Re: give me a call when you get a second
Subject: Re: give me a call when you get a second
From: Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com>
Date: 7/19/11, 19:24
To: "MICHAEL RILEY, BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM:" <michaelriley@bloomberg.net>

One more thing - National Lawyer's Guild will be providing assistance to those who need it. I've just put out this statement: http://pastebin.com/ddPgpyCP

On Tue, Jul 19, 2011 at 5:27 PM, Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com> wrote:
It's telling me that number doesn't work; you can call me now though.


On Tue, Jul 19, 2011 at 5:19 PM, MICHAEL RILEY, BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM: <michaelriley@bloomberg.net> wrote:
Hey, give a call when you get off the phone: 202 954 1982

------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Riley
Washington bureau/Bloomberg News
(202) 624 1982
(720) 635 8553 (cell)

----- Original Message -----
From: Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com>
To: MICHAEL RILEY (BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM:)
At:  7/19 17:38:00

Cool, thanks.

On Tue, Jul 19, 2011 at 6:46 AM, MICHAEL RILEY, BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM: <
michaelriley@bloomberg.net> wrote:

> Or the week after. You never know w these guys. But yep.
>
>
>
>
> ---
> Sent From Bloomberg Mobile MSG
>
> ---- Original Message ----
> From: Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com>
> At: 7/18/2011 23:56
>
> Are you guys still bringing out a piece on Endgame?
>
> On Thu, Jun 30, 2011 at 4:32 PM, Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> > The e-mails that Lulzsec took from CEO of Unveillance are located in a
> > Gmail account set up by my main technical guy for easy searching. Go to
> > gmail and use this to login:
> >
> > Login: karimhijazi.unveillance
> >
> > Password: hbgemail
> >
> > Just search Endgame and you'll find a number of discussions about them as
> > well as a bit of communication between the CEO and John Farrell.
> >
> >
> > On Thu, Jun 30, 2011 at 1:31 PM, MICHAEL RILEY, BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM: <
> > michaelriley@bloomberg.net> wrote:
> >
> >> 202 624 1982...or after 5 pm eastern on my cell: 720 635 8553
> >>
> >> ------------------------------------------------------------
> >> Michael Riley
> >> Washington bureau/Bloomberg News
> >> (202) 624 1982
> >> (720) 635 8553 (cell)
> >>
> >> ----- Original Message -----
> >> From: Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com>
> >> To: MICHAEL RILEY (BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM:)
> >> At:  6/22 22:12:38
> >>
> >> Oh, and here's another little tidbit:
> >> http://hbgary.anonleaks.ch/greg_hbgary_com/26795.html
> >>
> >> On Wed, Jun 22, 2011 at 9:11 PM, Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com>
> >> wrote:
> >>
> >> > Romas/COIN, the one I announced today. And this is the former NSA
> fellow
> >> > who went over to Pixar:
> >> > http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/press_room/2002/new_adr.shtml
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > On Wed, Jun 22, 2011 at 9:10 PM, MICHAEL RILEY, BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM: <
> >> > michaelriley@bloomberg.net> wrote:
> >> >
> >> >> Say it ain't so. Even Disney and Pixar?
> >> >>
> >> >> Seriously, though. What's the connection? What project is he talking
> >> about
> >> >> that links to pixar?
> >> >>
> >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------
> >> >> Michael Riley
> >> >> Washington bureau/Bloomberg News
> >> >> (202) 624 1982
> >> >> (720) 635 8553 (cell)
> >> >>
> >> >> ----- Original Message -----
> >> >> From: Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com>
> >> >> To: MICHAEL RILEY (BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM:)
> >> >> At:  6/22 21:56:32
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >>
> http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/jun/22/hacking-anonymous
> >> >>
> >> >> Also, you might take a look at this:
> >> >> http://hbgary.anonleaks.ch/aaron_hbgary_com/8403.html
> >> >>
> >> >> On Wed, Jun 22, 2011 at 8:55 PM, MICHAEL RILEY, BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM:
> <
> >> >> michaelriley@bloomberg.net> wrote:
> >> >>
> >> >> > thx for the heads up, Barrett.
> >> >> >
> >> >> > ------------------------------------------------------------
> >> >> > Michael Riley
> >> >> > Washington bureau/Bloomberg News
> >> >> > (202) 624 1982
> >> >> > (720) 635 8553 (cell)
> >> >> >
> >> >> > ----- Original Message -----
> >> >> > From: Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com>
> >> >> > To: ADRIENNE TOSCANO (BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM:), MICHAEL RILEY
> >> (BLOOMBERG/
> >> >> > NEWSROOM:)
> >> >> > At:  6/21 16:08:31
> >> >> >
> >> >> > Adrienne-
> >> >> >
> >> >> > As I noted on the phone, an accompanying explanatory piece will run
> >> in
> >> >> The
> >> >> > Guardian tomorrow, while the document itself, which I've pasted
> >> below,
> >> >> will
> >> >> > run on the wiki maintained by my group Project PM. The NYT has a
> copy
> >> >> and
> >> >> > is
> >> >> > vetting it now; the e-mails may be verified and other details
> >> obtained
> >> >> by
> >> >> > way of this search engine maintained by Anonymous, which acquired
> the
> >> >> > 71,000
> >> >> > e-mails in question in early February: http://hbgary.anonleaks.ch/
> >> >> >
> >> >> > Michael, I'm cc'ing you on this to give you a heads up; let me know
> >> if
> >> >> you
> >> >> > have any questions.
> >> >> >
> >> >> > ***
> >> >> >
> >> >> > For at least two years, the U.S. has been conducting a secretive
> and
> >> >> > immensely sophisticated campaign of mass surveillance and data
> mining
> >> >> > against the Arab world, allowing the intelligence community to
> >> monitor
> >> >> the
> >> >> > habits, conversations, and activity of millions of individuals at
> >> once.
> >> >> And
> >> >> > with an upgrade scheduled for later this year, the top contender to
> >> win
> >> >> the
> >> >> > federal contract and thus take over the program is a team of about
> a
> >> >> dozen
> >> >> > companies which were brought together in large part by Aaron Barr -
> >> the
> >> >> > same
> >> >> > disgraced CEO who resigned from his own firm earlier this year
> after
> >> he
> >> >> was
> >> >> > discovered to have planned a full-scale information war against
> >> >> political
> >> >> > activists at the behest of corporate clients. The new revelation
> >> >> provides
> >> >> > for a disturbing picture, particularly when viewed in a wider
> >> context.
> >> >> > Unprecedented surveillance capabilities are being produced by an
> >> >> industry
> >> >> > that works in secret on applications that are nonetheless funded by
> >> the
> >> >> > American public – and which in some cases are used against that
> very
> >> >> same
> >> >> > public. Their products are developed on demand for an intelligence
> >> >> > community
> >> >> > that is not subject to Congressional oversight and which has been
> >> >> > repeatedly
> >> >> > shown to have misused its existing powers in ways that violate U.S.
> >> law
> >> >> as
> >> >> > well as American ideals. And with expanded intelligence
> capabilities
> >> by
> >> >> > which to monitor Arab populations in ways that would have
> previously
> >> >> been
> >> >> > impossible, those same intelligence agencies now have improved
> means
> >> by
> >> >> > which to provide information on dissidents to those regional
> >> dictators
> >> >> > viewed by the U.S. as strategic allies.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >  The nature and extent of the operation, which was known as
> >> Romas/COIN
> >> >> and
> >> >> > which is scheduled for replacement sometime this year by a similar
> >> >> program
> >> >> > known as Odyssey, may be determined in part by a close reading of
> >> >> hundreds
> >> >> > of e-mails among the 70,000 that were stolen in February from the
> >> >> > contracting firm HBGary Federal and its parent company HBGary.
> Other
> >> >> > details
> >> >> > may be gleaned by an examination of the various other firms and
> >> >> individuals
> >> >> > that are discussed as being potential partners.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >  Of course, there are many in the U.S. that would prefer that such
> >> >> details
> >> >> > not be revealed at all; such people tend to cite the amorphous and
> >> >> > much-abused concept of “national security” as sufficient reason for
> >> the
> >> >> > citizenry to stand idly by as an ever-expanding coalition of
> >> government
> >> >> > agencies and semi-private corporations gain greater influence over
> >> U.S.
> >> >> > foreign policy. That the last decade of foreign policy as practiced
> >> by
> >> >> such
> >> >> > individuals has been an absolute disaster even by the admission of
> >> many
> >> >> of
> >> >> > those who put it into place will not phase those who nonetheless
> >> believe
> >> >> > that the citizenry should be prevented from knowing what is being
> >> done
> >> >> in
> >> >> > its name and with its tax dollars.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >  To the extent that the actions of a government are divorced from
> the
> >> >> > informed consent of those who pay for such actions, such a
> government
> >> is
> >> >> > illegitimate. To the extent that power is concentrated in the hands
> >> of
> >> >> > small
> >> >> > groups of men who wield such power behind the scenes, there is no
> >> >> assurance
> >> >> > that such power will be used in a manner that is compatible with
> the
> >> >> actual
> >> >> > interests of that citizenry, or populations elsewhere. The known
> >> history
> >> >> of
> >> >> > the U.S. intelligence community is comprised in large part of
> murder,
> >> >> > assassinations, disinformation, the topping of democratic
> >> governments,
> >> >> the
> >> >> > abuse of the rights of U.S. citizens, and a great number of other
> >> things
> >> >> > that cannot even be defended on “national security” grounds
> insomuch
> >> as
> >> >> > that
> >> >> > many such actions have quite correctly turned entire populations
> >> against
> >> >> > the
> >> >> > U.S. government. This is not only my opinion, but also the opinion
> of
> >> >> > countless individuals who once served in the intelligence community
> >> and
> >> >> > have
> >> >> > since come to criticize it and even unveil many of its secrets in
> an
> >> >> effort
> >> >> > to alert the citizenry to what has been unleashed against the world
> >> in
> >> >> the
> >> >> > name of “security.”
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >  Likewise, I will here provide as much information as I can on
> >> >> Romas/COIN
> >> >> > and its upcoming replacement.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >  ***
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >  Although the relatively well-known military contractor Northrop
> >> Grumman
> >> >> > had
> >> >> > long held the contract for Romas/COIN, such contracts are subject
> to
> >> >> > regular
> >> >> > recompetes by which other companies, or several working in tandem,
> >> can
> >> >> > apply
> >> >> > to take over. In early February, HBGary Federal CEO Aaron Barr
> wrote
> >> the
> >> >> > following e-mail to Al Pisani, an executive at the much larger
> >> federal
> >> >> > contractor TASC, a company which until recently had been owned by
> >> >> Northrop
> >> >> > and which was now looking to compete with it for lucrative
> contracts:
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >  "I met with [Mantech CEO] Bob Frisbie the other day to catch up.
> He
> >> is
> >> >> > looking to expand a capability in IO related to the COIN re-compete
> >> but
> >> >> > more
> >> >> > for DoD. He told me he has a few acquisitions in the works that
> will
> >> >> > increase his capability in this area. So just a thought that it
> might
> >> be
> >> >> > worth a phone call to see if there is any synergy and strength
> >> between
> >> >> TASC
> >> >> > and ManTech in this area. I think forming a team and response to
> >> compete
> >> >> > against SAIC will be tough but doable." IO in this context stands
> for
> >> >> > “information operations,” while COIN itself, as noted in an NDA
> >> attached
> >> >> to
> >> >> > one of the e-mails, stands for “counter intelligence. SAIC is a
> >> larger
> >> >> > intelligence contractor that was expected to pursue the recompete
> as
> >> >> well.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >  Pisani agreed to the idea, and in conjunction with Barr and fellow
> >> TASC
> >> >> > exec John Lovegrove, the growing party spent much of the next year
> >> >> working
> >> >> > to create a partnership of firms capable of providing the “client”
> -
> >> a
> >> >> U.S.
> >> >> > agency that is never specified in the hundreds of e-mails that
> follow
> >> –
> >> >> > with
> >> >> > capabilities that would outmatch those being provided by Northrop,
> >> SAIC,
> >> >> or
> >> >> > other competitors.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >  Several e-mails in particular provide a great deal of material by
> >> which
> >> >> to
> >> >> > determine the scope and intent of Romas/COIN. One that Barr wrote
> to
> >> his
> >> >> > own
> >> >> > e-mail account, likely for the purpose of adding to other documents
> >> >> later,
> >> >> > is entitled “Notes on COIN.” It begins with a list of entries for
> >> >> various
> >> >> > facets of the program, all of which are blank and were presumably
> >> filled
> >> >> > out
> >> >> > later: “ISP, Operations, Language/Culture, Media Development,
> >> Marketing
> >> >> and
> >> >> > Advertising, Security, MOE.” Afterwards, another list consists of
> the
> >> >> > following: “Capabilities, Mobile Development, Challenges, MOE,
> >> >> > Infrastructure, Security.” Finally, a list of the following
> websites
> >> is
> >> >> > composed, many of which represent various small companies that
> >> provide
> >> >> > niche
> >> >> > marketing services pursuant to mobile phones.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >  More helpful is a later e-mail from Lovegrove to Barr and some of
> >> his
> >> >> > colleagues at TASC in which he announces the following:
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >  *Our team consists of:*
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >  *- TASC (PMO, creative services)*
> >> >> >
> >> >> > *- HB Gary (Strategy, planning, PMO)*
> >> >> >
> >> >> > *- Akamai (infrastructure)*
> >> >> >
> >> >> > *- Archimedes Global (Specialized linguistics, strategy, planning)*
> >> >> >
> >> >> > *- Acclaim Technical Services (specialized linguistics)*
> >> >> >
> >> >> > *- Mission Essential Personnel (linguistic services)*
> >> >> >
> >> >> > *- Cipher (strategy, planning operations)*
> >> >> >
> >> >> > *- PointAbout (rapid mobile application development, list of
> >> strategic*
> >> >> >
> >> >> > *partners)*
> >> >> >
> >> >> > *- Google (strategy, mobile application and platform development -
> >> long*
> >> >> >
> >> >> > *list of strategic partners)*
> >> >> >
> >> >> > *- Apple (mobile and desktop platform, application assistance -long
> >> >> list*
> >> >> >
> >> >> > *of strategic partners)*
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >  *We are trying to schedule an interview with ATT plus some other
> >> small
> >> >> app
> >> >> > developers.*
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >  From these and dozens of other clues and references, the following
> >> may
> >> >> be
> >> >> > determined about the nature of Romas/COIN:
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >    1.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >   Mobile phone software and applications constitute a major
> component
> >> of
> >> >> >   the program.
> >> >> >   2.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >   There's discussion of bringing in a “gaming developer,”
> apparently
> >> at
> >> >> the
> >> >> >   behest of Barr, who mentions that the team could make good use of
> >> “a
> >> >> > social
> >> >> >   gaming company maybe like zynga, gameloft, etc.” Lovegrove
> >> elsewhere
> >> >> > notes:
> >> >> >   “I know a couple of small gaming companies at MIT that might fit
> >> the
> >> >> >   bill.”
> >> >> >    3.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >   Apple and Google were active team partners, and AT&T may have
> been
> >> as
> >> >> >   well. The latter is known to have provided the NSA free reign
> over
> >> >> > customer
> >> >> >   communications (and was in turn protected by a bill granting them
> >> >> >   retroactive immunity from lawsuits). Google itself is the only
> >> company
> >> >> to
> >> >> >   have received a “Hostile to Privacy” rating from Privacy
> >> >> International.
> >> >> >   Apple is currently being investigated by Congress after the
> iPhone
> >> was
> >> >> >   revealed to compile user location data in a way that differs from
> >> >> other
> >> >> >   mobile phones; the company has claimed this to have been a “bug.”
> >> >> >    4.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >   The program makes use of several providers of “linguistic
> >> services.”
> >> >> At
> >> >> >   one point, the team discusses hiring a military-trained Arabic
> >> >> linguist.
> >> >> >   Elsewhere, Barr writes: “I feel confident I can get you a ringer
> >> for
> >> >> > Farsi
> >> >> >   if they are still interested in Farsi (we need to find that out).
> >> >> These
> >> >> >   linguists are not only going to be developing new content but
> also
> >> >> > meeting
> >> >> >   with folks, so they have to have native or near native
> proficiency
> >> and
> >> >> > have
> >> >> >   to have the cultural relevance as well.”
> >> >> >    5.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >   Alterion and SocialEyez are listed as “businesses to contact.”
> The
> >> >> former
> >> >> >   specializes in “social media monitoring tools.” The latter uses
> >> >> >   “sophisticated natural language processing methodology” in order
> to
> >> >> > “process
> >> >> >   tens of millions of multi-lingual conversations daily” while also
> >> >> > employing
> >> >> >   “researchers and media analysts on the ground;” its website also
> >> notes
> >> >> > that
> >> >> >   “Millions of people around the globe are now networked as never
> >> before
> >> >> -
> >> >> >   exchanging information and ideas, forming opinions, and speaking
> >> their
> >> >> > minds
> >> >> >   about everything from politics to products.”
> >> >> >    6.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >   At one point, TASC exec Chris Clair asks Aaron and others, “Can
> we
> >> >> name
> >> >> >   COIN Saif? Saif is the sword an Arab executioner uses when they
> >> >> > decapitate
> >> >> >   criminals. I can think of a few cool brands for this.”
> >> >> >    7.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >   A diagram attached to one of Barr's e-mails to the group (
> >> >> >   http://imageshack.us/photo/my-images/7/pmo.png/) depicts Magpii
> as
> >> >> >   interacting in some unspecified manner with “Foreign Mobile” and
> >> >> “Foreign
> >> >> >   Web.” Magpii is a project of Barr's own creation which stands for
> >> >> > “Magnify
> >> >> >   Personal Identifying Information,” involves social networking,
> and
> >> is
> >> >> >   designed for the purpose of storing personal information on
> users.
> >> >> > Although
> >> >> >   details are difficult to determine from references in Barr's
> >> e-mails,
> >> >> he
> >> >> >   discusses the project almost exclusively with members of military
> >> >> >   intelligence to which he was pitching the idea.
> >> >> >   8.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >   There are sporadic references such things as “semantic analysis,”
> >> >> “Latent
> >> >> >   Semantic Indexing,” “specialized linguistics,” and OPS, a
> >> programming
> >> >> >   language designed for solving problems using expert systems.
> >> >> >   9.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >   Barr asks the team's partner at Apple, Andy Kemp (whose signature
> >> >> lists
> >> >> >   him as being from the company's Homeland Defense/National
> Programs
> >> >> >   division), to provide him “a contact at Pixar/Disney.”
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >  Altogether, then, a successful bid for the relevant contract was
> >> seen
> >> >> to
> >> >> > require the combined capabilities of perhaps a dozen firms –
> >> >> capabilities
> >> >> > whereby millions of conversations can be monitored and
> automatically
> >> >> > analyzed, whereby a wide range of personal data can be obtained and
> >> >> stored
> >> >> > in secret, and whereby some unknown degree of information can be
> >> >> released
> >> >> > to
> >> >> > a given population through a variety of means and without any hint
> >> that
> >> >> the
> >> >> > actual source is U.S. military intelligence. All this is merely in
> >> >> addition
> >> >> > to whichever additional capabilities are not evident from the
> limited
> >> >> > description available, with the program as a whole presumably being
> >> >> > operated
> >> >> > in conjunction with other surveillance and propaganda assets
> >> controlled
> >> >> by
> >> >> > the U.S. and its partners.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >  Whatever the exact nature and scope of COIN, the firms that had
> been
> >> >> > assembled for the purpose by Barr and TASC never got a chance to
> bid
> >> on
> >> >> the
> >> >> > program's recompete. In late September, Lovegrove noted to Barr and
> >> >> others
> >> >> > that he'd spoken to the “CO [contracting officer] for COIN.” “The
> >> >> current
> >> >> > procurement approach is cancelled [sic], she cited changed
> >> >> requirements,”
> >> >> > he
> >> >> > reported. “They will be coming out with some documents in a month
> or
> >> >> two,
> >> >> > most likely an updated RFI [request for information]. There will be
> a
> >> >> > procurement following soon after. We are on the list to receive all
> >> >> > information." On January 18th of next year, Lovegrove provided an
> >> >> update:
> >> >> > “I
> >> >> > just spoke to the group chief on the contracts side (Doug K). COIN
> >> has
> >> >> been
> >> >> > replaced by a procurement called Odyssey. He says that it is in the
> >> >> > formative stages and that something should be released this year.
> The
> >> >> > contracting officer is Kim R. He believes that Jason is the COTR
> >> >> > [contracting officer's technical representative].” Another clue is
> >> >> provided
> >> >> > in the ensuing discussion when a TASC executive asks, “Does Odyssey
> >> >> combine
> >> >> > the Technology and Content pieces of the work?”
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >  The unexpected change-up didn't seem to phase the corporate
> >> >> partnership,
> >> >> > which was still a top contender to compete for the upcoming Odyssey
> >> >> > procurement. Later e-mails indicate a meeting between key members
> of
> >> the
> >> >> > group and the contracting officer for Odyssey at a location noted
> as
> >> >> “HQ,”
> >> >> > apparently for a briefing on requirements for the new program, on
> >> >> February
> >> >> > 3
> >> >> > rd of 2011. But two days after that meeting, the servers of HBGary
> >> and
> >> >> > HBGary Federal were hacked by a small team of Anonymous operatives
> in
> >> >> > retaliation for Barr's boasts to Financial Times that he had
> >> identified
> >> >> the
> >> >> > movement's “leadership;” 70,000 e-mails were thereafter released
> onto
> >> >> the
> >> >> > internet. Barr resigned a few weeks later.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >  Along with clues as to the nature of COIN and its scheduled
> >> >> replacement, a
> >> >> > close study of the HBGary e-mails also provide reasons to be
> >> concerned
> >> >> with
> >> >> > the fact that such things are being developed and deployed in the
> way
> >> >> that
> >> >> > they are. In addition to being the driving force behind the COIN
> >> >> recompete,
> >> >> > Barr was also at the center of a series of conspiracies by which
> his
> >> own
> >> >> > company and two others hired out their collective capabilities for
> >> use
> >> >> by
> >> >> > corporations that sought to destroy their political enemies by
> >> >> clandestine
> >> >> > and dishonest means, some of which appear to be illegal. None of
> the
> >> >> > companies involved have been investigated; a proposed Congressional
> >> >> inquiry
> >> >> > was denied by the committee chair, noting that it was the Justice
> >> >> > Department's decision as to whether to investigate, even though it
> >> was
> >> >> the
> >> >> > Justice Department itself that made the initial introductions.
> Those
> >> in
> >> >> the
> >> >> > intelligence contracting industry who believe themselves above the
> >> law
> >> >> are
> >> >> > entirely correct.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >  That such firms will continue to target the public with advanced
> >> >> > information warfare capabilities on behalf of major corporations is
> >> by
> >> >> > itself an extraordinary danger to mankind as a whole, particularly
> >> >> insomuch
> >> >> > as that such capabilities are becoming more effective while
> remaining
> >> >> > largely unknown outside of the intelligence industry. But a far
> >> greater
> >> >> > danger is posed by the practice of arming small and unaccountable
> >> groups
> >> >> of
> >> >> > state and military personnel with a set of tools by which to
> achieve
> >> >> better
> >> >> > and better “situational awareness” on entire populations while also
> >> >> being
> >> >> > able to manipulate the information flow in such a way as to deceive
> >> >> those
> >> >> > same populations. The idea that such power can be wielded without
> >> being
> >> >> > misused is contradicted by even a brief review of history.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >  History also demonstrates that the state will claim such powers as
> a
> >> >> > necessity in fighting some considerable threat; the U.S. has
> defended
> >> >> its
> >> >> > recent expansion of powers by claiming they will only be deployed
> to
> >> >> fight
> >> >> > terrorism and will never be used against Ameerican civilians. This
> is
> >> >> cold
> >> >> > comfort for those in the Arab world who are aware of the long
> history
> >> of
> >> >> > U.S. material support for regimes they find convenient, including
> >> those
> >> >> of
> >> >> > Saddam Hussein, Hosni Mubarak, and the House of Saud. Nor should
> >> >> Americans
> >> >> > be comforted by such promises from a government that has no way of
> >> >> ensuring
> >> >> > that they will be kept; it was just a few months ago that a U.S.
> >> general
> >> >> in
> >> >> > Afghanistan ordered a military intelligence unit to use pysops on
> >> >> visiting
> >> >> > senators in an effort to secure increased funding for the war, an
> >> >> illegal
> >> >> > act; only a few days prior, CENTCOM spokesmen were confidently
> >> telling
> >> >> the
> >> >> > public that such other psychological capabilities as persona
> >> management
> >> >> > would never be used on Americans as that would be illegal. The fact
> >> is
> >> >> that
> >> >> > such laws have been routinely broken by the military and
> intelligence
> >> >> > community, who are now been joined in this practice by segments of
> >> the
> >> >> > federal contracting industry.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >  It is inevitable, then, that such capabilities as form the
> backbone
> >> of
> >> >> > Romas/COIN and its replacement Odyssey will be deployed against a
> >> >> growing
> >> >> > segment of the world's population. The powerful institutions that
> >> wield
> >> >> > them
> >> >> > will grow all the more powerful as they are provided better and
> >> better
> >> >> > methods by which to monitor, deceive, and manipulate. The informed
> >> >> > electorate upon which liberty depends will be increasingly
> >> misinformed.
> >> >> No
> >> >> > tactical advantage conferred by the use of these programs can
> >> outweigh
> >> >> the
> >> >> > damage that will be done to mankind in the process of creating
> them.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >  *Barrett Brown*
> >> >> >
> >> >> > *Project PM*
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> > On Tue, Jun 21, 2011 at 3:04 PM, ADRIENNE TOSCANO, BLOOMBERG/
> >> NEWSROOM:
> >> >> <
> >> >> > atoscano2@bloomberg.net> wrote:
> >> >> >
> >> >> > > Barrit, Per our conversation would you please send me details
> about
> >> >> your
> >> >> > > announcement tomorrow.  Thanks, Adrienne
> >> >> > >
> >> >> > > ------------------------------------------------------------
> >> >> > > Adrienne Toscano
> >> >> > > Segment Producer - Bloomberg TV
> >> >> > > 212-617-2366
> >> >> > > atoscano2@bloomberg.net
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> > --
> >> >> > Regards,
> >> >> >
> >> >> > Barrett Brown
> >> >> > 512-560-2302
> >> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >> --
> >> >> Regards,
> >> >>
> >> >> Barrett Brown
> >> >> 512-560-2302
> >> >>
> >> >
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > --
> >> > Regards,
> >> >
> >> > Barrett Brown
> >> > 512-560-2302
> >> >
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> --
> >> Regards,
> >>
> >> Barrett Brown
> >> 512-560-2302
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> > Regards,
> >
> > Barrett Brown
> > 512-560-2302
> >
>
>
>
> --
> Regards,
>
> Barrett Brown
> 512-560-2302
>



--
Regards,

Barrett Brown
512-560-2302



--
Regards,

Barrett Brown
512-560-2302



--
Regards,

Barrett Brown
512-560-2302