Re: endgame
Subject: Re: endgame
From: Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com>
Date: 7/21/11, 14:42
To: "MICHAEL RILEY, BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM:" <michaelriley@bloomberg.net>

I'll try, I don't have any direct means of getting in touch with them right now.

On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 8:35 AM, MICHAEL RILEY, BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM: <michaelriley@bloomberg.net> wrote:
Hey, man. Here's the endgame thing. Cover of Businessweek this week.

http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/cyber-weapons-the-new-arms-race-07212011.html

So, lulzsec supposedly is working with some media on news of the world emails they have.

Is it possible for you to approach topiary or one of the others and find out if they'd be willing to include us?



------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Riley
Washington bureau/Bloomberg News
(202) 624 1982
(720) 635 8553 (cell)

----- Original Message -----
From: Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com>
To: MICHAEL RILEY (BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM:)
At:  7/19 22:44:54

Also, a California attorney who's provided pro bono assistance to other
internet activists got in touch with me today offering to arrange some
colleagues to represent any of the 12 people who will likely be tried in
California's Northern District; I've also put him in touch with the National
Lawyer's Guild so that they can begin coordinating.

On Tue, Jul 19, 2011 at 6:24 PM, Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com> wrote:

> One more thing - National Lawyer's Guild will be providing assistance to
> those who need it. I've just put out this statement:
> http://pastebin.com/ddPgpyCP
>
>
> On Tue, Jul 19, 2011 at 5:27 PM, Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com>wrote:
>
>> It's telling me that number doesn't work; you can call me now though.
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Jul 19, 2011 at 5:19 PM, MICHAEL RILEY, BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM: <
>> michaelriley@bloomberg.net> wrote:
>>
>>> Hey, give a call when you get off the phone: 202 954 1982
>>>
>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>>> Michael Riley
>>> Washington bureau/Bloomberg News
>>> (202) 624 1982
>>> (720) 635 8553 (cell)
>>>
>>> ----- Original Message -----
>>> From: Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com>
>>> To: MICHAEL RILEY (BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM:)
>>> At:  7/19 17:38:00
>>>
>>> Cool, thanks.
>>>
>>> On Tue, Jul 19, 2011 at 6:46 AM, MICHAEL RILEY, BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM: <
>>> michaelriley@bloomberg.net> wrote:
>>>
>>> > Or the week after. You never know w these guys. But yep.
>>> >
>>> >
>>> >
>>> >
>>> > ---
>>> > Sent From Bloomberg Mobile MSG
>>> >
>>> > ---- Original Message ----
>>> > From: Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com>
>>> > At: 7/18/2011 23:56
>>> >
>>> > Are you guys still bringing out a piece on Endgame?
>>> >
>>> > On Thu, Jun 30, 2011 at 4:32 PM, Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com>
>>> > wrote:
>>> >
>>> > > The e-mails that Lulzsec took from CEO of Unveillance are located in
>>> a
>>> > > Gmail account set up by my main technical guy for easy searching. Go
>>> to
>>> > > gmail and use this to login:
>>> > >
>>> > > Login: karimhijazi.unveillance
>>> > >
>>> > > Password: hbgemail
>>> > >
>>> > > Just search Endgame and you'll find a number of discussions about
>>> them as
>>> > > well as a bit of communication between the CEO and John Farrell.
>>> > >
>>> > >
>>> > > On Thu, Jun 30, 2011 at 1:31 PM, MICHAEL RILEY, BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM:
>>> <
>>> > > michaelriley@bloomberg.net> wrote:
>>> > >
>>> > >> 202 624 1982...or after 5 pm eastern on my cell: 720 635 8553
>>> > >>
>>> > >> ------------------------------------------------------------
>>> > >> Michael Riley
>>> > >> Washington bureau/Bloomberg News
>>> > >> (202) 624 1982
>>> > >> (720) 635 8553 (cell)
>>> > >>
>>> > >> ----- Original Message -----
>>> > >> From: Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com>
>>> > >> To: MICHAEL RILEY (BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM:)
>>> > >> At:  6/22 22:12:38
>>> > >>
>>> > >> Oh, and here's another little tidbit:
>>> > >> http://hbgary.anonleaks.ch/greg_hbgary_com/26795.html
>>> > >>
>>> > >> On Wed, Jun 22, 2011 at 9:11 PM, Barrett Brown <
>>> barriticus@gmail.com>
>>> > >> wrote:
>>> > >>
>>> > >> > Romas/COIN, the one I announced today. And this is the former NSA
>>> > fellow
>>> > >> > who went over to Pixar:
>>> > >> > http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/press_room/2002/new_adr.shtml
>>> > >> >
>>> > >> >
>>> > >> > On Wed, Jun 22, 2011 at 9:10 PM, MICHAEL RILEY, BLOOMBERG/
>>> NEWSROOM: <
>>> > >> > michaelriley@bloomberg.net> wrote:
>>> > >> >
>>> > >> >> Say it ain't so. Even Disney and Pixar?
>>> > >> >>
>>> > >> >> Seriously, though. What's the connection? What project is he
>>> talking
>>> > >> about
>>> > >> >> that links to pixar?
>>> > >> >>
>>> > >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------
>>> > >> >> Michael Riley
>>> > >> >> Washington bureau/Bloomberg News
>>> > >> >> (202) 624 1982
>>> > >> >> (720) 635 8553 (cell)
>>> > >> >>
>>> > >> >> ----- Original Message -----
>>> > >> >> From: Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com>
>>> > >> >> To: MICHAEL RILEY (BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM:)
>>> > >> >> At:  6/22 21:56:32
>>> > >> >>
>>> > >> >>
>>> > >> >>
>>> > >>
>>> >
>>> http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/jun/22/hacking-anonymous
>>> > >> >>
>>> > >> >> Also, you might take a look at this:
>>> > >> >> http://hbgary.anonleaks.ch/aaron_hbgary_com/8403.html
>>> > >> >>
>>> > >> >> On Wed, Jun 22, 2011 at 8:55 PM, MICHAEL RILEY, BLOOMBERG/
>>> NEWSROOM:
>>> > <
>>> > >> >> michaelriley@bloomberg.net> wrote:
>>> > >> >>
>>> > >> >> > thx for the heads up, Barrett.
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> > ------------------------------------------------------------
>>> > >> >> > Michael Riley
>>> > >> >> > Washington bureau/Bloomberg News
>>> > >> >> > (202) 624 1982
>>> > >> >> > (720) 635 8553 (cell)
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> > ----- Original Message -----
>>> > >> >> > From: Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com>
>>> > >> >> > To: ADRIENNE TOSCANO (BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM:), MICHAEL RILEY
>>> > >> (BLOOMBERG/
>>> > >> >> > NEWSROOM:)
>>> > >> >> > At:  6/21 16:08:31
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> > Adrienne-
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> > As I noted on the phone, an accompanying explanatory piece will
>>> run
>>> > >> in
>>> > >> >> The
>>> > >> >> > Guardian tomorrow, while the document itself, which I've pasted
>>> > >> below,
>>> > >> >> will
>>> > >> >> > run on the wiki maintained by my group Project PM. The NYT has
>>> a
>>> > copy
>>> > >> >> and
>>> > >> >> > is
>>> > >> >> > vetting it now; the e-mails may be verified and other details
>>> > >> obtained
>>> > >> >> by
>>> > >> >> > way of this search engine maintained by Anonymous, which
>>> acquired
>>> > the
>>> > >> >> > 71,000
>>> > >> >> > e-mails in question in early February:
>>> http://hbgary.anonleaks.ch/
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> > Michael, I'm cc'ing you on this to give you a heads up; let me
>>> know
>>> > >> if
>>> > >> >> you
>>> > >> >> > have any questions.
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> > ***
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> > For at least two years, the U.S. has been conducting a
>>> secretive
>>> > and
>>> > >> >> > immensely sophisticated campaign of mass surveillance and data
>>> > mining
>>> > >> >> > against the Arab world, allowing the intelligence community to
>>> > >> monitor
>>> > >> >> the
>>> > >> >> > habits, conversations, and activity of millions of individuals
>>> at
>>> > >> once.
>>> > >> >> And
>>> > >> >> > with an upgrade scheduled for later this year, the top
>>> contender to
>>> > >> win
>>> > >> >> the
>>> > >> >> > federal contract and thus take over the program is a team of
>>> about
>>> > a
>>> > >> >> dozen
>>> > >> >> > companies which were brought together in large part by Aaron
>>> Barr -
>>> > >> the
>>> > >> >> > same
>>> > >> >> > disgraced CEO who resigned from his own firm earlier this year
>>> > after
>>> > >> he
>>> > >> >> was
>>> > >> >> > discovered to have planned a full-scale information war against
>>> > >> >> political
>>> > >> >> > activists at the behest of corporate clients. The new
>>> revelation
>>> > >> >> provides
>>> > >> >> > for a disturbing picture, particularly when viewed in a wider
>>> > >> context.
>>> > >> >> > Unprecedented surveillance capabilities are being produced by
>>> an
>>> > >> >> industry
>>> > >> >> > that works in secret on applications that are nonetheless
>>> funded by
>>> > >> the
>>> > >> >> > American public – and which in some cases are used against that
>>> > very
>>> > >> >> same
>>> > >> >> > public. Their products are developed on demand for an
>>> intelligence
>>> > >> >> > community
>>> > >> >> > that is not subject to Congressional oversight and which has
>>> been
>>> > >> >> > repeatedly
>>> > >> >> > shown to have misused its existing powers in ways that violate
>>> U.S.
>>> > >> law
>>> > >> >> as
>>> > >> >> > well as American ideals. And with expanded intelligence
>>> > capabilities
>>> > >> by
>>> > >> >> > which to monitor Arab populations in ways that would have
>>> > previously
>>> > >> >> been
>>> > >> >> > impossible, those same intelligence agencies now have improved
>>> > means
>>> > >> by
>>> > >> >> > which to provide information on dissidents to those regional
>>> > >> dictators
>>> > >> >> > viewed by the U.S. as strategic allies.
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >  The nature and extent of the operation, which was known as
>>> > >> Romas/COIN
>>> > >> >> and
>>> > >> >> > which is scheduled for replacement sometime this year by a
>>> similar
>>> > >> >> program
>>> > >> >> > known as Odyssey, may be determined in part by a close reading
>>> of
>>> > >> >> hundreds
>>> > >> >> > of e-mails among the 70,000 that were stolen in February from
>>> the
>>> > >> >> > contracting firm HBGary Federal and its parent company HBGary.
>>> > Other
>>> > >> >> > details
>>> > >> >> > may be gleaned by an examination of the various other firms and
>>> > >> >> individuals
>>> > >> >> > that are discussed as being potential partners.
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >  Of course, there are many in the U.S. that would prefer that
>>> such
>>> > >> >> details
>>> > >> >> > not be revealed at all; such people tend to cite the amorphous
>>> and
>>> > >> >> > much-abused concept of “national security” as sufficient reason
>>> for
>>> > >> the
>>> > >> >> > citizenry to stand idly by as an ever-expanding coalition of
>>> > >> government
>>> > >> >> > agencies and semi-private corporations gain greater influence
>>> over
>>> > >> U.S.
>>> > >> >> > foreign policy. That the last decade of foreign policy as
>>> practiced
>>> > >> by
>>> > >> >> such
>>> > >> >> > individuals has been an absolute disaster even by the admission
>>> of
>>> > >> many
>>> > >> >> of
>>> > >> >> > those who put it into place will not phase those who
>>> nonetheless
>>> > >> believe
>>> > >> >> > that the citizenry should be prevented from knowing what is
>>> being
>>> > >> done
>>> > >> >> in
>>> > >> >> > its name and with its tax dollars.
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >  To the extent that the actions of a government are divorced
>>> from
>>> > the
>>> > >> >> > informed consent of those who pay for such actions, such a
>>> > government
>>> > >> is
>>> > >> >> > illegitimate. To the extent that power is concentrated in the
>>> hands
>>> > >> of
>>> > >> >> > small
>>> > >> >> > groups of men who wield such power behind the scenes, there is
>>> no
>>> > >> >> assurance
>>> > >> >> > that such power will be used in a manner that is compatible
>>> with
>>> > the
>>> > >> >> actual
>>> > >> >> > interests of that citizenry, or populations elsewhere. The
>>> known
>>> > >> history
>>> > >> >> of
>>> > >> >> > the U.S. intelligence community is comprised in large part of
>>> > murder,
>>> > >> >> > assassinations, disinformation, the topping of democratic
>>> > >> governments,
>>> > >> >> the
>>> > >> >> > abuse of the rights of U.S. citizens, and a great number of
>>> other
>>> > >> things
>>> > >> >> > that cannot even be defended on “national security” grounds
>>> > insomuch
>>> > >> as
>>> > >> >> > that
>>> > >> >> > many such actions have quite correctly turned entire
>>> populations
>>> > >> against
>>> > >> >> > the
>>> > >> >> > U.S. government. This is not only my opinion, but also the
>>> opinion
>>> > of
>>> > >> >> > countless individuals who once served in the intelligence
>>> community
>>> > >> and
>>> > >> >> > have
>>> > >> >> > since come to criticize it and even unveil many of its secrets
>>> in
>>> > an
>>> > >> >> effort
>>> > >> >> > to alert the citizenry to what has been unleashed against the
>>> world
>>> > >> in
>>> > >> >> the
>>> > >> >> > name of “security.”
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >  Likewise, I will here provide as much information as I can on
>>> > >> >> Romas/COIN
>>> > >> >> > and its upcoming replacement.
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >  ***
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >  Although the relatively well-known military contractor
>>> Northrop
>>> > >> Grumman
>>> > >> >> > had
>>> > >> >> > long held the contract for Romas/COIN, such contracts are
>>> subject
>>> > to
>>> > >> >> > regular
>>> > >> >> > recompetes by which other companies, or several working in
>>> tandem,
>>> > >> can
>>> > >> >> > apply
>>> > >> >> > to take over. In early February, HBGary Federal CEO Aaron Barr
>>> > wrote
>>> > >> the
>>> > >> >> > following e-mail to Al Pisani, an executive at the much larger
>>> > >> federal
>>> > >> >> > contractor TASC, a company which until recently had been owned
>>> by
>>> > >> >> Northrop
>>> > >> >> > and which was now looking to compete with it for lucrative
>>> > contracts:
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >  "I met with [Mantech CEO] Bob Frisbie the other day to catch
>>> up.
>>> > He
>>> > >> is
>>> > >> >> > looking to expand a capability in IO related to the COIN
>>> re-compete
>>> > >> but
>>> > >> >> > more
>>> > >> >> > for DoD. He told me he has a few acquisitions in the works that
>>> > will
>>> > >> >> > increase his capability in this area. So just a thought that it
>>> > might
>>> > >> be
>>> > >> >> > worth a phone call to see if there is any synergy and strength
>>> > >> between
>>> > >> >> TASC
>>> > >> >> > and ManTech in this area. I think forming a team and response
>>> to
>>> > >> compete
>>> > >> >> > against SAIC will be tough but doable." IO in this context
>>> stands
>>> > for
>>> > >> >> > “information operations,” while COIN itself, as noted in an NDA
>>> > >> attached
>>> > >> >> to
>>> > >> >> > one of the e-mails, stands for “counter intelligence. SAIC is a
>>> > >> larger
>>> > >> >> > intelligence contractor that was expected to pursue the
>>> recompete
>>> > as
>>> > >> >> well.
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >  Pisani agreed to the idea, and in conjunction with Barr and
>>> fellow
>>> > >> TASC
>>> > >> >> > exec John Lovegrove, the growing party spent much of the next
>>> year
>>> > >> >> working
>>> > >> >> > to create a partnership of firms capable of providing the
>>> “client”
>>> > -
>>> > >> a
>>> > >> >> U.S.
>>> > >> >> > agency that is never specified in the hundreds of e-mails that
>>> > follow
>>> > >> –
>>> > >> >> > with
>>> > >> >> > capabilities that would outmatch those being provided by
>>> Northrop,
>>> > >> SAIC,
>>> > >> >> or
>>> > >> >> > other competitors.
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >  Several e-mails in particular provide a great deal of material
>>> by
>>> > >> which
>>> > >> >> to
>>> > >> >> > determine the scope and intent of Romas/COIN. One that Barr
>>> wrote
>>> > to
>>> > >> his
>>> > >> >> > own
>>> > >> >> > e-mail account, likely for the purpose of adding to other
>>> documents
>>> > >> >> later,
>>> > >> >> > is entitled “Notes on COIN.” It begins with a list of entries
>>> for
>>> > >> >> various
>>> > >> >> > facets of the program, all of which are blank and were
>>> presumably
>>> > >> filled
>>> > >> >> > out
>>> > >> >> > later: “ISP, Operations, Language/Culture, Media Development,
>>> > >> Marketing
>>> > >> >> and
>>> > >> >> > Advertising, Security, MOE.” Afterwards, another list consists
>>> of
>>> > the
>>> > >> >> > following: “Capabilities, Mobile Development, Challenges, MOE,
>>> > >> >> > Infrastructure, Security.” Finally, a list of the following
>>> > websites
>>> > >> is
>>> > >> >> > composed, many of which represent various small companies that
>>> > >> provide
>>> > >> >> > niche
>>> > >> >> > marketing services pursuant to mobile phones.
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >  More helpful is a later e-mail from Lovegrove to Barr and some
>>> of
>>> > >> his
>>> > >> >> > colleagues at TASC in which he announces the following:
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >  *Our team consists of:*
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >  *- TASC (PMO, creative services)*
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> > *- HB Gary (Strategy, planning, PMO)*
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> > *- Akamai (infrastructure)*
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> > *- Archimedes Global (Specialized linguistics, strategy,
>>> planning)*
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> > *- Acclaim Technical Services (specialized linguistics)*
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> > *- Mission Essential Personnel (linguistic services)*
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> > *- Cipher (strategy, planning operations)*
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> > *- PointAbout (rapid mobile application development, list of
>>> > >> strategic*
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> > *partners)*
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> > *- Google (strategy, mobile application and platform
>>> development -
>>> > >> long*
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> > *list of strategic partners)*
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> > *- Apple (mobile and desktop platform, application assistance
>>> -long
>>> > >> >> list*
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> > *of strategic partners)*
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >  *We are trying to schedule an interview with ATT plus some
>>> other
>>> > >> small
>>> > >> >> app
>>> > >> >> > developers.*
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >  From these and dozens of other clues and references, the
>>> following
>>> > >> may
>>> > >> >> be
>>> > >> >> > determined about the nature of Romas/COIN:
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >    1.
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >   Mobile phone software and applications constitute a major
>>> > component
>>> > >> of
>>> > >> >> >   the program.
>>> > >> >> >   2.
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >   There's discussion of bringing in a “gaming developer,”
>>> > apparently
>>> > >> at
>>> > >> >> the
>>> > >> >> >   behest of Barr, who mentions that the team could make good
>>> use of
>>> > >> “a
>>> > >> >> > social
>>> > >> >> >   gaming company maybe like zynga, gameloft, etc.” Lovegrove
>>> > >> elsewhere
>>> > >> >> > notes:
>>> > >> >> >   “I know a couple of small gaming companies at MIT that might
>>> fit
>>> > >> the
>>> > >> >> >   bill.”
>>> > >> >> >    3.
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >   Apple and Google were active team partners, and AT&T may have
>>> > been
>>> > >> as
>>> > >> >> >   well. The latter is known to have provided the NSA free reign
>>> > over
>>> > >> >> > customer
>>> > >> >> >   communications (and was in turn protected by a bill granting
>>> them
>>> > >> >> >   retroactive immunity from lawsuits). Google itself is the
>>> only
>>> > >> company
>>> > >> >> to
>>> > >> >> >   have received a “Hostile to Privacy” rating from Privacy
>>> > >> >> International.
>>> > >> >> >   Apple is currently being investigated by Congress after the
>>> > iPhone
>>> > >> was
>>> > >> >> >   revealed to compile user location data in a way that differs
>>> from
>>> > >> >> other
>>> > >> >> >   mobile phones; the company has claimed this to have been a
>>> “bug.”
>>> > >> >> >    4.
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >   The program makes use of several providers of “linguistic
>>> > >> services.”
>>> > >> >> At
>>> > >> >> >   one point, the team discusses hiring a military-trained
>>> Arabic
>>> > >> >> linguist.
>>> > >> >> >   Elsewhere, Barr writes: “I feel confident I can get you a
>>> ringer
>>> > >> for
>>> > >> >> > Farsi
>>> > >> >> >   if they are still interested in Farsi (we need to find that
>>> out).
>>> > >> >> These
>>> > >> >> >   linguists are not only going to be developing new content but
>>> > also
>>> > >> >> > meeting
>>> > >> >> >   with folks, so they have to have native or near native
>>> > proficiency
>>> > >> and
>>> > >> >> > have
>>> > >> >> >   to have the cultural relevance as well.”
>>> > >> >> >    5.
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >   Alterion and SocialEyez are listed as “businesses to
>>> contact.”
>>> > The
>>> > >> >> former
>>> > >> >> >   specializes in “social media monitoring tools.” The latter
>>> uses
>>> > >> >> >   “sophisticated natural language processing methodology” in
>>> order
>>> > to
>>> > >> >> > “process
>>> > >> >> >   tens of millions of multi-lingual conversations daily” while
>>> also
>>> > >> >> > employing
>>> > >> >> >   “researchers and media analysts on the ground;” its website
>>> also
>>> > >> notes
>>> > >> >> > that
>>> > >> >> >   “Millions of people around the globe are now networked as
>>> never
>>> > >> before
>>> > >> >> -
>>> > >> >> >   exchanging information and ideas, forming opinions, and
>>> speaking
>>> > >> their
>>> > >> >> > minds
>>> > >> >> >   about everything from politics to products.”
>>> > >> >> >    6.
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >   At one point, TASC exec Chris Clair asks Aaron and others,
>>> “Can
>>> > we
>>> > >> >> name
>>> > >> >> >   COIN Saif? Saif is the sword an Arab executioner uses when
>>> they
>>> > >> >> > decapitate
>>> > >> >> >   criminals. I can think of a few cool brands for this.”
>>> > >> >> >    7.
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >   A diagram attached to one of Barr's e-mails to the group (
>>> > >> >> >   http://imageshack.us/photo/my-images/7/pmo.png/) depicts
>>> Magpii
>>> > as
>>> > >> >> >   interacting in some unspecified manner with “Foreign Mobile”
>>> and
>>> > >> >> “Foreign
>>> > >> >> >   Web.” Magpii is a project of Barr's own creation which stands
>>> for
>>> > >> >> > “Magnify
>>> > >> >> >   Personal Identifying Information,” involves social
>>> networking,
>>> > and
>>> > >> is
>>> > >> >> >   designed for the purpose of storing personal information on
>>> > users.
>>> > >> >> > Although
>>> > >> >> >   details are difficult to determine from references in Barr's
>>> > >> e-mails,
>>> > >> >> he
>>> > >> >> >   discusses the project almost exclusively with members of
>>> military
>>> > >> >> >   intelligence to which he was pitching the idea.
>>> > >> >> >   8.
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >   There are sporadic references such things as “semantic
>>> analysis,”
>>> > >> >> “Latent
>>> > >> >> >   Semantic Indexing,” “specialized linguistics,” and OPS, a
>>> > >> programming
>>> > >> >> >   language designed for solving problems using expert systems.
>>> > >> >> >   9.
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >   Barr asks the team's partner at Apple, Andy Kemp (whose
>>> signature
>>> > >> >> lists
>>> > >> >> >   him as being from the company's Homeland Defense/National
>>> > Programs
>>> > >> >> >   division), to provide him “a contact at Pixar/Disney.”
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >  Altogether, then, a successful bid for the relevant contract
>>> was
>>> > >> seen
>>> > >> >> to
>>> > >> >> > require the combined capabilities of perhaps a dozen firms –
>>> > >> >> capabilities
>>> > >> >> > whereby millions of conversations can be monitored and
>>> > automatically
>>> > >> >> > analyzed, whereby a wide range of personal data can be obtained
>>> and
>>> > >> >> stored
>>> > >> >> > in secret, and whereby some unknown degree of information can
>>> be
>>> > >> >> released
>>> > >> >> > to
>>> > >> >> > a given population through a variety of means and without any
>>> hint
>>> > >> that
>>> > >> >> the
>>> > >> >> > actual source is U.S. military intelligence. All this is merely
>>> in
>>> > >> >> addition
>>> > >> >> > to whichever additional capabilities are not evident from the
>>> > limited
>>> > >> >> > description available, with the program as a whole presumably
>>> being
>>> > >> >> > operated
>>> > >> >> > in conjunction with other surveillance and propaganda assets
>>> > >> controlled
>>> > >> >> by
>>> > >> >> > the U.S. and its partners.
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >  Whatever the exact nature and scope of COIN, the firms that
>>> had
>>> > been
>>> > >> >> > assembled for the purpose by Barr and TASC never got a chance
>>> to
>>> > bid
>>> > >> on
>>> > >> >> the
>>> > >> >> > program's recompete. In late September, Lovegrove noted to Barr
>>> and
>>> > >> >> others
>>> > >> >> > that he'd spoken to the “CO [contracting officer] for COIN.”
>>> “The
>>> > >> >> current
>>> > >> >> > procurement approach is cancelled [sic], she cited changed
>>> > >> >> requirements,”
>>> > >> >> > he
>>> > >> >> > reported. “They will be coming out with some documents in a
>>> month
>>> > or
>>> > >> >> two,
>>> > >> >> > most likely an updated RFI [request for information]. There
>>> will be
>>> > a
>>> > >> >> > procurement following soon after. We are on the list to receive
>>> all
>>> > >> >> > information." On January 18th of next year, Lovegrove provided
>>> an
>>> > >> >> update:
>>> > >> >> > “I
>>> > >> >> > just spoke to the group chief on the contracts side (Doug K).
>>> COIN
>>> > >> has
>>> > >> >> been
>>> > >> >> > replaced by a procurement called Odyssey. He says that it is in
>>> the
>>> > >> >> > formative stages and that something should be released this
>>> year.
>>> > The
>>> > >> >> > contracting officer is Kim R. He believes that Jason is the
>>> COTR
>>> > >> >> > [contracting officer's technical representative].” Another clue
>>> is
>>> > >> >> provided
>>> > >> >> > in the ensuing discussion when a TASC executive asks, “Does
>>> Odyssey
>>> > >> >> combine
>>> > >> >> > the Technology and Content pieces of the work?”
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >  The unexpected change-up didn't seem to phase the corporate
>>> > >> >> partnership,
>>> > >> >> > which was still a top contender to compete for the upcoming
>>> Odyssey
>>> > >> >> > procurement. Later e-mails indicate a meeting between key
>>> members
>>> > of
>>> > >> the
>>> > >> >> > group and the contracting officer for Odyssey at a location
>>> noted
>>> > as
>>> > >> >> “HQ,”
>>> > >> >> > apparently for a briefing on requirements for the new program,
>>> on
>>> > >> >> February
>>> > >> >> > 3
>>> > >> >> > rd of 2011. But two days after that meeting, the servers of
>>> HBGary
>>> > >> and
>>> > >> >> > HBGary Federal were hacked by a small team of Anonymous
>>> operatives
>>> > in
>>> > >> >> > retaliation for Barr's boasts to Financial Times that he had
>>> > >> identified
>>> > >> >> the
>>> > >> >> > movement's “leadership;” 70,000 e-mails were thereafter
>>> released
>>> > onto
>>> > >> >> the
>>> > >> >> > internet. Barr resigned a few weeks later.
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >  Along with clues as to the nature of COIN and its scheduled
>>> > >> >> replacement, a
>>> > >> >> > close study of the HBGary e-mails also provide reasons to be
>>> > >> concerned
>>> > >> >> with
>>> > >> >> > the fact that such things are being developed and deployed in
>>> the
>>> > way
>>> > >> >> that
>>> > >> >> > they are. In addition to being the driving force behind the
>>> COIN
>>> > >> >> recompete,
>>> > >> >> > Barr was also at the center of a series of conspiracies by
>>> which
>>> > his
>>> > >> own
>>> > >> >> > company and two others hired out their collective capabilities
>>> for
>>> > >> use
>>> > >> >> by
>>> > >> >> > corporations that sought to destroy their political enemies by
>>> > >> >> clandestine
>>> > >> >> > and dishonest means, some of which appear to be illegal. None
>>> of
>>> > the
>>> > >> >> > companies involved have been investigated; a proposed
>>> Congressional
>>> > >> >> inquiry
>>> > >> >> > was denied by the committee chair, noting that it was the
>>> Justice
>>> > >> >> > Department's decision as to whether to investigate, even though
>>> it
>>> > >> was
>>> > >> >> the
>>> > >> >> > Justice Department itself that made the initial introductions.
>>> > Those
>>> > >> in
>>> > >> >> the
>>> > >> >> > intelligence contracting industry who believe themselves above
>>> the
>>> > >> law
>>> > >> >> are
>>> > >> >> > entirely correct.
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >  That such firms will continue to target the public with
>>> advanced
>>> > >> >> > information warfare capabilities on behalf of major
>>> corporations is
>>> > >> by
>>> > >> >> > itself an extraordinary danger to mankind as a whole,
>>> particularly
>>> > >> >> insomuch
>>> > >> >> > as that such capabilities are becoming more effective while
>>> > remaining
>>> > >> >> > largely unknown outside of the intelligence industry. But a far
>>> > >> greater
>>> > >> >> > danger is posed by the practice of arming small and
>>> unaccountable
>>> > >> groups
>>> > >> >> of
>>> > >> >> > state and military personnel with a set of tools by which to
>>> > achieve
>>> > >> >> better
>>> > >> >> > and better “situational awareness” on entire populations while
>>> also
>>> > >> >> being
>>> > >> >> > able to manipulate the information flow in such a way as to
>>> deceive
>>> > >> >> those
>>> > >> >> > same populations. The idea that such power can be wielded
>>> without
>>> > >> being
>>> > >> >> > misused is contradicted by even a brief review of history.
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >  History also demonstrates that the state will claim such
>>> powers as
>>> > a
>>> > >> >> > necessity in fighting some considerable threat; the U.S. has
>>> > defended
>>> > >> >> its
>>> > >> >> > recent expansion of powers by claiming they will only be
>>> deployed
>>> > to
>>> > >> >> fight
>>> > >> >> > terrorism and will never be used against Ameerican civilians.
>>> This
>>> > is
>>> > >> >> cold
>>> > >> >> > comfort for those in the Arab world who are aware of the long
>>> > history
>>> > >> of
>>> > >> >> > U.S. material support for regimes they find convenient,
>>> including
>>> > >> those
>>> > >> >> of
>>> > >> >> > Saddam Hussein, Hosni Mubarak, and the House of Saud. Nor
>>> should
>>> > >> >> Americans
>>> > >> >> > be comforted by such promises from a government that has no way
>>> of
>>> > >> >> ensuring
>>> > >> >> > that they will be kept; it was just a few months ago that a
>>> U.S.
>>> > >> general
>>> > >> >> in
>>> > >> >> > Afghanistan ordered a military intelligence unit to use pysops
>>> on
>>> > >> >> visiting
>>> > >> >> > senators in an effort to secure increased funding for the war,
>>> an
>>> > >> >> illegal
>>> > >> >> > act; only a few days prior, CENTCOM spokesmen were confidently
>>> > >> telling
>>> > >> >> the
>>> > >> >> > public that such other psychological capabilities as persona
>>> > >> management
>>> > >> >> > would never be used on Americans as that would be illegal. The
>>> fact
>>> > >> is
>>> > >> >> that
>>> > >> >> > such laws have been routinely broken by the military and
>>> > intelligence
>>> > >> >> > community, who are now been joined in this practice by segments
>>> of
>>> > >> the
>>> > >> >> > federal contracting industry.
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >  It is inevitable, then, that such capabilities as form the
>>> > backbone
>>> > >> of
>>> > >> >> > Romas/COIN and its replacement Odyssey will be deployed against
>>> a
>>> > >> >> growing
>>> > >> >> > segment of the world's population. The powerful institutions
>>> that
>>> > >> wield
>>> > >> >> > them
>>> > >> >> > will grow all the more powerful as they are provided better and
>>> > >> better
>>> > >> >> > methods by which to monitor, deceive, and manipulate. The
>>> informed
>>> > >> >> > electorate upon which liberty depends will be increasingly
>>> > >> misinformed.
>>> > >> >> No
>>> > >> >> > tactical advantage conferred by the use of these programs can
>>> > >> outweigh
>>> > >> >> the
>>> > >> >> > damage that will be done to mankind in the process of creating
>>> > them.
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >  *Barrett Brown*
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> > *Project PM*
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> > On Tue, Jun 21, 2011 at 3:04 PM, ADRIENNE TOSCANO, BLOOMBERG/
>>> > >> NEWSROOM:
>>> > >> >> <
>>> > >> >> > atoscano2@bloomberg.net> wrote:
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> > > Barrit, Per our conversation would you please send me details
>>> > about
>>> > >> >> your
>>> > >> >> > > announcement tomorrow.  Thanks, Adrienne
>>> > >> >> > >
>>> > >> >> > > ------------------------------------------------------------
>>> > >> >> > > Adrienne Toscano
>>> > >> >> > > Segment Producer - Bloomberg TV
>>> > >> >> > > 212-617-2366
>>> > >> >> > > atoscano2@bloomberg.net
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> > --
>>> > >> >> > Regards,
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >> > Barrett Brown
>>> > >> >> > 512-560-2302
>>> > >> >> >
>>> > >> >>
>>> > >> >>
>>> > >> >>
>>> > >> >> --
>>> > >> >> Regards,
>>> > >> >>
>>> > >> >> Barrett Brown
>>> > >> >> 512-560-2302
>>> > >> >>
>>> > >> >
>>> > >> >
>>> > >> >
>>> > >> > --
>>> > >> > Regards,
>>> > >> >
>>> > >> > Barrett Brown
>>> > >> > 512-560-2302
>>> > >> >
>>> > >>
>>> > >>
>>> > >>
>>> > >> --
>>> > >> Regards,
>>> > >>
>>> > >> Barrett Brown
>>> > >> 512-560-2302
>>> > >
>>> > >
>>> > >
>>> > >
>>> > > --
>>> > > Regards,
>>> > >
>>> > > Barrett Brown
>>> > > 512-560-2302
>>> > >
>>> >
>>> >
>>> >
>>> > --
>>> > Regards,
>>> >
>>> > Barrett Brown
>>> > 512-560-2302
>>> >
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>> Regards,
>>>
>>> Barrett Brown
>>> 512-560-2302
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> Regards,
>>
>> Barrett Brown
>> 512-560-2302
>>
>
>
>
> --
> Regards,
>
> Barrett Brown
> 512-560-2302
>



--
Regards,

Barrett Brown
512-560-2302



--
Regards,

Barrett Brown
512-560-2302