hey, you want to comment on the anonymous arrests?

------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Riley
Washington bureau/Bloomberg News
(202) 624 1982
(720) 635 8553 (cell)

----- Original Message -----
From: Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com>
To: MICHAEL RILEY (BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM:)
At:  7/19 17:38:00

Cool, thanks.

On Tue, Jul 19, 2011 at 6:46 AM, MICHAEL RILEY, BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM: <
michaelriley@bloomberg.net> wrote:

Or the week after. You never know w these guys. But yep.




---
Sent From Bloomberg Mobile MSG

---- Original Message ----
From: Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com>
At: 7/18/2011 23:56

Are you guys still bringing out a piece on Endgame?

On Thu, Jun 30, 2011 at 4:32 PM, Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com>
wrote:

The e-mails that Lulzsec took from CEO of Unveillance are located in a
Gmail account set up by my main technical guy for easy searching. Go to
gmail and use this to login:

Login: karimhijazi.unveillance

Password: hbgemail

Just search Endgame and you'll find a number of discussions about them as
well as a bit of communication between the CEO and John Farrell.


On Thu, Jun 30, 2011 at 1:31 PM, MICHAEL RILEY, BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM: <
michaelriley@bloomberg.net> wrote:

202 624 1982...or after 5 pm eastern on my cell: 720 635 8553

------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Riley
Washington bureau/Bloomberg News
(202) 624 1982
(720) 635 8553 (cell)

----- Original Message -----
From: Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com>
To: MICHAEL RILEY (BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM:)
At:  6/22 22:12:38

Oh, and here's another little tidbit:
http://hbgary.anonleaks.ch/greg_hbgary_com/26795.html

On Wed, Jun 22, 2011 at 9:11 PM, Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com>
wrote:

Romas/COIN, the one I announced today. And this is the former NSA

fellow

who went over to Pixar:
http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/press_room/2002/new_adr.shtml


On Wed, Jun 22, 2011 at 9:10 PM, MICHAEL RILEY, BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM: <
michaelriley@bloomberg.net> wrote:

Say it ain't so. Even Disney and Pixar?

Seriously, though. What's the connection? What project is he talking

about

that links to pixar?

------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Riley
Washington bureau/Bloomberg News
(202) 624 1982
(720) 635 8553 (cell)

----- Original Message -----
From: Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com>
To: MICHAEL RILEY (BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM:)
At:  6/22 21:56:32

http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/jun/22/hacking-anonymous

Also, you might take a look at this:
http://hbgary.anonleaks.ch/aaron_hbgary_com/8403.html

On Wed, Jun 22, 2011 at 8:55 PM, MICHAEL RILEY, BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM:

<

michaelriley@bloomberg.net> wrote:

thx for the heads up, Barrett.

------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Riley
Washington bureau/Bloomberg News
(202) 624 1982
(720) 635 8553 (cell)

----- Original Message -----
From: Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com>
To: ADRIENNE TOSCANO (BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM:), MICHAEL RILEY

(BLOOMBERG/

NEWSROOM:)
At:  6/21 16:08:31

Adrienne-

As I noted on the phone, an accompanying explanatory piece will run

in

The

Guardian tomorrow, while the document itself, which I've pasted

below,

will

run on the wiki maintained by my group Project PM. The NYT has a

copy

and

is
vetting it now; the e-mails may be verified and other details

obtained

by

way of this search engine maintained by Anonymous, which acquired

the

71,000
e-mails in question in early February: http://hbgary.anonleaks.ch/

Michael, I'm cc'ing you on this to give you a heads up; let me know

if

you

have any questions.

***

For at least two years, the U.S. has been conducting a secretive

and

immensely sophisticated campaign of mass surveillance and data

mining

against the Arab world, allowing the intelligence community to

monitor

the

habits, conversations, and activity of millions of individuals at

once.

And

with an upgrade scheduled for later this year, the top contender to

win

the

federal contract and thus take over the program is a team of about

a

dozen

companies which were brought together in large part by Aaron Barr -

the

same
disgraced CEO who resigned from his own firm earlier this year

after

he

was

discovered to have planned a full-scale information war against

political

activists at the behest of corporate clients. The new revelation

provides

for a disturbing picture, particularly when viewed in a wider

context.

Unprecedented surveillance capabilities are being produced by an

industry

that works in secret on applications that are nonetheless funded by

the

American public – and which in some cases are used against that

very

same

public. Their products are developed on demand for an intelligence
community
that is not subject to Congressional oversight and which has been
repeatedly
shown to have misused its existing powers in ways that violate U.S.

law

as

well as American ideals. And with expanded intelligence

capabilities

by

which to monitor Arab populations in ways that would have

previously

been

impossible, those same intelligence agencies now have improved

means

by

which to provide information on dissidents to those regional

dictators

viewed by the U.S. as strategic allies.


 The nature and extent of the operation, which was known as

Romas/COIN

and

which is scheduled for replacement sometime this year by a similar

program

known as Odyssey, may be determined in part by a close reading of

hundreds

of e-mails among the 70,000 that were stolen in February from the
contracting firm HBGary Federal and its parent company HBGary.

Other

details
may be gleaned by an examination of the various other firms and

individuals

that are discussed as being potential partners.


 Of course, there are many in the U.S. that would prefer that such

details

not be revealed at all; such people tend to cite the amorphous and
much-abused concept of “national security” as sufficient reason for

the

citizenry to stand idly by as an ever-expanding coalition of

government

agencies and semi-private corporations gain greater influence over

U.S.

foreign policy. That the last decade of foreign policy as practiced

by

such

individuals has been an absolute disaster even by the admission of

many

of

those who put it into place will not phase those who nonetheless

believe

that the citizenry should be prevented from knowing what is being

done

in

its name and with its tax dollars.


 To the extent that the actions of a government are divorced from

the

informed consent of those who pay for such actions, such a

government

is

illegitimate. To the extent that power is concentrated in the hands

of

small
groups of men who wield such power behind the scenes, there is no

assurance

that such power will be used in a manner that is compatible with

the

actual

interests of that citizenry, or populations elsewhere. The known

history

of

the U.S. intelligence community is comprised in large part of

murder,

assassinations, disinformation, the topping of democratic

governments,

the

abuse of the rights of U.S. citizens, and a great number of other

things

that cannot even be defended on “national security” grounds

insomuch

as

that
many such actions have quite correctly turned entire populations

against

the
U.S. government. This is not only my opinion, but also the opinion

of

countless individuals who once served in the intelligence community

and

have
since come to criticize it and even unveil many of its secrets in

an

effort

to alert the citizenry to what has been unleashed against the world

in

the

name of “security.”


 Likewise, I will here provide as much information as I can on

Romas/COIN

and its upcoming replacement.


 ***


 Although the relatively well-known military contractor Northrop

Grumman

had
long held the contract for Romas/COIN, such contracts are subject

to

regular
recompetes by which other companies, or several working in tandem,

can

apply
to take over. In early February, HBGary Federal CEO Aaron Barr

wrote

the

following e-mail to Al Pisani, an executive at the much larger

federal

contractor TASC, a company which until recently had been owned by

Northrop

and which was now looking to compete with it for lucrative

contracts:

 "I met with [Mantech CEO] Bob Frisbie the other day to catch up.

He

is

looking to expand a capability in IO related to the COIN re-compete

but

more
for DoD. He told me he has a few acquisitions in the works that

will

increase his capability in this area. So just a thought that it

might

be

worth a phone call to see if there is any synergy and strength

between

TASC

and ManTech in this area. I think forming a team and response to

compete

against SAIC will be tough but doable." IO in this context stands

for

“information operations,” while COIN itself, as noted in an NDA

attached

to

one of the e-mails, stands for “counter intelligence. SAIC is a

larger

intelligence contractor that was expected to pursue the recompete

as

well.

 Pisani agreed to the idea, and in conjunction with Barr and fellow

TASC

exec John Lovegrove, the growing party spent much of the next year

working

to create a partnership of firms capable of providing the “client”

-

a

U.S.

agency that is never specified in the hundreds of e-mails that

follow

–

with
capabilities that would outmatch those being provided by Northrop,

SAIC,

or

other competitors.


 Several e-mails in particular provide a great deal of material by

which

to

determine the scope and intent of Romas/COIN. One that Barr wrote

to

his

own
e-mail account, likely for the purpose of adding to other documents

later,

is entitled “Notes on COIN.” It begins with a list of entries for

various

facets of the program, all of which are blank and were presumably

filled

out
later: “ISP, Operations, Language/Culture, Media Development,

Marketing

and

Advertising, Security, MOE.” Afterwards, another list consists of

the

following: “Capabilities, Mobile Development, Challenges, MOE,
Infrastructure, Security.” Finally, a list of the following

websites

is

composed, many of which represent various small companies that

provide

niche
marketing services pursuant to mobile phones.


 More helpful is a later e-mail from Lovegrove to Barr and some of

his

colleagues at TASC in which he announces the following:


 *Our team consists of:*


 *- TASC (PMO, creative services)*

*- HB Gary (Strategy, planning, PMO)*

*- Akamai (infrastructure)*

*- Archimedes Global (Specialized linguistics, strategy, planning)*

*- Acclaim Technical Services (specialized linguistics)*

*- Mission Essential Personnel (linguistic services)*

*- Cipher (strategy, planning operations)*

*- PointAbout (rapid mobile application development, list of

strategic*

*partners)*

*- Google (strategy, mobile application and platform development -

long*

*list of strategic partners)*

*- Apple (mobile and desktop platform, application assistance -long

list*

*of strategic partners)*


 *We are trying to schedule an interview with ATT plus some other

small

app

developers.*


 From these and dozens of other clues and references, the following

may

be

determined about the nature of Romas/COIN:



   1.

  Mobile phone software and applications constitute a major

component

of

  the program.
  2.

  There's discussion of bringing in a “gaming developer,”

apparently

at

the

  behest of Barr, who mentions that the team could make good use of

“a

social
  gaming company maybe like zynga, gameloft, etc.” Lovegrove

elsewhere

notes:
  “I know a couple of small gaming companies at MIT that might fit

the

  bill.”
   3.

  Apple and Google were active team partners, and AT&T may have

been

as

  well. The latter is known to have provided the NSA free reign

over

customer
  communications (and was in turn protected by a bill granting them
  retroactive immunity from lawsuits). Google itself is the only

company

to

  have received a “Hostile to Privacy” rating from Privacy

International.

  Apple is currently being investigated by Congress after the

iPhone

was

  revealed to compile user location data in a way that differs from

other

  mobile phones; the company has claimed this to have been a “bug.”
   4.

  The program makes use of several providers of “linguistic

services.”

At

  one point, the team discusses hiring a military-trained Arabic

linguist.

  Elsewhere, Barr writes: “I feel confident I can get you a ringer

for

Farsi
  if they are still interested in Farsi (we need to find that out).

These

  linguists are not only going to be developing new content but

also

meeting
  with folks, so they have to have native or near native

proficiency

and

have
  to have the cultural relevance as well.”
   5.

  Alterion and SocialEyez are listed as “businesses to contact.”

The

former

  specializes in “social media monitoring tools.” The latter uses
  “sophisticated natural language processing methodology” in order

to

“process
  tens of millions of multi-lingual conversations daily” while also
employing
  “researchers and media analysts on the ground;” its website also

notes

that
  “Millions of people around the globe are now networked as never

before

-

  exchanging information and ideas, forming opinions, and speaking

their

minds
  about everything from politics to products.”
   6.

  At one point, TASC exec Chris Clair asks Aaron and others, “Can

we

name

  COIN Saif? Saif is the sword an Arab executioner uses when they
decapitate
  criminals. I can think of a few cool brands for this.”
   7.

  A diagram attached to one of Barr's e-mails to the group (
  http://imageshack.us/photo/my-images/7/pmo.png/) depicts Magpii

as

  interacting in some unspecified manner with “Foreign Mobile” and

“Foreign

  Web.” Magpii is a project of Barr's own creation which stands for
“Magnify
  Personal Identifying Information,” involves social networking,

and

is

  designed for the purpose of storing personal information on

users.

Although
  details are difficult to determine from references in Barr's

e-mails,

he

  discusses the project almost exclusively with members of military
  intelligence to which he was pitching the idea.
  8.

  There are sporadic references such things as “semantic analysis,”

“Latent

  Semantic Indexing,” “specialized linguistics,” and OPS, a

programming

  language designed for solving problems using expert systems.
  9.

  Barr asks the team's partner at Apple, Andy Kemp (whose signature

lists

  him as being from the company's Homeland Defense/National

Programs

  division), to provide him “a contact at Pixar/Disney.”


 Altogether, then, a successful bid for the relevant contract was

seen

to

require the combined capabilities of perhaps a dozen firms –

capabilities

whereby millions of conversations can be monitored and

automatically

analyzed, whereby a wide range of personal data can be obtained and

stored

in secret, and whereby some unknown degree of information can be

released

to
a given population through a variety of means and without any hint

that

the

actual source is U.S. military intelligence. All this is merely in

addition

to whichever additional capabilities are not evident from the

limited

description available, with the program as a whole presumably being
operated
in conjunction with other surveillance and propaganda assets

controlled

by

the U.S. and its partners.


 Whatever the exact nature and scope of COIN, the firms that had

been

assembled for the purpose by Barr and TASC never got a chance to

bid

on

the

program's recompete. In late September, Lovegrove noted to Barr and

others

that he'd spoken to the “CO [contracting officer] for COIN.” “The

current

procurement approach is cancelled [sic], she cited changed

requirements,”

he
reported. “They will be coming out with some documents in a month

or

two,

most likely an updated RFI [request for information]. There will be

a

procurement following soon after. We are on the list to receive all
information." On January 18th of next year, Lovegrove provided an

update:

“I
just spoke to the group chief on the contracts side (Doug K). COIN

has

been

replaced by a procurement called Odyssey. He says that it is in the
formative stages and that something should be released this year.

The

contracting officer is Kim R. He believes that Jason is the COTR
[contracting officer's technical representative].” Another clue is

provided

in the ensuing discussion when a TASC executive asks, “Does Odyssey

combine

the Technology and Content pieces of the work?”


 The unexpected change-up didn't seem to phase the corporate

partnership,

which was still a top contender to compete for the upcoming Odyssey
procurement. Later e-mails indicate a meeting between key members

of

the

group and the contracting officer for Odyssey at a location noted

as

“HQ,”

apparently for a briefing on requirements for the new program, on

February

3
rd of 2011. But two days after that meeting, the servers of HBGary

and

HBGary Federal were hacked by a small team of Anonymous operatives

in

retaliation for Barr's boasts to Financial Times that he had

identified

the

movement's “leadership;” 70,000 e-mails were thereafter released

onto

the

internet. Barr resigned a few weeks later.


 Along with clues as to the nature of COIN and its scheduled

replacement, a

close study of the HBGary e-mails also provide reasons to be

concerned

with

the fact that such things are being developed and deployed in the

way

that

they are. In addition to being the driving force behind the COIN

recompete,

Barr was also at the center of a series of conspiracies by which

his

own

company and two others hired out their collective capabilities for

use

by

corporations that sought to destroy their political enemies by

clandestine

and dishonest means, some of which appear to be illegal. None of

the

companies involved have been investigated; a proposed Congressional

inquiry

was denied by the committee chair, noting that it was the Justice
Department's decision as to whether to investigate, even though it

was

the

Justice Department itself that made the initial introductions.

Those

in

the

intelligence contracting industry who believe themselves above the

law

are

entirely correct.


 That such firms will continue to target the public with advanced
information warfare capabilities on behalf of major corporations is

by

itself an extraordinary danger to mankind as a whole, particularly

insomuch

as that such capabilities are becoming more effective while

remaining

largely unknown outside of the intelligence industry. But a far

greater

danger is posed by the practice of arming small and unaccountable

groups

of

state and military personnel with a set of tools by which to

achieve

better

and better “situational awareness” on entire populations while also

being

able to manipulate the information flow in such a way as to deceive

those

same populations. The idea that such power can be wielded without

being

misused is contradicted by even a brief review of history.


 History also demonstrates that the state will claim such powers as

a

necessity in fighting some considerable threat; the U.S. has

defended

its

recent expansion of powers by claiming they will only be deployed

to

fight

terrorism and will never be used against Ameerican civilians. This

is

cold

comfort for those in the Arab world who are aware of the long

history

of

U.S. material support for regimes they find convenient, including

those

of

Saddam Hussein, Hosni Mubarak, and the House of Saud. Nor should

Americans

be comforted by such promises from a government that has no way of

ensuring

that they will be kept; it was just a few months ago that a U.S.

general

in

Afghanistan ordered a military intelligence unit to use pysops on

visiting

senators in an effort to secure increased funding for the war, an

illegal

act; only a few days prior, CENTCOM spokesmen were confidently

telling

the

public that such other psychological capabilities as persona

management

would never be used on Americans as that would be illegal. The fact

is

that

such laws have been routinely broken by the military and

intelligence

community, who are now been joined in this practice by segments of

the

federal contracting industry.


 It is inevitable, then, that such capabilities as form the

backbone

of

Romas/COIN and its replacement Odyssey will be deployed against a

growing

segment of the world's population. The powerful institutions that

wield

them
will grow all the more powerful as they are provided better and

better

methods by which to monitor, deceive, and manipulate. The informed
electorate upon which liberty depends will be increasingly

misinformed.

No

tactical advantage conferred by the use of these programs can

outweigh

the

damage that will be done to mankind in the process of creating

them.

 *Barrett Brown*

*Project PM*





On Tue, Jun 21, 2011 at 3:04 PM, ADRIENNE TOSCANO, BLOOMBERG/

NEWSROOM:

<

atoscano2@bloomberg.net> wrote:

Barrit, Per our conversation would you please send me details

about

your

announcement tomorrow.  Thanks, Adrienne

------------------------------------------------------------
Adrienne Toscano
Segment Producer - Bloomberg TV
212-617-2366
atoscano2@bloomberg.net

--
Regards,

Barrett Brown
512-560-2302

--
Regards,

Barrett Brown
512-560-2302

--
Regards,

Barrett Brown
512-560-2302

--
Regards,

Barrett Brown
512-560-2302

--
Regards,

Barrett Brown
512-560-2302

--
Regards,

Barrett Brown
512-560-2302

-- 
Regards,

Barrett Brown
512-560-2302