Re: give me a call when you get a second
Subject: Re: give me a call when you get a second
From: Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com>
Date: 7/19/11, 22:44
To: "MICHAEL RILEY, BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM:" <michaelriley@bloomberg.net>

Also, a California attorney who's provided pro bono assistance to other internet activists got in touch with me today offering to arrange some colleagues to represent any of the 12 people who will likely be tried in California's Northern District; I've also put him in touch with the National Lawyer's Guild so that they can begin coordinating.

On Tue, Jul 19, 2011 at 6:24 PM, Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com> wrote:
One more thing - National Lawyer's Guild will be providing assistance to those who need it. I've just put out this statement: http://pastebin.com/ddPgpyCP


On Tue, Jul 19, 2011 at 5:27 PM, Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com> wrote:
It's telling me that number doesn't work; you can call me now though.


On Tue, Jul 19, 2011 at 5:19 PM, MICHAEL RILEY, BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM: <michaelriley@bloomberg.net> wrote:
Hey, give a call when you get off the phone: 202 954 1982

------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Riley
Washington bureau/Bloomberg News
(202) 624 1982
(720) 635 8553 (cell)

----- Original Message -----
From: Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com>
To: MICHAEL RILEY (BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM:)
At:  7/19 17:38:00

Cool, thanks.

On Tue, Jul 19, 2011 at 6:46 AM, MICHAEL RILEY, BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM: <
michaelriley@bloomberg.net> wrote:

> Or the week after. You never know w these guys. But yep.
>
>
>
>
> ---
> Sent From Bloomberg Mobile MSG
>
> ---- Original Message ----
> From: Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com>
> At: 7/18/2011 23:56
>
> Are you guys still bringing out a piece on Endgame?
>
> On Thu, Jun 30, 2011 at 4:32 PM, Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> > The e-mails that Lulzsec took from CEO of Unveillance are located in a
> > Gmail account set up by my main technical guy for easy searching. Go to
> > gmail and use this to login:
> >
> > Login: karimhijazi.unveillance
> >
> > Password: hbgemail
> >
> > Just search Endgame and you'll find a number of discussions about them as
> > well as a bit of communication between the CEO and John Farrell.
> >
> >
> > On Thu, Jun 30, 2011 at 1:31 PM, MICHAEL RILEY, BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM: <
> > michaelriley@bloomberg.net> wrote:
> >
> >> 202 624 1982...or after 5 pm eastern on my cell: 720 635 8553
> >>
> >> ------------------------------------------------------------
> >> Michael Riley
> >> Washington bureau/Bloomberg News
> >> (202) 624 1982
> >> (720) 635 8553 (cell)
> >>
> >> ----- Original Message -----
> >> From: Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com>
> >> To: MICHAEL RILEY (BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM:)
> >> At:  6/22 22:12:38
> >>
> >> Oh, and here's another little tidbit:
> >> http://hbgary.anonleaks.ch/greg_hbgary_com/26795.html
> >>
> >> On Wed, Jun 22, 2011 at 9:11 PM, Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com>
> >> wrote:
> >>
> >> > Romas/COIN, the one I announced today. And this is the former NSA
> fellow
> >> > who went over to Pixar:
> >> > http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/press_room/2002/new_adr.shtml
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > On Wed, Jun 22, 2011 at 9:10 PM, MICHAEL RILEY, BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM: <
> >> > michaelriley@bloomberg.net> wrote:
> >> >
> >> >> Say it ain't so. Even Disney and Pixar?
> >> >>
> >> >> Seriously, though. What's the connection? What project is he talking
> >> about
> >> >> that links to pixar?
> >> >>
> >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------
> >> >> Michael Riley
> >> >> Washington bureau/Bloomberg News
> >> >> (202) 624 1982
> >> >> (720) 635 8553 (cell)
> >> >>
> >> >> ----- Original Message -----
> >> >> From: Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com>
> >> >> To: MICHAEL RILEY (BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM:)
> >> >> At:  6/22 21:56:32
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >>
> http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/jun/22/hacking-anonymous
> >> >>
> >> >> Also, you might take a look at this:
> >> >> http://hbgary.anonleaks.ch/aaron_hbgary_com/8403.html
> >> >>
> >> >> On Wed, Jun 22, 2011 at 8:55 PM, MICHAEL RILEY, BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM:
> <
> >> >> michaelriley@bloomberg.net> wrote:
> >> >>
> >> >> > thx for the heads up, Barrett.
> >> >> >
> >> >> > ------------------------------------------------------------
> >> >> > Michael Riley
> >> >> > Washington bureau/Bloomberg News
> >> >> > (202) 624 1982
> >> >> > (720) 635 8553 (cell)
> >> >> >
> >> >> > ----- Original Message -----
> >> >> > From: Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com>
> >> >> > To: ADRIENNE TOSCANO (BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM:), MICHAEL RILEY
> >> (BLOOMBERG/
> >> >> > NEWSROOM:)
> >> >> > At:  6/21 16:08:31
> >> >> >
> >> >> > Adrienne-
> >> >> >
> >> >> > As I noted on the phone, an accompanying explanatory piece will run
> >> in
> >> >> The
> >> >> > Guardian tomorrow, while the document itself, which I've pasted
> >> below,
> >> >> will
> >> >> > run on the wiki maintained by my group Project PM. The NYT has a
> copy
> >> >> and
> >> >> > is
> >> >> > vetting it now; the e-mails may be verified and other details
> >> obtained
> >> >> by
> >> >> > way of this search engine maintained by Anonymous, which acquired
> the
> >> >> > 71,000
> >> >> > e-mails in question in early February: http://hbgary.anonleaks.ch/
> >> >> >
> >> >> > Michael, I'm cc'ing you on this to give you a heads up; let me know
> >> if
> >> >> you
> >> >> > have any questions.
> >> >> >
> >> >> > ***
> >> >> >
> >> >> > For at least two years, the U.S. has been conducting a secretive
> and
> >> >> > immensely sophisticated campaign of mass surveillance and data
> mining
> >> >> > against the Arab world, allowing the intelligence community to
> >> monitor
> >> >> the
> >> >> > habits, conversations, and activity of millions of individuals at
> >> once.
> >> >> And
> >> >> > with an upgrade scheduled for later this year, the top contender to
> >> win
> >> >> the
> >> >> > federal contract and thus take over the program is a team of about
> a
> >> >> dozen
> >> >> > companies which were brought together in large part by Aaron Barr -
> >> the
> >> >> > same
> >> >> > disgraced CEO who resigned from his own firm earlier this year
> after
> >> he
> >> >> was
> >> >> > discovered to have planned a full-scale information war against
> >> >> political
> >> >> > activists at the behest of corporate clients. The new revelation
> >> >> provides
> >> >> > for a disturbing picture, particularly when viewed in a wider
> >> context.
> >> >> > Unprecedented surveillance capabilities are being produced by an
> >> >> industry
> >> >> > that works in secret on applications that are nonetheless funded by
> >> the
> >> >> > American public – and which in some cases are used against that
> very
> >> >> same
> >> >> > public. Their products are developed on demand for an intelligence
> >> >> > community
> >> >> > that is not subject to Congressional oversight and which has been
> >> >> > repeatedly
> >> >> > shown to have misused its existing powers in ways that violate U.S.
> >> law
> >> >> as
> >> >> > well as American ideals. And with expanded intelligence
> capabilities
> >> by
> >> >> > which to monitor Arab populations in ways that would have
> previously
> >> >> been
> >> >> > impossible, those same intelligence agencies now have improved
> means
> >> by
> >> >> > which to provide information on dissidents to those regional
> >> dictators
> >> >> > viewed by the U.S. as strategic allies.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >  The nature and extent of the operation, which was known as
> >> Romas/COIN
> >> >> and
> >> >> > which is scheduled for replacement sometime this year by a similar
> >> >> program
> >> >> > known as Odyssey, may be determined in part by a close reading of
> >> >> hundreds
> >> >> > of e-mails among the 70,000 that were stolen in February from the
> >> >> > contracting firm HBGary Federal and its parent company HBGary.
> Other
> >> >> > details
> >> >> > may be gleaned by an examination of the various other firms and
> >> >> individuals
> >> >> > that are discussed as being potential partners.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >  Of course, there are many in the U.S. that would prefer that such
> >> >> details
> >> >> > not be revealed at all; such people tend to cite the amorphous and
> >> >> > much-abused concept of “national security” as sufficient reason for
> >> the
> >> >> > citizenry to stand idly by as an ever-expanding coalition of
> >> government
> >> >> > agencies and semi-private corporations gain greater influence over
> >> U.S.
> >> >> > foreign policy. That the last decade of foreign policy as practiced
> >> by
> >> >> such
> >> >> > individuals has been an absolute disaster even by the admission of
> >> many
> >> >> of
> >> >> > those who put it into place will not phase those who nonetheless
> >> believe
> >> >> > that the citizenry should be prevented from knowing what is being
> >> done
> >> >> in
> >> >> > its name and with its tax dollars.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >  To the extent that the actions of a government are divorced from
> the
> >> >> > informed consent of those who pay for such actions, such a
> government
> >> is
> >> >> > illegitimate. To the extent that power is concentrated in the hands
> >> of
> >> >> > small
> >> >> > groups of men who wield such power behind the scenes, there is no
> >> >> assurance
> >> >> > that such power will be used in a manner that is compatible with
> the
> >> >> actual
> >> >> > interests of that citizenry, or populations elsewhere. The known
> >> history
> >> >> of
> >> >> > the U.S. intelligence community is comprised in large part of
> murder,
> >> >> > assassinations, disinformation, the topping of democratic
> >> governments,
> >> >> the
> >> >> > abuse of the rights of U.S. citizens, and a great number of other
> >> things
> >> >> > that cannot even be defended on “national security” grounds
> insomuch
> >> as
> >> >> > that
> >> >> > many such actions have quite correctly turned entire populations
> >> against
> >> >> > the
> >> >> > U.S. government. This is not only my opinion, but also the opinion
> of
> >> >> > countless individuals who once served in the intelligence community
> >> and
> >> >> > have
> >> >> > since come to criticize it and even unveil many of its secrets in
> an
> >> >> effort
> >> >> > to alert the citizenry to what has been unleashed against the world
> >> in
> >> >> the
> >> >> > name of “security.”
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >  Likewise, I will here provide as much information as I can on
> >> >> Romas/COIN
> >> >> > and its upcoming replacement.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >  ***
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >  Although the relatively well-known military contractor Northrop
> >> Grumman
> >> >> > had
> >> >> > long held the contract for Romas/COIN, such contracts are subject
> to
> >> >> > regular
> >> >> > recompetes by which other companies, or several working in tandem,
> >> can
> >> >> > apply
> >> >> > to take over. In early February, HBGary Federal CEO Aaron Barr
> wrote
> >> the
> >> >> > following e-mail to Al Pisani, an executive at the much larger
> >> federal
> >> >> > contractor TASC, a company which until recently had been owned by
> >> >> Northrop
> >> >> > and which was now looking to compete with it for lucrative
> contracts:
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >  "I met with [Mantech CEO] Bob Frisbie the other day to catch up.
> He
> >> is
> >> >> > looking to expand a capability in IO related to the COIN re-compete
> >> but
> >> >> > more
> >> >> > for DoD. He told me he has a few acquisitions in the works that
> will
> >> >> > increase his capability in this area. So just a thought that it
> might
> >> be
> >> >> > worth a phone call to see if there is any synergy and strength
> >> between
> >> >> TASC
> >> >> > and ManTech in this area. I think forming a team and response to
> >> compete
> >> >> > against SAIC will be tough but doable." IO in this context stands
> for
> >> >> > “information operations,” while COIN itself, as noted in an NDA
> >> attached
> >> >> to
> >> >> > one of the e-mails, stands for “counter intelligence. SAIC is a
> >> larger
> >> >> > intelligence contractor that was expected to pursue the recompete
> as
> >> >> well.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >  Pisani agreed to the idea, and in conjunction with Barr and fellow
> >> TASC
> >> >> > exec John Lovegrove, the growing party spent much of the next year
> >> >> working
> >> >> > to create a partnership of firms capable of providing the “client”
> -
> >> a
> >> >> U.S.
> >> >> > agency that is never specified in the hundreds of e-mails that
> follow
> >> –
> >> >> > with
> >> >> > capabilities that would outmatch those being provided by Northrop,
> >> SAIC,
> >> >> or
> >> >> > other competitors.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >  Several e-mails in particular provide a great deal of material by
> >> which
> >> >> to
> >> >> > determine the scope and intent of Romas/COIN. One that Barr wrote
> to
> >> his
> >> >> > own
> >> >> > e-mail account, likely for the purpose of adding to other documents
> >> >> later,
> >> >> > is entitled “Notes on COIN.” It begins with a list of entries for
> >> >> various
> >> >> > facets of the program, all of which are blank and were presumably
> >> filled
> >> >> > out
> >> >> > later: “ISP, Operations, Language/Culture, Media Development,
> >> Marketing
> >> >> and
> >> >> > Advertising, Security, MOE.” Afterwards, another list consists of
> the
> >> >> > following: “Capabilities, Mobile Development, Challenges, MOE,
> >> >> > Infrastructure, Security.” Finally, a list of the following
> websites
> >> is
> >> >> > composed, many of which represent various small companies that
> >> provide
> >> >> > niche
> >> >> > marketing services pursuant to mobile phones.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >  More helpful is a later e-mail from Lovegrove to Barr and some of
> >> his
> >> >> > colleagues at TASC in which he announces the following:
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >  *Our team consists of:*
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >  *- TASC (PMO, creative services)*
> >> >> >
> >> >> > *- HB Gary (Strategy, planning, PMO)*
> >> >> >
> >> >> > *- Akamai (infrastructure)*
> >> >> >
> >> >> > *- Archimedes Global (Specialized linguistics, strategy, planning)*
> >> >> >
> >> >> > *- Acclaim Technical Services (specialized linguistics)*
> >> >> >
> >> >> > *- Mission Essential Personnel (linguistic services)*
> >> >> >
> >> >> > *- Cipher (strategy, planning operations)*
> >> >> >
> >> >> > *- PointAbout (rapid mobile application development, list of
> >> strategic*
> >> >> >
> >> >> > *partners)*
> >> >> >
> >> >> > *- Google (strategy, mobile application and platform development -
> >> long*
> >> >> >
> >> >> > *list of strategic partners)*
> >> >> >
> >> >> > *- Apple (mobile and desktop platform, application assistance -long
> >> >> list*
> >> >> >
> >> >> > *of strategic partners)*
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >  *We are trying to schedule an interview with ATT plus some other
> >> small
> >> >> app
> >> >> > developers.*
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >  From these and dozens of other clues and references, the following
> >> may
> >> >> be
> >> >> > determined about the nature of Romas/COIN:
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >    1.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >   Mobile phone software and applications constitute a major
> component
> >> of
> >> >> >   the program.
> >> >> >   2.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >   There's discussion of bringing in a “gaming developer,”
> apparently
> >> at
> >> >> the
> >> >> >   behest of Barr, who mentions that the team could make good use of
> >> “a
> >> >> > social
> >> >> >   gaming company maybe like zynga, gameloft, etc.” Lovegrove
> >> elsewhere
> >> >> > notes:
> >> >> >   “I know a couple of small gaming companies at MIT that might fit
> >> the
> >> >> >   bill.”
> >> >> >    3.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >   Apple and Google were active team partners, and AT&T may have
> been
> >> as
> >> >> >   well. The latter is known to have provided the NSA free reign
> over
> >> >> > customer
> >> >> >   communications (and was in turn protected by a bill granting them
> >> >> >   retroactive immunity from lawsuits). Google itself is the only
> >> company
> >> >> to
> >> >> >   have received a “Hostile to Privacy” rating from Privacy
> >> >> International.
> >> >> >   Apple is currently being investigated by Congress after the
> iPhone
> >> was
> >> >> >   revealed to compile user location data in a way that differs from
> >> >> other
> >> >> >   mobile phones; the company has claimed this to have been a “bug.”
> >> >> >    4.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >   The program makes use of several providers of “linguistic
> >> services.”
> >> >> At
> >> >> >   one point, the team discusses hiring a military-trained Arabic
> >> >> linguist.
> >> >> >   Elsewhere, Barr writes: “I feel confident I can get you a ringer
> >> for
> >> >> > Farsi
> >> >> >   if they are still interested in Farsi (we need to find that out).
> >> >> These
> >> >> >   linguists are not only going to be developing new content but
> also
> >> >> > meeting
> >> >> >   with folks, so they have to have native or near native
> proficiency
> >> and
> >> >> > have
> >> >> >   to have the cultural relevance as well.”
> >> >> >    5.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >   Alterion and SocialEyez are listed as “businesses to contact.”
> The
> >> >> former
> >> >> >   specializes in “social media monitoring tools.” The latter uses
> >> >> >   “sophisticated natural language processing methodology” in order
> to
> >> >> > “process
> >> >> >   tens of millions of multi-lingual conversations daily” while also
> >> >> > employing
> >> >> >   “researchers and media analysts on the ground;” its website also
> >> notes
> >> >> > that
> >> >> >   “Millions of people around the globe are now networked as never
> >> before
> >> >> -
> >> >> >   exchanging information and ideas, forming opinions, and speaking
> >> their
> >> >> > minds
> >> >> >   about everything from politics to products.”
> >> >> >    6.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >   At one point, TASC exec Chris Clair asks Aaron and others, “Can
> we
> >> >> name
> >> >> >   COIN Saif? Saif is the sword an Arab executioner uses when they
> >> >> > decapitate
> >> >> >   criminals. I can think of a few cool brands for this.”
> >> >> >    7.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >   A diagram attached to one of Barr's e-mails to the group (
> >> >> >   http://imageshack.us/photo/my-images/7/pmo.png/) depicts Magpii
> as
> >> >> >   interacting in some unspecified manner with “Foreign Mobile” and
> >> >> “Foreign
> >> >> >   Web.” Magpii is a project of Barr's own creation which stands for
> >> >> > “Magnify
> >> >> >   Personal Identifying Information,” involves social networking,
> and
> >> is
> >> >> >   designed for the purpose of storing personal information on
> users.
> >> >> > Although
> >> >> >   details are difficult to determine from references in Barr's
> >> e-mails,
> >> >> he
> >> >> >   discusses the project almost exclusively with members of military
> >> >> >   intelligence to which he was pitching the idea.
> >> >> >   8.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >   There are sporadic references such things as “semantic analysis,”
> >> >> “Latent
> >> >> >   Semantic Indexing,” “specialized linguistics,” and OPS, a
> >> programming
> >> >> >   language designed for solving problems using expert systems.
> >> >> >   9.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >   Barr asks the team's partner at Apple, Andy Kemp (whose signature
> >> >> lists
> >> >> >   him as being from the company's Homeland Defense/National
> Programs
> >> >> >   division), to provide him “a contact at Pixar/Disney.”
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >  Altogether, then, a successful bid for the relevant contract was
> >> seen
> >> >> to
> >> >> > require the combined capabilities of perhaps a dozen firms –
> >> >> capabilities
> >> >> > whereby millions of conversations can be monitored and
> automatically
> >> >> > analyzed, whereby a wide range of personal data can be obtained and
> >> >> stored
> >> >> > in secret, and whereby some unknown degree of information can be
> >> >> released
> >> >> > to
> >> >> > a given population through a variety of means and without any hint
> >> that
> >> >> the
> >> >> > actual source is U.S. military intelligence. All this is merely in
> >> >> addition
> >> >> > to whichever additional capabilities are not evident from the
> limited
> >> >> > description available, with the program as a whole presumably being
> >> >> > operated
> >> >> > in conjunction with other surveillance and propaganda assets
> >> controlled
> >> >> by
> >> >> > the U.S. and its partners.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >  Whatever the exact nature and scope of COIN, the firms that had
> been
> >> >> > assembled for the purpose by Barr and TASC never got a chance to
> bid
> >> on
> >> >> the
> >> >> > program's recompete. In late September, Lovegrove noted to Barr and
> >> >> others
> >> >> > that he'd spoken to the “CO [contracting officer] for COIN.” “The
> >> >> current
> >> >> > procurement approach is cancelled [sic], she cited changed
> >> >> requirements,”
> >> >> > he
> >> >> > reported. “They will be coming out with some documents in a month
> or
> >> >> two,
> >> >> > most likely an updated RFI [request for information]. There will be
> a
> >> >> > procurement following soon after. We are on the list to receive all
> >> >> > information." On January 18th of next year, Lovegrove provided an
> >> >> update:
> >> >> > “I
> >> >> > just spoke to the group chief on the contracts side (Doug K). COIN
> >> has
> >> >> been
> >> >> > replaced by a procurement called Odyssey. He says that it is in the
> >> >> > formative stages and that something should be released this year.
> The
> >> >> > contracting officer is Kim R. He believes that Jason is the COTR
> >> >> > [contracting officer's technical representative].” Another clue is
> >> >> provided
> >> >> > in the ensuing discussion when a TASC executive asks, “Does Odyssey
> >> >> combine
> >> >> > the Technology and Content pieces of the work?”
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >  The unexpected change-up didn't seem to phase the corporate
> >> >> partnership,
> >> >> > which was still a top contender to compete for the upcoming Odyssey
> >> >> > procurement. Later e-mails indicate a meeting between key members
> of
> >> the
> >> >> > group and the contracting officer for Odyssey at a location noted
> as
> >> >> “HQ,”
> >> >> > apparently for a briefing on requirements for the new program, on
> >> >> February
> >> >> > 3
> >> >> > rd of 2011. But two days after that meeting, the servers of HBGary
> >> and
> >> >> > HBGary Federal were hacked by a small team of Anonymous operatives
> in
> >> >> > retaliation for Barr's boasts to Financial Times that he had
> >> identified
> >> >> the
> >> >> > movement's “leadership;” 70,000 e-mails were thereafter released
> onto
> >> >> the
> >> >> > internet. Barr resigned a few weeks later.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >  Along with clues as to the nature of COIN and its scheduled
> >> >> replacement, a
> >> >> > close study of the HBGary e-mails also provide reasons to be
> >> concerned
> >> >> with
> >> >> > the fact that such things are being developed and deployed in the
> way
> >> >> that
> >> >> > they are. In addition to being the driving force behind the COIN
> >> >> recompete,
> >> >> > Barr was also at the center of a series of conspiracies by which
> his
> >> own
> >> >> > company and two others hired out their collective capabilities for
> >> use
> >> >> by
> >> >> > corporations that sought to destroy their political enemies by
> >> >> clandestine
> >> >> > and dishonest means, some of which appear to be illegal. None of
> the
> >> >> > companies involved have been investigated; a proposed Congressional
> >> >> inquiry
> >> >> > was denied by the committee chair, noting that it was the Justice
> >> >> > Department's decision as to whether to investigate, even though it
> >> was
> >> >> the
> >> >> > Justice Department itself that made the initial introductions.
> Those
> >> in
> >> >> the
> >> >> > intelligence contracting industry who believe themselves above the
> >> law
> >> >> are
> >> >> > entirely correct.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >  That such firms will continue to target the public with advanced
> >> >> > information warfare capabilities on behalf of major corporations is
> >> by
> >> >> > itself an extraordinary danger to mankind as a whole, particularly
> >> >> insomuch
> >> >> > as that such capabilities are becoming more effective while
> remaining
> >> >> > largely unknown outside of the intelligence industry. But a far
> >> greater
> >> >> > danger is posed by the practice of arming small and unaccountable
> >> groups
> >> >> of
> >> >> > state and military personnel with a set of tools by which to
> achieve
> >> >> better
> >> >> > and better “situational awareness” on entire populations while also
> >> >> being
> >> >> > able to manipulate the information flow in such a way as to deceive
> >> >> those
> >> >> > same populations. The idea that such power can be wielded without
> >> being
> >> >> > misused is contradicted by even a brief review of history.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >  History also demonstrates that the state will claim such powers as
> a
> >> >> > necessity in fighting some considerable threat; the U.S. has
> defended
> >> >> its
> >> >> > recent expansion of powers by claiming they will only be deployed
> to
> >> >> fight
> >> >> > terrorism and will never be used against Ameerican civilians. This
> is
> >> >> cold
> >> >> > comfort for those in the Arab world who are aware of the long
> history
> >> of
> >> >> > U.S. material support for regimes they find convenient, including
> >> those
> >> >> of
> >> >> > Saddam Hussein, Hosni Mubarak, and the House of Saud. Nor should
> >> >> Americans
> >> >> > be comforted by such promises from a government that has no way of
> >> >> ensuring
> >> >> > that they will be kept; it was just a few months ago that a U.S.
> >> general
> >> >> in
> >> >> > Afghanistan ordered a military intelligence unit to use pysops on
> >> >> visiting
> >> >> > senators in an effort to secure increased funding for the war, an
> >> >> illegal
> >> >> > act; only a few days prior, CENTCOM spokesmen were confidently
> >> telling
> >> >> the
> >> >> > public that such other psychological capabilities as persona
> >> management
> >> >> > would never be used on Americans as that would be illegal. The fact
> >> is
> >> >> that
> >> >> > such laws have been routinely broken by the military and
> intelligence
> >> >> > community, who are now been joined in this practice by segments of
> >> the
> >> >> > federal contracting industry.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >  It is inevitable, then, that such capabilities as form the
> backbone
> >> of
> >> >> > Romas/COIN and its replacement Odyssey will be deployed against a
> >> >> growing
> >> >> > segment of the world's population. The powerful institutions that
> >> wield
> >> >> > them
> >> >> > will grow all the more powerful as they are provided better and
> >> better
> >> >> > methods by which to monitor, deceive, and manipulate. The informed
> >> >> > electorate upon which liberty depends will be increasingly
> >> misinformed.
> >> >> No
> >> >> > tactical advantage conferred by the use of these programs can
> >> outweigh
> >> >> the
> >> >> > damage that will be done to mankind in the process of creating
> them.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >  *Barrett Brown*
> >> >> >
> >> >> > *Project PM*
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> > On Tue, Jun 21, 2011 at 3:04 PM, ADRIENNE TOSCANO, BLOOMBERG/
> >> NEWSROOM:
> >> >> <
> >> >> > atoscano2@bloomberg.net> wrote:
> >> >> >
> >> >> > > Barrit, Per our conversation would you please send me details
> about
> >> >> your
> >> >> > > announcement tomorrow.  Thanks, Adrienne
> >> >> > >
> >> >> > > ------------------------------------------------------------
> >> >> > > Adrienne Toscano
> >> >> > > Segment Producer - Bloomberg TV
> >> >> > > 212-617-2366
> >> >> > > atoscano2@bloomberg.net
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> > --
> >> >> > Regards,
> >> >> >
> >> >> > Barrett Brown
> >> >> > 512-560-2302
> >> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >> --
> >> >> Regards,
> >> >>
> >> >> Barrett Brown
> >> >> 512-560-2302
> >> >>
> >> >
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > --
> >> > Regards,
> >> >
> >> > Barrett Brown
> >> > 512-560-2302
> >> >
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> --
> >> Regards,
> >>
> >> Barrett Brown
> >> 512-560-2302
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> > Regards,
> >
> > Barrett Brown
> > 512-560-2302
> >
>
>
>
> --
> Regards,
>
> Barrett Brown
> 512-560-2302
>



--
Regards,

Barrett Brown
512-560-2302



--
Regards,

Barrett Brown
512-560-2302



--
Regards,

Barrett Brown
512-560-2302



--
Regards,

Barrett Brown
512-560-2302