ok. whatever you can do...

------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Riley
Washington bureau/Bloomberg News
(202) 624 1982
(720) 635 8553 (cell)

----- Original Message -----
From: Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com>
To: MICHAEL RILEY (BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM:)
At:  7/21 14:42:38

I'll try, I don't have any direct means of getting in touch with them right
now.

On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 8:35 AM, MICHAEL RILEY, BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM: <
michaelriley@bloomberg.net> wrote:

Hey, man. Here's the endgame thing. Cover of Businessweek this week.


http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/cyber-weapons-the-new-arms-race-07212011.html

So, lulzsec supposedly is working with some media on news of the world
emails they have.

Is it possible for you to approach topiary or one of the others and find
out if they'd be willing to include us?



------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Riley
Washington bureau/Bloomberg News
(202) 624 1982
(720) 635 8553 (cell)

----- Original Message -----
From: Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com>
To: MICHAEL RILEY (BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM:)
At:  7/19 22:44:54

Also, a California attorney who's provided pro bono assistance to other
internet activists got in touch with me today offering to arrange some
colleagues to represent any of the 12 people who will likely be tried in
California's Northern District; I've also put him in touch with the
National
Lawyer's Guild so that they can begin coordinating.

On Tue, Jul 19, 2011 at 6:24 PM, Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com>
wrote:

One more thing - National Lawyer's Guild will be providing assistance to
those who need it. I've just put out this statement:
http://pastebin.com/ddPgpyCP


On Tue, Jul 19, 2011 at 5:27 PM, Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com
wrote:

It's telling me that number doesn't work; you can call me now though.


On Tue, Jul 19, 2011 at 5:19 PM, MICHAEL RILEY, BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM: <
michaelriley@bloomberg.net> wrote:

Hey, give a call when you get off the phone: 202 954 1982

------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Riley
Washington bureau/Bloomberg News
(202) 624 1982
(720) 635 8553 (cell)

----- Original Message -----
From: Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com>
To: MICHAEL RILEY (BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM:)
At:  7/19 17:38:00

Cool, thanks.

On Tue, Jul 19, 2011 at 6:46 AM, MICHAEL RILEY, BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM: <
michaelriley@bloomberg.net> wrote:

Or the week after. You never know w these guys. But yep.




---
Sent From Bloomberg Mobile MSG

---- Original Message ----
From: Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com>
At: 7/18/2011 23:56

Are you guys still bringing out a piece on Endgame?

On Thu, Jun 30, 2011 at 4:32 PM, Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com

wrote:

The e-mails that Lulzsec took from CEO of Unveillance are located

in

a

Gmail account set up by my main technical guy for easy searching.

Go

to

gmail and use this to login:

Login: karimhijazi.unveillance

Password: hbgemail

Just search Endgame and you'll find a number of discussions about

them as

well as a bit of communication between the CEO and John Farrell.


On Thu, Jun 30, 2011 at 1:31 PM, MICHAEL RILEY, BLOOMBERG/

NEWSROOM:

<

michaelriley@bloomberg.net> wrote:

202 624 1982...or after 5 pm eastern on my cell: 720 635 8553

------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Riley
Washington bureau/Bloomberg News
(202) 624 1982
(720) 635 8553 (cell)

----- Original Message -----
From: Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com>
To: MICHAEL RILEY (BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM:)
At:  6/22 22:12:38

Oh, and here's another little tidbit:
http://hbgary.anonleaks.ch/greg_hbgary_com/26795.html

On Wed, Jun 22, 2011 at 9:11 PM, Barrett Brown <

barriticus@gmail.com>

wrote:

Romas/COIN, the one I announced today. And this is the former

NSA

fellow

who went over to Pixar:
http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/press_room/2002/new_adr.shtml


On Wed, Jun 22, 2011 at 9:10 PM, MICHAEL RILEY, BLOOMBERG/

NEWSROOM: <

michaelriley@bloomberg.net> wrote:

Say it ain't so. Even Disney and Pixar?

Seriously, though. What's the connection? What project is he

talking

about

that links to pixar?

------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Riley
Washington bureau/Bloomberg News
(202) 624 1982
(720) 635 8553 (cell)

----- Original Message -----
From: Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com>
To: MICHAEL RILEY (BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM:)
At:  6/22 21:56:32

http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/jun/22/hacking-anonymous

Also, you might take a look at this:
http://hbgary.anonleaks.ch/aaron_hbgary_com/8403.html

On Wed, Jun 22, 2011 at 8:55 PM, MICHAEL RILEY, BLOOMBERG/

NEWSROOM:

<

michaelriley@bloomberg.net> wrote:

thx for the heads up, Barrett.

------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Riley
Washington bureau/Bloomberg News
(202) 624 1982
(720) 635 8553 (cell)

----- Original Message -----
From: Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com>
To: ADRIENNE TOSCANO (BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM:), MICHAEL RILEY

(BLOOMBERG/

NEWSROOM:)
At:  6/21 16:08:31

Adrienne-

As I noted on the phone, an accompanying explanatory piece

will

run

in

The

Guardian tomorrow, while the document itself, which I've

pasted

below,

will

run on the wiki maintained by my group Project PM. The NYT

has

a

copy

and

is
vetting it now; the e-mails may be verified and other details

obtained

by

way of this search engine maintained by Anonymous, which

acquired

the

71,000
e-mails in question in early February:

http://hbgary.anonleaks.ch/

Michael, I'm cc'ing you on this to give you a heads up; let

me

know

if

you

have any questions.

***

For at least two years, the U.S. has been conducting a

secretive

and

immensely sophisticated campaign of mass surveillance and

data

mining

against the Arab world, allowing the intelligence community

to

monitor

the

habits, conversations, and activity of millions of

individuals

at

once.

And

with an upgrade scheduled for later this year, the top

contender to

win

the

federal contract and thus take over the program is a team of

about

a

dozen

companies which were brought together in large part by Aaron

Barr -

the

same
disgraced CEO who resigned from his own firm earlier this

year

after

he

was

discovered to have planned a full-scale information war

against

political

activists at the behest of corporate clients. The new

revelation

provides

for a disturbing picture, particularly when viewed in a wider

context.

Unprecedented surveillance capabilities are being produced by

an

industry

that works in secret on applications that are nonetheless

funded by

the

American public – and which in some cases are used against

that

very

same

public. Their products are developed on demand for an

intelligence

community
that is not subject to Congressional oversight and which has

been

repeatedly
shown to have misused its existing powers in ways that

violate

U.S.

law

as

well as American ideals. And with expanded intelligence

capabilities

by

which to monitor Arab populations in ways that would have

previously

been

impossible, those same intelligence agencies now have

improved

means

by

which to provide information on dissidents to those regional

dictators

viewed by the U.S. as strategic allies.


 The nature and extent of the operation, which was known as

Romas/COIN

and

which is scheduled for replacement sometime this year by a

similar

program

known as Odyssey, may be determined in part by a close

reading

of

hundreds

of e-mails among the 70,000 that were stolen in February from

the

contracting firm HBGary Federal and its parent company

HBGary.

Other

details
may be gleaned by an examination of the various other firms

and

individuals

that are discussed as being potential partners.


 Of course, there are many in the U.S. that would prefer that

such

details

not be revealed at all; such people tend to cite the

amorphous

and

much-abused concept of “national security” as sufficient

reason

for

the

citizenry to stand idly by as an ever-expanding coalition of

government

agencies and semi-private corporations gain greater influence

over

U.S.

foreign policy. That the last decade of foreign policy as

practiced

by

such

individuals has been an absolute disaster even by the

admission

of

many

of

those who put it into place will not phase those who

nonetheless

believe

that the citizenry should be prevented from knowing what is

being

done

in

its name and with its tax dollars.


 To the extent that the actions of a government are divorced

from

the

informed consent of those who pay for such actions, such a

government

is

illegitimate. To the extent that power is concentrated in the

hands

of

small
groups of men who wield such power behind the scenes, there

is

no

assurance

that such power will be used in a manner that is compatible

with

the

actual

interests of that citizenry, or populations elsewhere. The

known

history

of

the U.S. intelligence community is comprised in large part of

murder,

assassinations, disinformation, the topping of democratic

governments,

the

abuse of the rights of U.S. citizens, and a great number of

other

things

that cannot even be defended on “national security” grounds

insomuch

as

that
many such actions have quite correctly turned entire

populations

against

the
U.S. government. This is not only my opinion, but also the

opinion

of

countless individuals who once served in the intelligence

community

and

have
since come to criticize it and even unveil many of its

secrets

in

an

effort

to alert the citizenry to what has been unleashed against the

world

in

the

name of “security.”


 Likewise, I will here provide as much information as I can

on

Romas/COIN

and its upcoming replacement.


 ***


 Although the relatively well-known military contractor

Northrop

Grumman

had
long held the contract for Romas/COIN, such contracts are

subject

to

regular
recompetes by which other companies, or several working in

tandem,

can

apply
to take over. In early February, HBGary Federal CEO Aaron

Barr

wrote

the

following e-mail to Al Pisani, an executive at the much

larger

federal

contractor TASC, a company which until recently had been

owned

by

Northrop

and which was now looking to compete with it for lucrative

contracts:

 "I met with [Mantech CEO] Bob Frisbie the other day to catch

up.

He

is

looking to expand a capability in IO related to the COIN

re-compete

but

more
for DoD. He told me he has a few acquisitions in the works

that

will

increase his capability in this area. So just a thought that

it

might

be

worth a phone call to see if there is any synergy and

strength

between

TASC

and ManTech in this area. I think forming a team and response

to

compete

against SAIC will be tough but doable." IO in this context

stands

for

“information operations,” while COIN itself, as noted in an

NDA

attached

to

one of the e-mails, stands for “counter intelligence. SAIC is

a

larger

intelligence contractor that was expected to pursue the

recompete

as

well.

 Pisani agreed to the idea, and in conjunction with Barr and

fellow

TASC

exec John Lovegrove, the growing party spent much of the next

year

working

to create a partnership of firms capable of providing the

“client”

-

a

U.S.

agency that is never specified in the hundreds of e-mails

that

follow

–

with
capabilities that would outmatch those being provided by

Northrop,

SAIC,

or

other competitors.


 Several e-mails in particular provide a great deal of

material

by

which

to

determine the scope and intent of Romas/COIN. One that Barr

wrote

to

his

own
e-mail account, likely for the purpose of adding to other

documents

later,

is entitled “Notes on COIN.” It begins with a list of entries

for

various

facets of the program, all of which are blank and were

presumably

filled

out
later: “ISP, Operations, Language/Culture, Media Development,

Marketing

and

Advertising, Security, MOE.” Afterwards, another list

consists

of

the

following: “Capabilities, Mobile Development, Challenges,

MOE,

Infrastructure, Security.” Finally, a list of the following

websites

is

composed, many of which represent various small companies

that

provide

niche
marketing services pursuant to mobile phones.


 More helpful is a later e-mail from Lovegrove to Barr and

some

of

his

colleagues at TASC in which he announces the following:


 *Our team consists of:*


 *- TASC (PMO, creative services)*

*- HB Gary (Strategy, planning, PMO)*

*- Akamai (infrastructure)*

*- Archimedes Global (Specialized linguistics, strategy,

planning)*

*- Acclaim Technical Services (specialized linguistics)*

*- Mission Essential Personnel (linguistic services)*

*- Cipher (strategy, planning operations)*

*- PointAbout (rapid mobile application development, list of

strategic*

*partners)*

*- Google (strategy, mobile application and platform

development -

long*

*list of strategic partners)*

*- Apple (mobile and desktop platform, application assistance

-long

list*

*of strategic partners)*


 *We are trying to schedule an interview with ATT plus some

other

small

app

developers.*


 From these and dozens of other clues and references, the

following

may

be

determined about the nature of Romas/COIN:



   1.

  Mobile phone software and applications constitute a major

component

of

  the program.
  2.

  There's discussion of bringing in a “gaming developer,”

apparently

at

the

  behest of Barr, who mentions that the team could make good

use of

“a

social
  gaming company maybe like zynga, gameloft, etc.” Lovegrove

elsewhere

notes:
  “I know a couple of small gaming companies at MIT that

might

fit

the

  bill.”
   3.

  Apple and Google were active team partners, and AT&T may

have

been

as

  well. The latter is known to have provided the NSA free

reign

over

customer
  communications (and was in turn protected by a bill

granting

them

  retroactive immunity from lawsuits). Google itself is the

only

company

to

  have received a “Hostile to Privacy” rating from Privacy

International.

  Apple is currently being investigated by Congress after the

iPhone

was

  revealed to compile user location data in a way that

differs

from

other

  mobile phones; the company has claimed this to have been a

“bug.”

   4.

  The program makes use of several providers of “linguistic

services.”

At

  one point, the team discusses hiring a military-trained

Arabic

linguist.

  Elsewhere, Barr writes: “I feel confident I can get you a

ringer

for

Farsi
  if they are still interested in Farsi (we need to find that

out).

These

  linguists are not only going to be developing new content

but

also

meeting
  with folks, so they have to have native or near native

proficiency

and

have
  to have the cultural relevance as well.”
   5.

  Alterion and SocialEyez are listed as “businesses to

contact.”

The

former

  specializes in “social media monitoring tools.” The latter

uses

  “sophisticated natural language processing methodology” in

order

to

“process
  tens of millions of multi-lingual conversations daily”

while

also

employing
  “researchers and media analysts on the ground;” its website

also

notes

that
  “Millions of people around the globe are now networked as

never

before

-

  exchanging information and ideas, forming opinions, and

speaking

their

minds
  about everything from politics to products.”
   6.

  At one point, TASC exec Chris Clair asks Aaron and others,

“Can

we

name

  COIN Saif? Saif is the sword an Arab executioner uses when

they

decapitate
  criminals. I can think of a few cool brands for this.”
   7.

  A diagram attached to one of Barr's e-mails to the group (
  http://imageshack.us/photo/my-images/7/pmo.png/) depicts

Magpii

as

  interacting in some unspecified manner with “Foreign

Mobile”

and

“Foreign

  Web.” Magpii is a project of Barr's own creation which

stands

for

“Magnify
  Personal Identifying Information,” involves social

networking,

and

is

  designed for the purpose of storing personal information on

users.

Although
  details are difficult to determine from references in

Barr's

e-mails,

he

  discusses the project almost exclusively with members of

military

  intelligence to which he was pitching the idea.
  8.

  There are sporadic references such things as “semantic

analysis,”

“Latent

  Semantic Indexing,” “specialized linguistics,” and OPS, a

programming

  language designed for solving problems using expert

systems.

  9.

  Barr asks the team's partner at Apple, Andy Kemp (whose

signature

lists

  him as being from the company's Homeland Defense/National

Programs

  division), to provide him “a contact at Pixar/Disney.”


 Altogether, then, a successful bid for the relevant contract

was

seen

to

require the combined capabilities of perhaps a dozen firms –

capabilities

whereby millions of conversations can be monitored and

automatically

analyzed, whereby a wide range of personal data can be

obtained

and

stored

in secret, and whereby some unknown degree of information can

be

released

to
a given population through a variety of means and without any

hint

that

the

actual source is U.S. military intelligence. All this is

merely

in

addition

to whichever additional capabilities are not evident from the

limited

description available, with the program as a whole presumably

being

operated
in conjunction with other surveillance and propaganda assets

controlled

by

the U.S. and its partners.


 Whatever the exact nature and scope of COIN, the firms that

had

been

assembled for the purpose by Barr and TASC never got a chance

to

bid

on

the

program's recompete. In late September, Lovegrove noted to

Barr

and

others

that he'd spoken to the “CO [contracting officer] for COIN.”

“The

current

procurement approach is cancelled [sic], she cited changed

requirements,”

he
reported. “They will be coming out with some documents in a

month

or

two,

most likely an updated RFI [request for information]. There

will be

a

procurement following soon after. We are on the list to

receive

all

information." On January 18th of next year, Lovegrove

provided

an

update:

“I
just spoke to the group chief on the contracts side (Doug K).

COIN

has

been

replaced by a procurement called Odyssey. He says that it is

in

the

formative stages and that something should be released this

year.

The

contracting officer is Kim R. He believes that Jason is the

COTR

[contracting officer's technical representative].” Another

clue

is

provided

in the ensuing discussion when a TASC executive asks, “Does

Odyssey

combine

the Technology and Content pieces of the work?”


 The unexpected change-up didn't seem to phase the corporate

partnership,

which was still a top contender to compete for the upcoming

Odyssey

procurement. Later e-mails indicate a meeting between key

members

of

the

group and the contracting officer for Odyssey at a location

noted

as

“HQ,”

apparently for a briefing on requirements for the new

program,

on

February

3
rd of 2011. But two days after that meeting, the servers of

HBGary

and

HBGary Federal were hacked by a small team of Anonymous

operatives

in

retaliation for Barr's boasts to Financial Times that he had

identified

the

movement's “leadership;” 70,000 e-mails were thereafter

released

onto

the

internet. Barr resigned a few weeks later.


 Along with clues as to the nature of COIN and its scheduled

replacement, a

close study of the HBGary e-mails also provide reasons to be

concerned

with

the fact that such things are being developed and deployed in

the

way

that

they are. In addition to being the driving force behind the

COIN

recompete,

Barr was also at the center of a series of conspiracies by

which

his

own

company and two others hired out their collective

capabilities

for

use

by

corporations that sought to destroy their political enemies

by

clandestine

and dishonest means, some of which appear to be illegal. None

of

the

companies involved have been investigated; a proposed

Congressional

inquiry

was denied by the committee chair, noting that it was the

Justice

Department's decision as to whether to investigate, even

though

it

was

the

Justice Department itself that made the initial

introductions.

Those

in

the

intelligence contracting industry who believe themselves

above

the

law

are

entirely correct.


 That such firms will continue to target the public with

advanced

information warfare capabilities on behalf of major

corporations is

by

itself an extraordinary danger to mankind as a whole,

particularly

insomuch

as that such capabilities are becoming more effective while

remaining

largely unknown outside of the intelligence industry. But a

far

greater

danger is posed by the practice of arming small and

unaccountable

groups

of

state and military personnel with a set of tools by which to

achieve

better

and better “situational awareness” on entire populations

while

also

being

able to manipulate the information flow in such a way as to

deceive

those

same populations. The idea that such power can be wielded

without

being

misused is contradicted by even a brief review of history.


 History also demonstrates that the state will claim such

powers as

a

necessity in fighting some considerable threat; the U.S. has

defended

its

recent expansion of powers by claiming they will only be

deployed

to

fight

terrorism and will never be used against Ameerican civilians.

This

is

cold

comfort for those in the Arab world who are aware of the long

history

of

U.S. material support for regimes they find convenient,

including

those

of

Saddam Hussein, Hosni Mubarak, and the House of Saud. Nor

should

Americans

be comforted by such promises from a government that has no

way

of

ensuring

that they will be kept; it was just a few months ago that a

U.S.

general

in

Afghanistan ordered a military intelligence unit to use

pysops

on

visiting

senators in an effort to secure increased funding for the

war,

an

illegal

act; only a few days prior, CENTCOM spokesmen were

confidently

telling

the

public that such other psychological capabilities as persona

management

would never be used on Americans as that would be illegal.

The

fact

is

that

such laws have been routinely broken by the military and

intelligence

community, who are now been joined in this practice by

segments

of

the

federal contracting industry.


 It is inevitable, then, that such capabilities as form the

backbone

of

Romas/COIN and its replacement Odyssey will be deployed

against

a

growing

segment of the world's population. The powerful institutions

that

wield

them
will grow all the more powerful as they are provided better

and

better

methods by which to monitor, deceive, and manipulate. The

informed

electorate upon which liberty depends will be increasingly

misinformed.

No

tactical advantage conferred by the use of these programs can

outweigh

the

damage that will be done to mankind in the process of

creating

them.

 *Barrett Brown*

*Project PM*





On Tue, Jun 21, 2011 at 3:04 PM, ADRIENNE TOSCANO, BLOOMBERG/

NEWSROOM:

<

atoscano2@bloomberg.net> wrote:

Barrit, Per our conversation would you please send me

details

about

your

announcement tomorrow.  Thanks, Adrienne

------------------------------------------------------------

Adrienne Toscano
Segment Producer - Bloomberg TV
212-617-2366
atoscano2@bloomberg.net

--
Regards,

Barrett Brown
512-560-2302

--
Regards,

Barrett Brown
512-560-2302

--
Regards,

Barrett Brown
512-560-2302

--
Regards,

Barrett Brown
512-560-2302

--
Regards,

Barrett Brown
512-560-2302

--
Regards,

Barrett Brown
512-560-2302

--
Regards,

Barrett Brown
512-560-2302

--
Regards,

Barrett Brown
512-560-2302

--
Regards,

Barrett Brown
512-560-2302

--
Regards,

Barrett Brown
512-560-2302

-- 
Regards,

Barrett Brown
512-560-2302