Re: give me a call when you get a second

On Thu, Jun 30, 2011 at 4:32 PM, Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com> wrote:

The e-mails that Lulzsec took from CEO of Unveillance are located in a Gmail account set up by my main technical guy for easy searching. Go to gmail and use this to login:

Login: karimhijazi.unveillance

Password: hbgemail

Just search Endgame and you'll find a number of discussions about them as well as a bit of communication between the CEO and John Farrell.

On Thu, Jun 30, 2011 at 1:31 PM, MICHAEL RILEY, BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM: <michaelriley@bloomberg.net> wrote:

202 624 1982...or after 5 pm eastern on my cell: 720 635 8553

------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Riley
Washington bureau/Bloomberg News
(202) 624 1982
(720) 635 8553 (cell)

----- Original Message -----
From: Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com>
To: MICHAEL RILEY (BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM:)
At: 6/22 22:12:38

Oh, and here's another little tidbit:
http://hbgary.anonleaks.ch/greg_hbgary_com/26795.html

On Wed, Jun 22, 2011 at 9:11 PM, Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com> wrote:

> Romas/COIN, the one I announced today. And this is the former NSA fellow
> who went over to Pixar:
> http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/press_room/2002/new_adr.shtml
>
>
> On Wed, Jun 22, 2011 at 9:10 PM, MICHAEL RILEY, BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM: <
> michaelriley@bloomberg.net> wrote:
>
>> Say it ain't so. Even Disney and Pixar?
>>
>> Seriously, though. What's the connection? What project is he talking about
>> that links to pixar?
>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>> Michael Riley
>> Washington bureau/Bloomberg News
>> (202) 624 1982
>> (720) 635 8553 (cell)
>>
>> ----- Original Message -----
>> From: Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com>
>> To: MICHAEL RILEY (BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM:)
>> At: 6/22 21:56:32
>>
>>
>> http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/jun/22/hacking-anonymous
>>
>> Also, you might take a look at this:
>> http://hbgary.anonleaks.ch/aaron_hbgary_com/8403.html
>>
>> On Wed, Jun 22, 2011 at 8:55 PM, MICHAEL RILEY, BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM: <
>> michaelriley@bloomberg.net> wrote:
>>
>> > thx for the heads up, Barrett.
>> >
>> > ------------------------------------------------------------
>> > Michael Riley
>> > Washington bureau/Bloomberg News
>> > (202) 624 1982
>> > (720) 635 8553 (cell)
>> >
>> > ----- Original Message -----
>> > From: Barrett Brown <barriticus@gmail.com>
>> > To: ADRIENNE TOSCANO (BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM:), MICHAEL RILEY (BLOOMBERG/
>> > NEWSROOM:)
>> > At: 6/21 16:08:31
>> >
>> > Adrienne-
>> >
>> > As I noted on the phone, an accompanying explanatory piece will run in
>> The
>> > Guardian tomorrow, while the document itself, which I've pasted below,
>> will
>> > run on the wiki maintained by my group Project PM. The NYT has a copy
>> and
>> > is
>> > vetting it now; the e-mails may be verified and other details obtained
>> by
>> > way of this search engine maintained by Anonymous, which acquired the
>> > 71,000
>> > e-mails in question in early February: http://hbgary.anonleaks.ch/
>> >
>> > Michael, I'm cc'ing you on this to give you a heads up; let me know if
>> you
>> > have any questions.
>> >
>> > ***
>> >
>> > For at least two years, the U.S. has been conducting a secretive and
>> > immensely sophisticated campaign of mass surveillance and data mining
>> > against the Arab world, allowing the intelligence community to monitor
>> the
>> > habits, conversations, and activity of millions of individuals at once.
>> And
>> > with an upgrade scheduled for later this year, the top contender to win
>> the
>> > federal contract and thus take over the program is a team of about a
>> dozen
>> > companies which were brought together in large part by Aaron Barr - the
>> > same
>> > disgraced CEO who resigned from his own firm earlier this year after he
>> was
>> > discovered to have planned a full-scale information war against
>> political
>> > activists at the behest of corporate clients. The new revelation
>> provides
>> > for a disturbing picture, particularly when viewed in a wider context.
>> > Unprecedented surveillance capabilities are being produced by an
>> industry
>> > that works in secret on applications that are nonetheless funded by the
>> > American public and which in some cases are used against that very
>> same
>> > public. Their products are developed on demand for an intelligence
>> > community
>> > that is not subject to Congressional oversight and which has been
>> > repeatedly
>> > shown to have misused its existing powers in ways that violate U.S. law
>> as
>> > well as American ideals. And with expanded intelligence capabilities by
>> > which to monitor Arab populations in ways that would have previously
>> been
>> > impossible, those same intelligence agencies now have improved means by
>> > which to provide information on dissidents to those regional dictators
>> > viewed by the U.S. as strategic allies.
>> >
>> >
>> > The nature and extent of the operation, which was known as Romas/COIN
>> and
>> > which is scheduled for replacement sometime this year by a similar
>> program
>> > known as Odyssey, may be determined in part by a close reading of
>> hundreds
>> > of e-mails among the 70,000 that were stolen in February from the
>> > contracting firm HBGary Federal and its parent company HBGary. Other
>> > details
>> > may be gleaned by an examination of the various other firms and
>> individuals
>> > that are discussed as being potential partners.
>> >
>> >
>> > Of course, there are many in the U.S. that would prefer that such
>> details
>> > not be revealed at all; such people tend to cite the amorphous and
>> > much-abused concept of national security as sufficient reason for the
>> > citizenry to stand idly by as an ever-expanding coalition of government
>> > agencies and semi-private corporations gain greater influence over U.S.
>> > foreign policy. That the last decade of foreign policy as practiced by
>> such
>> > individuals has been an absolute disaster even by the admission of many
>> of
>> > those who put it into place will not phase those who nonetheless believe
>> > that the citizenry should be prevented from knowing what is being done
>> in
>> > its name and with its tax dollars.
>> >
>> >
>> > To the extent that the actions of a government are divorced from the
>> > informed consent of those who pay for such actions, such a government is
>> > illegitimate. To the extent that power is concentrated in the hands of
>> > small
>> > groups of men who wield such power behind the scenes, there is no
>> assurance
>> > that such power will be used in a manner that is compatible with the
>> actual
>> > interests of that citizenry, or populations elsewhere. The known history
>> of
>> > the U.S. intelligence community is comprised in large part of murder,
>> > assassinations, disinformation, the topping of democratic governments,
>> the
>> > abuse of the rights of U.S. citizens, and a great number of other things
>> > that cannot even be defended on national security grounds insomuch as
>> > that
>> > many such actions have quite correctly turned entire populations against
>> > the
>> > U.S. government. This is not only my opinion, but also the opinion of
>> > countless individuals who once served in the intelligence community and
>> > have
>> > since come to criticize it and even unveil many of its secrets in an
>> effort
>> > to alert the citizenry to what has been unleashed against the world in
>> the
>> > name of security.
>> >
>> >
>> > Likewise, I will here provide as much information as I can on
>> Romas/COIN
>> > and its upcoming replacement.
>> >
>> >
>> > ***
>> >
>> >
>> > Although the relatively well-known military contractor Northrop Grumman
>> > had
>> > long held the contract for Romas/COIN, such contracts are subject to
>> > regular
>> > recompetes by which other companies, or several working in tandem, can
>> > apply
>> > to take over. In early February, HBGary Federal CEO Aaron Barr wrote the
>> > following e-mail to Al Pisani, an executive at the much larger federal
>> > contractor TASC, a company which until recently had been owned by
>> Northrop
>> > and which was now looking to compete with it for lucrative contracts:
>> >
>> >
>> > "I met with [Mantech CEO] Bob Frisbie the other day to catch up. He is
>> > looking to expand a capability in IO related to the COIN re-compete but
>> > more
>> > for DoD. He told me he has a few acquisitions in the works that will
>> > increase his capability in this area. So just a thought that it might be
>> > worth a phone call to see if there is any synergy and strength between
>> TASC
>> > and ManTech in this area. I think forming a team and response to compete
>> > against SAIC will be tough but doable." IO in this context stands for
>> > information operations, while COIN itself, as noted in an NDA attached
>> to
>> > one of the e-mails, stands for counter intelligence. SAIC is a larger
>> > intelligence contractor that was expected to pursue the recompete as
>> well.
>> >
>> >
>> > Pisani agreed to the idea, and in conjunction with Barr and fellow TASC
>> > exec John Lovegrove, the growing party spent much of the next year
>> working
>> > to create a partnership of firms capable of providing the client - a
>> U.S.
>> > agency that is never specified in the hundreds of e-mails that follow
>> > with
>> > capabilities that would outmatch those being provided by Northrop, SAIC,
>> or
>> > other competitors.
>> >
>> >
>> > Several e-mails in particular provide a great deal of material by which
>> to
>> > determine the scope and intent of Romas/COIN. One that Barr wrote to his
>> > own
>> > e-mail account, likely for the purpose of adding to other documents
>> later,
>> > is entitled Notes on COIN. It begins with a list of entries for
>> various
>> > facets of the program, all of which are blank and were presumably filled
>> > out
>> > later: ISP, Operations, Language/Culture, Media Development, Marketing
>> and
>> > Advertising, Security, MOE. Afterwards, another list consists of the
>> > following: Capabilities, Mobile Development, Challenges, MOE,
>> > Infrastructure, Security. Finally, a list of the following websites is
>> > composed, many of which represent various small companies that provide
>> > niche
>> > marketing services pursuant to mobile phones.
>> >
>> >
>> > More helpful is a later e-mail from Lovegrove to Barr and some of his
>> > colleagues at TASC in which he announces the following:
>> >
>> >
>> > *Our team consists of:*
>> >
>> >
>> > *- TASC (PMO, creative services)*
>> >
>> > *- HB Gary (Strategy, planning, PMO)*
>> >
>> > *- Akamai (infrastructure)*
>> >
>> > *- Archimedes Global (Specialized linguistics, strategy, planning)*
>> >
>> > *- Acclaim Technical Services (specialized linguistics)*
>> >
>> > *- Mission Essential Personnel (linguistic services)*
>> >
>> > *- Cipher (strategy, planning operations)*
>> >
>> > *- PointAbout (rapid mobile application development, list of strategic*
>> >
>> > *partners)*
>> >
>> > *- Google (strategy, mobile application and platform development - long*
>> >
>> > *list of strategic partners)*
>> >
>> > *- Apple (mobile and desktop platform, application assistance -long
>> list*
>> >
>> > *of strategic partners)*
>> >
>> >
>> > *We are trying to schedule an interview with ATT plus some other small
>> app
>> > developers.*
>> >
>> >
>> > From these and dozens of other clues and references, the following may
>> be
>> > determined about the nature of Romas/COIN:
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > 1.
>> >
>> > Mobile phone software and applications constitute a major component of
>> > the program.
>> > 2.
>> >
>> > There's discussion of bringing in a gaming developer, apparently at
>> the
>> > behest of Barr, who mentions that the team could make good use of a
>> > social
>> > gaming company maybe like zynga, gameloft, etc. Lovegrove elsewhere
>> > notes:
>> > I know a couple of small gaming companies at MIT that might fit the
>> > bill.
>> > 3.
>> >
>> > Apple and Google were active team partners, and AT&T may have been as
>> > well. The latter is known to have provided the NSA free reign over
>> > customer
>> > communications (and was in turn protected by a bill granting them
>> > retroactive immunity from lawsuits). Google itself is the only company
>> to
>> > have received a Hostile to Privacy rating from Privacy
>> International.
>> > Apple is currently being investigated by Congress after the iPhone was
>> > revealed to compile user location data in a way that differs from
>> other
>> > mobile phones; the company has claimed this to have been a bug.
>> > 4.
>> >
>> > The program makes use of several providers of linguistic services.
>> At
>> > one point, the team discusses hiring a military-trained Arabic
>> linguist.
>> > Elsewhere, Barr writes: I feel confident I can get you a ringer for
>> > Farsi
>> > if they are still interested in Farsi (we need to find that out).
>> These
>> > linguists are not only going to be developing new content but also
>> > meeting
>> > with folks, so they have to have native or near native proficiency and
>> > have
>> > to have the cultural relevance as well.
>> > 5.
>> >
>> > Alterion and SocialEyez are listed as businesses to contact. The
>> former
>> > specializes in social media monitoring tools. The latter uses
>> > sophisticated natural language processing methodology in order to
>> > process
>> > tens of millions of multi-lingual conversations daily while also
>> > employing
>> > researchers and media analysts on the ground; its website also notes
>> > that
>> > Millions of people around the globe are now networked as never before
>> -
>> > exchanging information and ideas, forming opinions, and speaking their
>> > minds
>> > about everything from politics to products.
>> > 6.
>> >
>> > At one point, TASC exec Chris Clair asks Aaron and others, Can we
>> name
>> > COIN Saif? Saif is the sword an Arab executioner uses when they
>> > decapitate
>> > criminals. I can think of a few cool brands for this.
>> > 7.
>> >
>> > A diagram attached to one of Barr's e-mails to the group (
>> > http://imageshack.us/photo/my-images/7/pmo.png/) depicts Magpii as
>> > interacting in some unspecified manner with Foreign Mobile and
>> Foreign
>> > Web. Magpii is a project of Barr's own creation which stands for
>> > Magnify
>> > Personal Identifying Information, involves social networking, and is
>> > designed for the purpose of storing personal information on users.
>> > Although
>> > details are difficult to determine from references in Barr's e-mails,
>> he
>> > discusses the project almost exclusively with members of military
>> > intelligence to which he was pitching the idea.
>> > 8.
>> >
>> > There are sporadic references such things as semantic analysis,
>> Latent
>> > Semantic Indexing, specialized linguistics, and OPS, a programming
>> > language designed for solving problems using expert systems.
>> > 9.
>> >
>> > Barr asks the team's partner at Apple, Andy Kemp (whose signature
>> lists
>> > him as being from the company's Homeland Defense/National Programs
>> > division), to provide him a contact at Pixar/Disney.
>> >
>> >
>> > Altogether, then, a successful bid for the relevant contract was seen
>> to
>> > require the combined capabilities of perhaps a dozen firms
>> capabilities
>> > whereby millions of conversations can be monitored and automatically
>> > analyzed, whereby a wide range of personal data can be obtained and
>> stored
>> > in secret, and whereby some unknown degree of information can be
>> released
>> > to
>> > a given population through a variety of means and without any hint that
>> the
>> > actual source is U.S. military intelligence. All this is merely in
>> addition
>> > to whichever additional capabilities are not evident from the limited
>> > description available, with the program as a whole presumably being
>> > operated
>> > in conjunction with other surveillance and propaganda assets controlled
>> by
>> > the U.S. and its partners.
>> >
>> >
>> > Whatever the exact nature and scope of COIN, the firms that had been
>> > assembled for the purpose by Barr and TASC never got a chance to bid on
>> the
>> > program's recompete. In late September, Lovegrove noted to Barr and
>> others
>> > that he'd spoken to the CO [contracting officer] for COIN. The
>> current
>> > procurement approach is cancelled [sic], she cited changed
>> requirements,
>> > he
>> > reported. They will be coming out with some documents in a month or
>> two,
>> > most likely an updated RFI [request for information]. There will be a
>> > procurement following soon after. We are on the list to receive all
>> > information." On January 18th of next year, Lovegrove provided an
>> update:
>> > I
>> > just spoke to the group chief on the contracts side (Doug K). COIN has
>> been
>> > replaced by a procurement called Odyssey. He says that it is in the
>> > formative stages and that something should be released this year. The
>> > contracting officer is Kim R. He believes that Jason is the COTR
>> > [contracting officer's technical representative]. Another clue is
>> provided
>> > in the ensuing discussion when a TASC executive asks, Does Odyssey
>> combine
>> > the Technology and Content pieces of the work?
>> >
>> >
>> > The unexpected change-up didn't seem to phase the corporate
>> partnership,
>> > which was still a top contender to compete for the upcoming Odyssey
>> > procurement. Later e-mails indicate a meeting between key members of the
>> > group and the contracting officer for Odyssey at a location noted as
>> HQ,
>> > apparently for a briefing on requirements for the new program, on
>> February
>> > 3
>> > rd of 2011. But two days after that meeting, the servers of HBGary and
>> > HBGary Federal were hacked by a small team of Anonymous operatives in
>> > retaliation for Barr's boasts to Financial Times that he had identified
>> the
>> > movement's leadership; 70,000 e-mails were thereafter released onto
>> the
>> > internet. Barr resigned a few weeks later.
>> >
>> >
>> > Along with clues as to the nature of COIN and its scheduled
>> replacement, a
>> > close study of the HBGary e-mails also provide reasons to be concerned
>> with
>> > the fact that such things are being developed and deployed in the way
>> that
>> > they are. In addition to being the driving force behind the COIN
>> recompete,
>> > Barr was also at the center of a series of conspiracies by which his own
>> > company and two others hired out their collective capabilities for use
>> by
>> > corporations that sought to destroy their political enemies by
>> clandestine
>> > and dishonest means, some of which appear to be illegal. None of the
>> > companies involved have been investigated; a proposed Congressional
>> inquiry
>> > was denied by the committee chair, noting that it was the Justice
>> > Department's decision as to whether to investigate, even though it was
>> the
>> > Justice Department itself that made the initial introductions. Those in
>> the
>> > intelligence contracting industry who believe themselves above the law
>> are
>> > entirely correct.
>> >
>> >
>> > That such firms will continue to target the public with advanced
>> > information warfare capabilities on behalf of major corporations is by
>> > itself an extraordinary danger to mankind as a whole, particularly
>> insomuch
>> > as that such capabilities are becoming more effective while remaining
>> > largely unknown outside of the intelligence industry. But a far greater
>> > danger is posed by the practice of arming small and unaccountable groups
>> of
>> > state and military personnel with a set of tools by which to achieve
>> better
>> > and better situational awareness on entire populations while also
>> being
>> > able to manipulate the information flow in such a way as to deceive
>> those
>> > same populations. The idea that such power can be wielded without being
>> > misused is contradicted by even a brief review of history.
>> >
>> >
>> > History also demonstrates that the state will claim such powers as a
>> > necessity in fighting some considerable threat; the U.S. has defended
>> its
>> > recent expansion of powers by claiming they will only be deployed to
>> fight
>> > terrorism and will never be used against Ameerican civilians. This is
>> cold
>> > comfort for those in the Arab world who are aware of the long history of
>> > U.S. material support for regimes they find convenient, including those
>> of
>> > Saddam Hussein, Hosni Mubarak, and the House of Saud. Nor should
>> Americans
>> > be comforted by such promises from a government that has no way of
>> ensuring
>> > that they will be kept; it was just a few months ago that a U.S. general
>> in
>> > Afghanistan ordered a military intelligence unit to use pysops on
>> visiting
>> > senators in an effort to secure increased funding for the war, an
>> illegal
>> > act; only a few days prior, CENTCOM spokesmen were confidently telling
>> the
>> > public that such other psychological capabilities as persona management
>> > would never be used on Americans as that would be illegal. The fact is
>> that
>> > such laws have been routinely broken by the military and intelligence
>> > community, who are now been joined in this practice by segments of the
>> > federal contracting industry.
>> >
>> >
>> > It is inevitable, then, that such capabilities as form the backbone of
>> > Romas/COIN and its replacement Odyssey will be deployed against a
>> growing
>> > segment of the world's population. The powerful institutions that wield
>> > them
>> > will grow all the more powerful as they are provided better and better
>> > methods by which to monitor, deceive, and manipulate. The informed
>> > electorate upon which liberty depends will be increasingly misinformed.
>> No
>> > tactical advantage conferred by the use of these programs can outweigh
>> the
>> > damage that will be done to mankind in the process of creating them.
>> >
>> >
>> > *Barrett Brown*
>> >
>> > *Project PM*
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > On Tue, Jun 21, 2011 at 3:04 PM, ADRIENNE TOSCANO, BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM:
>> <
>> > atoscano2@bloomberg.net> wrote:
>> >
>> > > Barrit, Per our conversation would you please send me details about
>> your
>> > > announcement tomorrow. Thanks, Adrienne
>> > >
>> > > ------------------------------------------------------------
>> > > Adrienne Toscano
>> > > Segment Producer - Bloomberg TV
>> > > 212-617-2366
>> > > atoscano2@bloomberg.net
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > --
>> > Regards,
>> >
>> > Barrett Brown
>> > 512-560-2302
>> >
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> Regards,
>>
>> Barrett Brown
>> 512-560-2302
>>
>
>
>
> --
> Regards,
>
> Barrett Brown
> 512-560-2302
>

--
Regards,

Barrett Brown
512-560-2302

--
Regards,

Barrett Brown
512-560-2302