linguists are not only going to be developing new content
but
also
meeting
with folks, so they have to have native or near native
proficiency
and
have
to have the cultural relevance as well.”
5.
Alterion and SocialEyez are listed as “businesses to
contact.”
The
former
specializes in “social media monitoring tools.” The
latter
uses
“sophisticated natural language processing methodology”
in
order
to
“process
tens of millions of multi-lingual conversations daily”
while
also
employing
“researchers and media analysts on the ground;” its
website
also
notes
that
“Millions of people around the globe are now networked as
never
before
-
exchanging information and ideas, forming opinions, and
speaking
their
minds
about everything from politics to products.”
6.
At one point, TASC exec Chris Clair asks Aaron and
others,
“Can
we
name
COIN Saif? Saif is the sword an Arab executioner uses
when
they
decapitate
criminals. I can think of a few cool brands for this.”
7.
A diagram attached to one of Barr's e-mails to the group
(
http://imageshack.us/photo/my-images/7/pmo.png/) depicts
Magpii
as
interacting in some unspecified manner with “Foreign
Mobile”
and
“Foreign
Web.” Magpii is a project of Barr's own creation which
stands
for
“Magnify
Personal Identifying Information,” involves social
networking,
and
is
designed for the purpose of storing personal information
on
users.
Although
details are difficult to determine from references in
Barr's
e-mails,
he
discusses the project almost exclusively with members of
military
intelligence to which he was pitching the idea.
8.
There are sporadic references such things as “semantic
analysis,”
“Latent
Semantic Indexing,” “specialized linguistics,” and OPS, a
programming
language designed for solving problems using expert
systems.
9.
Barr asks the team's partner at Apple, Andy Kemp (whose
signature
lists
him as being from the company's Homeland Defense/National
Programs
division), to provide him “a contact at Pixar/Disney.”
Altogether, then, a successful bid for the relevant
contract
was
seen
to
require the combined capabilities of perhaps a dozen firms
–
capabilities
whereby millions of conversations can be monitored and
automatically
analyzed, whereby a wide range of personal data can be
obtained
and
stored
in secret, and whereby some unknown degree of information
can
be
released
to
a given population through a variety of means and without
any
hint
that
the
actual source is U.S. military intelligence. All this is
merely
in
addition
to whichever additional capabilities are not evident from
the
limited
description available, with the program as a whole
presumably
being
operated
in conjunction with other surveillance and propaganda
assets
controlled
by
the U.S. and its partners.
Whatever the exact nature and scope of COIN, the firms
that
had
been
assembled for the purpose by Barr and TASC never got a
chance
to
bid
on
the
program's recompete. In late September, Lovegrove noted to
Barr
and
others
that he'd spoken to the “CO [contracting officer] for
COIN.”
“The
current
procurement approach is cancelled [sic], she cited changed
requirements,”
he
reported. “They will be coming out with some documents in a
month
or
two,
most likely an updated RFI [request for information]. There
will be
a
procurement following soon after. We are on the list to
receive
all
information." On January 18th of next year, Lovegrove
provided
an
update:
“I
just spoke to the group chief on the contracts side (Doug
K).
COIN
has
been
replaced by a procurement called Odyssey. He says that it
is
in
the
formative stages and that something should be released this
year.
The
contracting officer is Kim R. He believes that Jason is the
COTR
[contracting officer's technical representative].” Another
clue
is
provided
in the ensuing discussion when a TASC executive asks, “Does
Odyssey
combine
the Technology and Content pieces of the work?”
The unexpected change-up didn't seem to phase the
corporate
partnership,
which was still a top contender to compete for the upcoming
Odyssey
procurement. Later e-mails indicate a meeting between key
members
of
the
group and the contracting officer for Odyssey at a location
noted
as
“HQ,”
apparently for a briefing on requirements for the new
program,
on
February
3
rd of 2011. But two days after that meeting, the servers of
HBGary
and
HBGary Federal were hacked by a small team of Anonymous
operatives
in
retaliation for Barr's boasts to Financial Times that he
had
identified
the
movement's “leadership;” 70,000 e-mails were thereafter
released
onto
the
internet. Barr resigned a few weeks later.
Along with clues as to the nature of COIN and its
scheduled
replacement, a
close study of the HBGary e-mails also provide reasons to
be
concerned
with
the fact that such things are being developed and deployed
in
the
way
that
they are. In addition to being the driving force behind the
COIN
recompete,
Barr was also at the center of a series of conspiracies by
which
his
own
company and two others hired out their collective
capabilities
for
use
by
corporations that sought to destroy their political enemies
by
clandestine
and dishonest means, some of which appear to be illegal.
None
of
the
companies involved have been investigated; a proposed
Congressional
inquiry
was denied by the committee chair, noting that it was the
Justice
Department's decision as to whether to investigate, even
though
it
was
the
Justice Department itself that made the initial
introductions.
Those
in
the
intelligence contracting industry who believe themselves
above
the
law
are
entirely correct.
That such firms will continue to target the public with
advanced
information warfare capabilities on behalf of major
corporations is
by
itself an extraordinary danger to mankind as a whole,
particularly
insomuch
as that such capabilities are becoming more effective while
remaining
largely unknown outside of the intelligence industry. But a
far
greater
danger is posed by the practice of arming small and
unaccountable
groups
of
state and military personnel with a set of tools by which
to
achieve
better
and better “situational awareness” on entire populations
while
also
being
able to manipulate the information flow in such a way as to
deceive
those
same populations. The idea that such power can be wielded
without
being
misused is contradicted by even a brief review of history.
History also demonstrates that the state will claim such
powers as
a
necessity in fighting some considerable threat; the U.S.
has
defended
its
recent expansion of powers by claiming they will only be
deployed
to
fight
terrorism and will never be used against Ameerican
civilians.
This
is
cold
comfort for those in the Arab world who are aware of the
long
history
of
U.S. material support for regimes they find convenient,
including
those
of
Saddam Hussein, Hosni Mubarak, and the House of Saud. Nor
should
Americans
be comforted by such promises from a government that has no
way
of
ensuring
that they will be kept; it was just a few months ago that a
U.S.
general
in
Afghanistan ordered a military intelligence unit to use
pysops
on
visiting
senators in an effort to secure increased funding for the
war,
an
illegal
act; only a few days prior, CENTCOM spokesmen were
confidently
telling
the
public that such other psychological capabilities as
persona
management
would never be used on Americans as that would be illegal.
The
fact
is
that
such laws have been routinely broken by the military and
intelligence
community, who are now been joined in this practice by
segments
of
the
federal contracting industry.
It is inevitable, then, that such capabilities as form the
backbone
of
Romas/COIN and its replacement Odyssey will be deployed
against
a
growing
segment of the world's population. The powerful
institutions
that
wield
them
will grow all the more powerful as they are provided better
and
better
methods by which to monitor, deceive, and manipulate. The
informed
electorate upon which liberty depends will be increasingly
misinformed.
No
tactical advantage conferred by the use of these programs
can
outweigh
the
damage that will be done to mankind in the process of
creating
them.
*Barrett Brown*
*Project PM*
On Tue, Jun 21, 2011 at 3:04 PM, ADRIENNE TOSCANO,
BLOOMBERG/
NEWSROOM:
<
atoscano2@bloomberg.net> wrote:
Barrit, Per our conversation would you please send me
details
about
your
announcement tomorrow. Thanks, Adrienne
------------------------------------------------------------
Adrienne Toscano
Segment Producer - Bloomberg TV
212-617-2366
atoscano2@bloomberg.net
--
Regards,
Barrett Brown
512-560-2302
--
Regards,
Barrett Brown
512-560-2302
--
Regards,
Barrett Brown
512-560-2302
--
Regards,
Barrett Brown
512-560-2302
--
Regards,
Barrett Brown
512-560-2302
--
Regards,
Barrett Brown
512-560-2302
--
Regards,
Barrett Brown
512-560-2302
--
Regards,
Barrett Brown
512-560-2302
--
Regards,
Barrett Brown
512-560-2302
--
Regards,
Barrett Brown
512-560-2302
--
Regards,
Barrett Brown
512-560-2302
--
Regards,
Barrett Brown
512-560-2302
