---
Sent From Bloomberg Mobile MSG
---- Original Message ----
From: Barrett Brown <
barriticus@gmail.com>
At: 7/18/2011 23:56
Are you guys still bringing out a piece on Endgame?
On Thu, Jun 30, 2011 at 4:32 PM, Barrett Brown <
barriticus@gmail.com> wrote:
> The e-mails that Lulzsec took from CEO of Unveillance are located in a
> Gmail account set up by my main technical guy for easy searching. Go to
> gmail and use this to login:
>
> Login: karimhijazi.unveillance
>
> Password: hbgemail
>
> Just search Endgame and you'll find a number of discussions about them as
> well as a bit of communication between the CEO and John Farrell.
>
>
> On Thu, Jun 30, 2011 at 1:31 PM, MICHAEL RILEY, BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM: <
>
michaelriley@bloomberg.net> wrote:
>
>>
202 624 1982...or after 5 pm eastern on my cell:
720 635 8553
>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>> Michael Riley
>> Washington bureau/Bloomberg News
>>
(202) 624 1982
>>
(720) 635 8553 (cell)
>>
>> ----- Original Message -----
>> From: Barrett Brown <
barriticus@gmail.com>
>> To: MICHAEL RILEY (BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM:)
>> At: 6/22 22:12:38
>>
>> Oh, and here's another little tidbit:
>>
http://hbgary.anonleaks.ch/greg_hbgary_com/26795.html
>>
>> On Wed, Jun 22, 2011 at 9:11 PM, Barrett Brown <
barriticus@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>> > Romas/COIN, the one I announced today. And this is the former NSA fellow
>> > who went over to Pixar:
>> >
http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/press_room/2002/new_adr.shtml
>> >
>> >
>> > On Wed, Jun 22, 2011 at 9:10 PM, MICHAEL RILEY, BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM: <
>> >
michaelriley@bloomberg.net> wrote:
>> >
>> >> Say it ain't so. Even Disney and Pixar?
>> >>
>> >> Seriously, though. What's the connection? What project is he talking
>> about
>> >> that links to pixar?
>> >>
>> >> ------------------------------------------------------------
>> >> Michael Riley
>> >> Washington bureau/Bloomberg News
>> >>
(202) 624 1982
>> >>
(720) 635 8553 (cell)
>> >>
>> >> ----- Original Message -----
>> >> From: Barrett Brown <
barriticus@gmail.com>
>> >> To: MICHAEL RILEY (BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM:)
>> >> At: 6/22 21:56:32
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>>
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/jun/22/hacking-anonymous
>> >>
>> >> Also, you might take a look at this:
>> >>
http://hbgary.anonleaks.ch/aaron_hbgary_com/8403.html
>> >>
>> >> On Wed, Jun 22, 2011 at 8:55 PM, MICHAEL RILEY, BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM: <
>> >>
michaelriley@bloomberg.net> wrote:
>> >>
>> >> > thx for the heads up, Barrett.
>> >> >
>> >> > ------------------------------------------------------------
>> >> > Michael Riley
>> >> > Washington bureau/Bloomberg News
>> >> >
(202) 624 1982
>> >> >
(720) 635 8553 (cell)
>> >> >
>> >> > ----- Original Message -----
>> >> > From: Barrett Brown <
barriticus@gmail.com>
>> >> > To: ADRIENNE TOSCANO (BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM:), MICHAEL RILEY
>> (BLOOMBERG/
>> >> > NEWSROOM:)
>> >> > At: 6/21 16:08:31
>> >> >
>> >> > Adrienne-
>> >> >
>> >> > As I noted on the phone, an accompanying explanatory piece will run
>> in
>> >> The
>> >> > Guardian tomorrow, while the document itself, which I've pasted
>> below,
>> >> will
>> >> > run on the wiki maintained by my group Project PM. The NYT has a copy
>> >> and
>> >> > is
>> >> > vetting it now; the e-mails may be verified and other details
>> obtained
>> >> by
>> >> > way of this search engine maintained by Anonymous, which acquired the
>> >> > 71,000
>> >> > e-mails in question in early February:
http://hbgary.anonleaks.ch/
>> >> >
>> >> > Michael, I'm cc'ing you on this to give you a heads up; let me know
>> if
>> >> you
>> >> > have any questions.
>> >> >
>> >> > ***
>> >> >
>> >> > For at least two years, the U.S. has been conducting a secretive and
>> >> > immensely sophisticated campaign of mass surveillance and data mining
>> >> > against the Arab world, allowing the intelligence community to
>> monitor
>> >> the
>> >> > habits, conversations, and activity of millions of individuals at
>> once.
>> >> And
>> >> > with an upgrade scheduled for later this year, the top contender to
>> win
>> >> the
>> >> > federal contract and thus take over the program is a team of about a
>> >> dozen
>> >> > companies which were brought together in large part by Aaron Barr -
>> the
>> >> > same
>> >> > disgraced CEO who resigned from his own firm earlier this year after
>> he
>> >> was
>> >> > discovered to have planned a full-scale information war against
>> >> political
>> >> > activists at the behest of corporate clients. The new revelation
>> >> provides
>> >> > for a disturbing picture, particularly when viewed in a wider
>> context.
>> >> > Unprecedented surveillance capabilities are being produced by an
>> >> industry
>> >> > that works in secret on applications that are nonetheless funded by
>> the
>> >> > American public and which in some cases are used against that very
>> >> same
>> >> > public. Their products are developed on demand for an intelligence
>> >> > community
>> >> > that is not subject to Congressional oversight and which has been
>> >> > repeatedly
>> >> > shown to have misused its existing powers in ways that violate U.S.
>> law
>> >> as
>> >> > well as American ideals. And with expanded intelligence capabilities
>> by
>> >> > which to monitor Arab populations in ways that would have previously
>> >> been
>> >> > impossible, those same intelligence agencies now have improved means
>> by
>> >> > which to provide information on dissidents to those regional
>> dictators
>> >> > viewed by the U.S. as strategic allies.
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> > The nature and extent of the operation, which was known as
>> Romas/COIN
>> >> and
>> >> > which is scheduled for replacement sometime this year by a similar
>> >> program
>> >> > known as Odyssey, may be determined in part by a close reading of
>> >> hundreds
>> >> > of e-mails among the 70,000 that were stolen in February from the
>> >> > contracting firm HBGary Federal and its parent company HBGary. Other
>> >> > details
>> >> > may be gleaned by an examination of the various other firms and
>> >> individuals
>> >> > that are discussed as being potential partners.
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> > Of course, there are many in the U.S. that would prefer that such
>> >> details
>> >> > not be revealed at all; such people tend to cite the amorphous and
>> >> > much-abused concept of national security as sufficient reason for
>> the
>> >> > citizenry to stand idly by as an ever-expanding coalition of
>> government
>> >> > agencies and semi-private corporations gain greater influence over
>> U.S.
>> >> > foreign policy. That the last decade of foreign policy as practiced
>> by
>> >> such
>> >> > individuals has been an absolute disaster even by the admission of
>> many
>> >> of
>> >> > those who put it into place will not phase those who nonetheless
>> believe
>> >> > that the citizenry should be prevented from knowing what is being
>> done
>> >> in
>> >> > its name and with its tax dollars.
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> > To the extent that the actions of a government are divorced from the
>> >> > informed consent of those who pay for such actions, such a government
>> is
>> >> > illegitimate. To the extent that power is concentrated in the hands
>> of
>> >> > small
>> >> > groups of men who wield such power behind the scenes, there is no
>> >> assurance
>> >> > that such power will be used in a manner that is compatible with the
>> >> actual
>> >> > interests of that citizenry, or populations elsewhere. The known
>> history
>> >> of
>> >> > the U.S. intelligence community is comprised in large part of murder,
>> >> > assassinations, disinformation, the topping of democratic
>> governments,
>> >> the
>> >> > abuse of the rights of U.S. citizens, and a great number of other
>> things
>> >> > that cannot even be defended on national security grounds insomuch
>> as
>> >> > that
>> >> > many such actions have quite correctly turned entire populations
>> against
>> >> > the
>> >> > U.S. government. This is not only my opinion, but also the opinion of
>> >> > countless individuals who once served in the intelligence community
>> and
>> >> > have
>> >> > since come to criticize it and even unveil many of its secrets in an
>> >> effort
>> >> > to alert the citizenry to what has been unleashed against the world
>> in
>> >> the
>> >> > name of security.
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> > Likewise, I will here provide as much information as I can on
>> >> Romas/COIN
>> >> > and its upcoming replacement.
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> > ***
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> > Although the relatively well-known military contractor Northrop
>> Grumman
>> >> > had
>> >> > long held the contract for Romas/COIN, such contracts are subject to
>> >> > regular
>> >> > recompetes by which other companies, or several working in tandem,
>> can
>> >> > apply
>> >> > to take over. In early February, HBGary Federal CEO Aaron Barr wrote
>> the
>> >> > following e-mail to Al Pisani, an executive at the much larger
>> federal
>> >> > contractor TASC, a company which until recently had been owned by
>> >> Northrop
>> >> > and which was now looking to compete with it for lucrative contracts:
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> > "I met with [Mantech CEO] Bob Frisbie the other day to catch up. He
>> is
>> >> > looking to expand a capability in IO related to the COIN re-compete
>> but
>> >> > more
>> >> > for DoD. He told me he has a few acquisitions in the works that will
>> >> > increase his capability in this area. So just a thought that it might
>> be
>> >> > worth a phone call to see if there is any synergy and strength
>> between
>> >> TASC
>> >> > and ManTech in this area. I think forming a team and response to
>> compete
>> >> > against SAIC will be tough but doable." IO in this context stands for
>> >> > information operations, while COIN itself, as noted in an NDA
>> attached
>> >> to
>> >> > one of the e-mails, stands for counter intelligence. SAIC is a
>> larger
>> >> > intelligence contractor that was expected to pursue the recompete as
>> >> well.
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> > Pisani agreed to the idea, and in conjunction with Barr and fellow
>> TASC
>> >> > exec John Lovegrove, the growing party spent much of the next year
>> >> working
>> >> > to create a partnership of firms capable of providing the client -
>> a
>> >> U.S.
>> >> > agency that is never specified in the hundreds of e-mails that follow
>>
>> >> > with
>> >> > capabilities that would outmatch those being provided by Northrop,
>> SAIC,
>> >> or
>> >> > other competitors.
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> > Several e-mails in particular provide a great deal of material by
>> which
>> >> to
>> >> > determine the scope and intent of Romas/COIN. One that Barr wrote to
>> his
>> >> > own
>> >> > e-mail account, likely for the purpose of adding to other documents
>> >> later,
>> >> > is entitled Notes on COIN. It begins with a list of entries for
>> >> various
>> >> > facets of the program, all of which are blank and were presumably
>> filled
>> >> > out
>> >> > later: ISP, Operations, Language/Culture, Media Development,
>> Marketing
>> >> and
>> >> > Advertising, Security, MOE. Afterwards, another list consists of the
>> >> > following: Capabilities, Mobile Development, Challenges, MOE,
>> >> > Infrastructure, Security. Finally, a list of the following websites
>> is
>> >> > composed, many of which represent various small companies that
>> provide
>> >> > niche
>> >> > marketing services pursuant to mobile phones.
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> > More helpful is a later e-mail from Lovegrove to Barr and some of
>> his
>> >> > colleagues at TASC in which he announces the following:
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> > *Our team consists of:*
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> > *- TASC (PMO, creative services)*
>> >> >
>> >> > *- HB Gary (Strategy, planning, PMO)*
>> >> >
>> >> > *- Akamai (infrastructure)*
>> >> >
>> >> > *- Archimedes Global (Specialized linguistics, strategy, planning)*
>> >> >
>> >> > *- Acclaim Technical Services (specialized linguistics)*
>> >> >
>> >> > *- Mission Essential Personnel (linguistic services)*
>> >> >
>> >> > *- Cipher (strategy, planning operations)*
>> >> >
>> >> > *- PointAbout (rapid mobile application development, list of
>> strategic*
>> >> >
>> >> > *partners)*
>> >> >
>> >> > *- Google (strategy, mobile application and platform development -
>> long*
>> >> >
>> >> > *list of strategic partners)*
>> >> >
>> >> > *- Apple (mobile and desktop platform, application assistance -long
>> >> list*
>> >> >
>> >> > *of strategic partners)*
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> > *We are trying to schedule an interview with ATT plus some other
>> small
>> >> app
>> >> > developers.*
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> > From these and dozens of other clues and references, the following
>> may
>> >> be
>> >> > determined about the nature of Romas/COIN:
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> > 1.
>> >> >
>> >> > Mobile phone software and applications constitute a major component
>> of
>> >> > the program.
>> >> > 2.
>> >> >
>> >> > There's discussion of bringing in a gaming developer, apparently
>> at
>> >> the
>> >> > behest of Barr, who mentions that the team could make good use of
>> a
>> >> > social
>> >> > gaming company maybe like zynga, gameloft, etc. Lovegrove
>> elsewhere
>> >> > notes:
>> >> > I know a couple of small gaming companies at MIT that might fit
>> the
>> >> > bill.
>> >> > 3.
>> >> >
>> >> > Apple and Google were active team partners, and AT&T may have been
>> as
>> >> > well. The latter is known to have provided the NSA free reign over
>> >> > customer
>> >> > communications (and was in turn protected by a bill granting them
>> >> > retroactive immunity from lawsuits). Google itself is the only
>> company
>> >> to
>> >> > have received a Hostile to Privacy rating from Privacy
>> >> International.
>> >> > Apple is currently being investigated by Congress after the iPhone
>> was
>> >> > revealed to compile user location data in a way that differs from
>> >> other
>> >> > mobile phones; the company has claimed this to have been a bug.
>> >> > 4.
>> >> >
>> >> > The program makes use of several providers of linguistic
>> services.
>> >> At
>> >> > one point, the team discusses hiring a military-trained Arabic
>> >> linguist.
>> >> > Elsewhere, Barr writes: I feel confident I can get you a ringer
>> for
>> >> > Farsi
>> >> > if they are still interested in Farsi (we need to find that out).
>> >> These
>> >> > linguists are not only going to be developing new content but also
>> >> > meeting
>> >> > with folks, so they have to have native or near native proficiency
>> and
>> >> > have
>> >> > to have the cultural relevance as well.
>> >> > 5.
>> >> >
>> >> > Alterion and SocialEyez are listed as businesses to contact. The
>> >> former
>> >> > specializes in social media monitoring tools. The latter uses
>> >> > sophisticated natural language processing methodology in order to
>> >> > process
>> >> > tens of millions of multi-lingual conversations daily while also
>> >> > employing
>> >> > researchers and media analysts on the ground; its website also
>> notes
>> >> > that
>> >> > Millions of people around the globe are now networked as never
>> before
>> >> -
>> >> > exchanging information and ideas, forming opinions, and speaking
>> their
>> >> > minds
>> >> > about everything from politics to products.
>> >> > 6.
>> >> >
>> >> > At one point, TASC exec Chris Clair asks Aaron and others, Can we
>> >> name
>> >> > COIN Saif? Saif is the sword an Arab executioner uses when they
>> >> > decapitate
>> >> > criminals. I can think of a few cool brands for this.
>> >> > 7.
>> >> >
>> >> > A diagram attached to one of Barr's e-mails to the group (
>> >> >
http://imageshack.us/photo/my-images/7/pmo.png/) depicts Magpii as
>> >> > interacting in some unspecified manner with Foreign Mobile and
>> >> Foreign
>> >> > Web. Magpii is a project of Barr's own creation which stands for
>> >> > Magnify
>> >> > Personal Identifying Information, involves social networking, and
>> is
>> >> > designed for the purpose of storing personal information on users.
>> >> > Although
>> >> > details are difficult to determine from references in Barr's
>> e-mails,
>> >> he
>> >> > discusses the project almost exclusively with members of military
>> >> > intelligence to which he was pitching the idea.
>> >> > 8.
>> >> >
>> >> > There are sporadic references such things as semantic analysis,
>> >> Latent
>> >> > Semantic Indexing, specialized linguistics, and OPS, a
>> programming
>> >> > language designed for solving problems using expert systems.
>> >> > 9.
>> >> >
>> >> > Barr asks the team's partner at Apple, Andy Kemp (whose signature
>> >> lists
>> >> > him as being from the company's Homeland Defense/National Programs
>> >> > division), to provide him a contact at Pixar/Disney.
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> > Altogether, then, a successful bid for the relevant contract was
>> seen
>> >> to
>> >> > require the combined capabilities of perhaps a dozen firms
>> >> capabilities
>> >> > whereby millions of conversations can be monitored and automatically
>> >> > analyzed, whereby a wide range of personal data can be obtained and
>> >> stored
>> >> > in secret, and whereby some unknown degree of information can be
>> >> released
>> >> > to
>> >> > a given population through a variety of means and without any hint
>> that
>> >> the
>> >> > actual source is U.S. military intelligence. All this is merely in
>> >> addition
>> >> > to whichever additional capabilities are not evident from the limited
>> >> > description available, with the program as a whole presumably being
>> >> > operated
>> >> > in conjunction with other surveillance and propaganda assets
>> controlled
>> >> by
>> >> > the U.S. and its partners.
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> > Whatever the exact nature and scope of COIN, the firms that had been
>> >> > assembled for the purpose by Barr and TASC never got a chance to bid
>> on
>> >> the
>> >> > program's recompete. In late September, Lovegrove noted to Barr and
>> >> others
>> >> > that he'd spoken to the CO [contracting officer] for COIN. The
>> >> current
>> >> > procurement approach is cancelled [sic], she cited changed
>> >> requirements,
>> >> > he
>> >> > reported. They will be coming out with some documents in a month or
>> >> two,
>> >> > most likely an updated RFI [request for information]. There will be a
>> >> > procurement following soon after. We are on the list to receive all
>> >> > information." On January 18th of next year, Lovegrove provided an
>> >> update:
>> >> > I
>> >> > just spoke to the group chief on the contracts side (Doug K). COIN
>> has
>> >> been
>> >> > replaced by a procurement called Odyssey. He says that it is in the
>> >> > formative stages and that something should be released this year. The
>> >> > contracting officer is Kim R. He believes that Jason is the COTR
>> >> > [contracting officer's technical representative]. Another clue is
>> >> provided
>> >> > in the ensuing discussion when a TASC executive asks, Does Odyssey
>> >> combine
>> >> > the Technology and Content pieces of the work?
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> > The unexpected change-up didn't seem to phase the corporate
>> >> partnership,
>> >> > which was still a top contender to compete for the upcoming Odyssey
>> >> > procurement. Later e-mails indicate a meeting between key members of
>> the
>> >> > group and the contracting officer for Odyssey at a location noted as
>> >> HQ,
>> >> > apparently for a briefing on requirements for the new program, on
>> >> February
>> >> > 3
>> >> > rd of 2011. But two days after that meeting, the servers of HBGary
>> and
>> >> > HBGary Federal were hacked by a small team of Anonymous operatives in
>> >> > retaliation for Barr's boasts to Financial Times that he had
>> identified
>> >> the
>> >> > movement's leadership; 70,000 e-mails were thereafter released onto
>> >> the
>> >> > internet. Barr resigned a few weeks later.
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> > Along with clues as to the nature of COIN and its scheduled
>> >> replacement, a
>> >> > close study of the HBGary e-mails also provide reasons to be
>> concerned
>> >> with
>> >> > the fact that such things are being developed and deployed in the way
>> >> that
>> >> > they are. In addition to being the driving force behind the COIN
>> >> recompete,
>> >> > Barr was also at the center of a series of conspiracies by which his
>> own
>> >> > company and two others hired out their collective capabilities for
>> use
>> >> by
>> >> > corporations that sought to destroy their political enemies by
>> >> clandestine
>> >> > and dishonest means, some of which appear to be illegal. None of the
>> >> > companies involved have been investigated; a proposed Congressional
>> >> inquiry
>> >> > was denied by the committee chair, noting that it was the Justice
>> >> > Department's decision as to whether to investigate, even though it
>> was
>> >> the
>> >> > Justice Department itself that made the initial introductions. Those
>> in
>> >> the
>> >> > intelligence contracting industry who believe themselves above the
>> law
>> >> are
>> >> > entirely correct.
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> > That such firms will continue to target the public with advanced
>> >> > information warfare capabilities on behalf of major corporations is
>> by
>> >> > itself an extraordinary danger to mankind as a whole, particularly
>> >> insomuch
>> >> > as that such capabilities are becoming more effective while remaining
>> >> > largely unknown outside of the intelligence industry. But a far
>> greater
>> >> > danger is posed by the practice of arming small and unaccountable
>> groups
>> >> of
>> >> > state and military personnel with a set of tools by which to achieve
>> >> better
>> >> > and better situational awareness on entire populations while also
>> >> being
>> >> > able to manipulate the information flow in such a way as to deceive
>> >> those
>> >> > same populations. The idea that such power can be wielded without
>> being
>> >> > misused is contradicted by even a brief review of history.
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> > History also demonstrates that the state will claim such powers as a
>> >> > necessity in fighting some considerable threat; the U.S. has defended
>> >> its
>> >> > recent expansion of powers by claiming they will only be deployed to
>> >> fight
>> >> > terrorism and will never be used against Ameerican civilians. This is
>> >> cold
>> >> > comfort for those in the Arab world who are aware of the long history
>> of
>> >> > U.S. material support for regimes they find convenient, including
>> those
>> >> of
>> >> > Saddam Hussein, Hosni Mubarak, and the House of Saud. Nor should
>> >> Americans
>> >> > be comforted by such promises from a government that has no way of
>> >> ensuring
>> >> > that they will be kept; it was just a few months ago that a U.S.
>> general
>> >> in
>> >> > Afghanistan ordered a military intelligence unit to use pysops on
>> >> visiting
>> >> > senators in an effort to secure increased funding for the war, an
>> >> illegal
>> >> > act; only a few days prior, CENTCOM spokesmen were confidently
>> telling
>> >> the
>> >> > public that such other psychological capabilities as persona
>> management
>> >> > would never be used on Americans as that would be illegal. The fact
>> is
>> >> that
>> >> > such laws have been routinely broken by the military and intelligence
>> >> > community, who are now been joined in this practice by segments of
>> the
>> >> > federal contracting industry.
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> > It is inevitable, then, that such capabilities as form the backbone
>> of
>> >> > Romas/COIN and its replacement Odyssey will be deployed against a
>> >> growing
>> >> > segment of the world's population. The powerful institutions that
>> wield
>> >> > them
>> >> > will grow all the more powerful as they are provided better and
>> better
>> >> > methods by which to monitor, deceive, and manipulate. The informed
>> >> > electorate upon which liberty depends will be increasingly
>> misinformed.
>> >> No
>> >> > tactical advantage conferred by the use of these programs can
>> outweigh
>> >> the
>> >> > damage that will be done to mankind in the process of creating them.
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> > *Barrett Brown*
>> >> >
>> >> > *Project PM*
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> > On Tue, Jun 21, 2011 at 3:04 PM, ADRIENNE TOSCANO, BLOOMBERG/
>> NEWSROOM:
>> >> <
>> >> >
atoscano2@bloomberg.net> wrote:
>> >> >
>> >> > > Barrit, Per our conversation would you please send me details about
>> >> your
>> >> > > announcement tomorrow. Thanks, Adrienne
>> >> > >
>> >> > > ------------------------------------------------------------
>> >> > > Adrienne Toscano
>> >> > > Segment Producer - Bloomberg TV
>> >> > >
212-617-2366
>> >> > >
atoscano2@bloomberg.net
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> > --
>> >> > Regards,
>> >> >
>> >> > Barrett Brown
>> >> >
512-560-2302
>> >> >
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> --
>> >> Regards,
>> >>
>> >> Barrett Brown
>> >>
512-560-2302
>> >>
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > --
>> > Regards,
>> >
>> > Barrett Brown
>> >
512-560-2302
>> >
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> Regards,
>>
>> Barrett Brown
>>
512-560-2302
>
>
>
>
> --
> Regards,
>
> Barrett Brown
>
512-560-2302
>
--
Regards,
Barrett Brown
512-560-2302