To: MICHAEL RILEY (BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM:)
At: 6/22 21:56:32
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/jun/22/hacking-anonymous
Also, you might take a look at this:
http://hbgary.anonleaks.ch/aaron_hbgary_com/8403.html
On Wed, Jun 22, 2011 at 8:55 PM, MICHAEL RILEY, BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM: <
michaelriley@bloomberg.net> wrote:
> thx for the heads up, Barrett.
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------
> Michael Riley
> Washington bureau/Bloomberg News
>
(202) 624 1982
>
(720) 635 8553 (cell)
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: Barrett Brown <
barriticus@gmail.com>
> To: ADRIENNE TOSCANO (BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM:), MICHAEL RILEY (BLOOMBERG/
> NEWSROOM:)
> At: 6/21 16:08:31
>
> Adrienne-
>
> As I noted on the phone, an accompanying explanatory piece will run in The
> Guardian tomorrow, while the document itself, which I've pasted below, will
> run on the wiki maintained by my group Project PM. The NYT has a copy and
> is
> vetting it now; the e-mails may be verified and other details obtained by
> way of this search engine maintained by Anonymous, which acquired the
> 71,000
> e-mails in question in early February:
http://hbgary.anonleaks.ch/
>
> Michael, I'm cc'ing you on this to give you a heads up; let me know if you
> have any questions.
>
> ***
>
> For at least two years, the U.S. has been conducting a secretive and
> immensely sophisticated campaign of mass surveillance and data mining
> against the Arab world, allowing the intelligence community to monitor the
> habits, conversations, and activity of millions of individuals at once. And
> with an upgrade scheduled for later this year, the top contender to win the
> federal contract and thus take over the program is a team of about a dozen
> companies which were brought together in large part by Aaron Barr - the
> same
> disgraced CEO who resigned from his own firm earlier this year after he was
> discovered to have planned a full-scale information war against political
> activists at the behest of corporate clients. The new revelation provides
> for a disturbing picture, particularly when viewed in a wider context.
> Unprecedented surveillance capabilities are being produced by an industry
> that works in secret on applications that are nonetheless funded by the
> American public and which in some cases are used against that very same
> public. Their products are developed on demand for an intelligence
> community
> that is not subject to Congressional oversight and which has been
> repeatedly
> shown to have misused its existing powers in ways that violate U.S. law as
> well as American ideals. And with expanded intelligence capabilities by
> which to monitor Arab populations in ways that would have previously been
> impossible, those same intelligence agencies now have improved means by
> which to provide information on dissidents to those regional dictators
> viewed by the U.S. as strategic allies.
>
>
> The nature and extent of the operation, which was known as Romas/COIN and
> which is scheduled for replacement sometime this year by a similar program
> known as Odyssey, may be determined in part by a close reading of hundreds
> of e-mails among the 70,000 that were stolen in February from the
> contracting firm HBGary Federal and its parent company HBGary. Other
> details
> may be gleaned by an examination of the various other firms and individuals
> that are discussed as being potential partners.
>
>
> Of course, there are many in the U.S. that would prefer that such details
> not be revealed at all; such people tend to cite the amorphous and
> much-abused concept of national security as sufficient reason for the
> citizenry to stand idly by as an ever-expanding coalition of government
> agencies and semi-private corporations gain greater influence over U.S.
> foreign policy. That the last decade of foreign policy as practiced by such
> individuals has been an absolute disaster even by the admission of many of
> those who put it into place will not phase those who nonetheless believe
> that the citizenry should be prevented from knowing what is being done in
> its name and with its tax dollars.
>
>
> To the extent that the actions of a government are divorced from the
> informed consent of those who pay for such actions, such a government is
> illegitimate. To the extent that power is concentrated in the hands of
> small
> groups of men who wield such power behind the scenes, there is no assurance
> that such power will be used in a manner that is compatible with the actual
> interests of that citizenry, or populations elsewhere. The known history of
> the U.S. intelligence community is comprised in large part of murder,
> assassinations, disinformation, the topping of democratic governments, the
> abuse of the rights of U.S. citizens, and a great number of other things
> that cannot even be defended on national security grounds insomuch as
> that
> many such actions have quite correctly turned entire populations against
> the
> U.S. government. This is not only my opinion, but also the opinion of
> countless individuals who once served in the intelligence community and
> have
> since come to criticize it and even unveil many of its secrets in an effort
> to alert the citizenry to what has been unleashed against the world in the
> name of security.
>
>
> Likewise, I will here provide as much information as I can on Romas/COIN
> and its upcoming replacement.
>
>
> ***
>
>
> Although the relatively well-known military contractor Northrop Grumman
> had
> long held the contract for Romas/COIN, such contracts are subject to
> regular
> recompetes by which other companies, or several working in tandem, can
> apply
> to take over. In early February, HBGary Federal CEO Aaron Barr wrote the
> following e-mail to Al Pisani, an executive at the much larger federal
> contractor TASC, a company which until recently had been owned by Northrop
> and which was now looking to compete with it for lucrative contracts:
>
>
> "I met with [Mantech CEO] Bob Frisbie the other day to catch up. He is
> looking to expand a capability in IO related to the COIN re-compete but
> more
> for DoD. He told me he has a few acquisitions in the works that will
> increase his capability in this area. So just a thought that it might be
> worth a phone call to see if there is any synergy and strength between TASC
> and ManTech in this area. I think forming a team and response to compete
> against SAIC will be tough but doable." IO in this context stands for
> information operations, while COIN itself, as noted in an NDA attached to
> one of the e-mails, stands for counter intelligence. SAIC is a larger
> intelligence contractor that was expected to pursue the recompete as well.
>
>
> Pisani agreed to the idea, and in conjunction with Barr and fellow TASC
> exec John Lovegrove, the growing party spent much of the next year working
> to create a partnership of firms capable of providing the client - a U.S.
> agency that is never specified in the hundreds of e-mails that follow
> with
> capabilities that would outmatch those being provided by Northrop, SAIC, or
> other competitors.
>
>
> Several e-mails in particular provide a great deal of material by which to
> determine the scope and intent of Romas/COIN. One that Barr wrote to his
> own
> e-mail account, likely for the purpose of adding to other documents later,
> is entitled Notes on COIN. It begins with a list of entries for various
> facets of the program, all of which are blank and were presumably filled
> out
> later: ISP, Operations, Language/Culture, Media Development, Marketing and
> Advertising, Security, MOE. Afterwards, another list consists of the
> following: Capabilities, Mobile Development, Challenges, MOE,
> Infrastructure, Security. Finally, a list of the following websites is
> composed, many of which represent various small companies that provide
> niche
> marketing services pursuant to mobile phones.
>
>
> More helpful is a later e-mail from Lovegrove to Barr and some of his
> colleagues at TASC in which he announces the following:
>
>
> *Our team consists of:*
>
>
> *- TASC (PMO, creative services)*
>
> *- HB Gary (Strategy, planning, PMO)*
>
> *- Akamai (infrastructure)*
>
> *- Archimedes Global (Specialized linguistics, strategy, planning)*
>
> *- Acclaim Technical Services (specialized linguistics)*
>
> *- Mission Essential Personnel (linguistic services)*
>
> *- Cipher (strategy, planning operations)*
>
> *- PointAbout (rapid mobile application development, list of strategic*
>
> *partners)*
>
> *- Google (strategy, mobile application and platform development - long*
>
> *list of strategic partners)*
>
> *- Apple (mobile and desktop platform, application assistance -long list*
>
> *of strategic partners)*
>
>
> *We are trying to schedule an interview with ATT plus some other small app
> developers.*
>
>
> From these and dozens of other clues and references, the following may be
> determined about the nature of Romas/COIN:
>
>
>
> 1.
>
> Mobile phone software and applications constitute a major component of
> the program.
> 2.
>
> There's discussion of bringing in a gaming developer, apparently at the
> behest of Barr, who mentions that the team could make good use of a
> social
> gaming company maybe like zynga, gameloft, etc. Lovegrove elsewhere
> notes:
> I know a couple of small gaming companies at MIT that might fit the
> bill.
> 3.
>
> Apple and Google were active team partners, and AT&T may have been as
> well. The latter is known to have provided the NSA free reign over
> customer
> communications (and was in turn protected by a bill granting them
> retroactive immunity from lawsuits). Google itself is the only company to
> have received a Hostile to Privacy rating from Privacy International.
> Apple is currently being investigated by Congress after the iPhone was
> revealed to compile user location data in a way that differs from other
> mobile phones; the company has claimed this to have been a bug.
> 4.
>
> The program makes use of several providers of linguistic services. At
> one point, the team discusses hiring a military-trained Arabic linguist.
> Elsewhere, Barr writes: I feel confident I can get you a ringer for
> Farsi
> if they are still interested in Farsi (we need to find that out). These
> linguists are not only going to be developing new content but also
> meeting
> with folks, so they have to have native or near native proficiency and
> have
> to have the cultural relevance as well.
> 5.
>
> Alterion and SocialEyez are listed as businesses to contact. The former
> specializes in social media monitoring tools. The latter uses
> sophisticated natural language processing methodology in order to
> process
> tens of millions of multi-lingual conversations daily while also
> employing
> researchers and media analysts on the ground; its website also notes
> that
> Millions of people around the globe are now networked as never before -
> exchanging information and ideas, forming opinions, and speaking their
> minds
> about everything from politics to products.
> 6.
>
> At one point, TASC exec Chris Clair asks Aaron and others, Can we name
> COIN Saif? Saif is the sword an Arab executioner uses when they
> decapitate
> criminals. I can think of a few cool brands for this.
> 7.
>
> A diagram attached to one of Barr's e-mails to the group (
>
http://imageshack.us/photo/my-images/7/pmo.png/) depicts Magpii as
> interacting in some unspecified manner with Foreign Mobile and Foreign
> Web. Magpii is a project of Barr's own creation which stands for
> Magnify
> Personal Identifying Information, involves social networking, and is
> designed for the purpose of storing personal information on users.
> Although
> details are difficult to determine from references in Barr's e-mails, he
> discusses the project almost exclusively with members of military
> intelligence to which he was pitching the idea.
> 8.
>
> There are sporadic references such things as semantic analysis, Latent
> Semantic Indexing, specialized linguistics, and OPS, a programming
> language designed for solving problems using expert systems.
> 9.
>
> Barr asks the team's partner at Apple, Andy Kemp (whose signature lists
> him as being from the company's Homeland Defense/National Programs
> division), to provide him a contact at Pixar/Disney.
>
>
> Altogether, then, a successful bid for the relevant contract was seen to
> require the combined capabilities of perhaps a dozen firms capabilities
> whereby millions of conversations can be monitored and automatically
> analyzed, whereby a wide range of personal data can be obtained and stored
> in secret, and whereby some unknown degree of information can be released
> to
> a given population through a variety of means and without any hint that the
> actual source is U.S. military intelligence. All this is merely in addition
> to whichever additional capabilities are not evident from the limited
> description available, with the program as a whole presumably being
> operated
> in conjunction with other surveillance and propaganda assets controlled by
> the U.S. and its partners.
>
>
> Whatever the exact nature and scope of COIN, the firms that had been
> assembled for the purpose by Barr and TASC never got a chance to bid on the
> program's recompete. In late September, Lovegrove noted to Barr and others
> that he'd spoken to the CO [contracting officer] for COIN. The current
> procurement approach is cancelled [sic], she cited changed requirements,
> he
> reported. They will be coming out with some documents in a month or two,
> most likely an updated RFI [request for information]. There will be a
> procurement following soon after. We are on the list to receive all
> information." On January 18th of next year, Lovegrove provided an update:
> I
> just spoke to the group chief on the contracts side (Doug K). COIN has been
> replaced by a procurement called Odyssey. He says that it is in the
> formative stages and that something should be released this year. The
> contracting officer is Kim R. He believes that Jason is the COTR
> [contracting officer's technical representative]. Another clue is provided
> in the ensuing discussion when a TASC executive asks, Does Odyssey combine
> the Technology and Content pieces of the work?
>
>
> The unexpected change-up didn't seem to phase the corporate partnership,
> which was still a top contender to compete for the upcoming Odyssey
> procurement. Later e-mails indicate a meeting between key members of the
> group and the contracting officer for Odyssey at a location noted as HQ,
> apparently for a briefing on requirements for the new program, on February
> 3
> rd of 2011. But two days after that meeting, the servers of HBGary and
> HBGary Federal were hacked by a small team of Anonymous operatives in
> retaliation for Barr's boasts to Financial Times that he had identified the
> movement's leadership; 70,000 e-mails were thereafter released onto the
> internet. Barr resigned a few weeks later.
>
>
> Along with clues as to the nature of COIN and its scheduled replacement, a
> close study of the HBGary e-mails also provide reasons to be concerned with
> the fact that such things are being developed and deployed in the way that
> they are. In addition to being the driving force behind the COIN recompete,
> Barr was also at the center of a series of conspiracies by which his own
> company and two others hired out their collective capabilities for use by
> corporations that sought to destroy their political enemies by clandestine
> and dishonest means, some of which appear to be illegal. None of the
> companies involved have been investigated; a proposed Congressional inquiry
> was denied by the committee chair, noting that it was the Justice
> Department's decision as to whether to investigate, even though it was the
> Justice Department itself that made the initial introductions. Those in the
> intelligence contracting industry who believe themselves above the law are
> entirely correct.
>
>
> That such firms will continue to target the public with advanced
> information warfare capabilities on behalf of major corporations is by
> itself an extraordinary danger to mankind as a whole, particularly insomuch
> as that such capabilities are becoming more effective while remaining
> largely unknown outside of the intelligence industry. But a far greater
> danger is posed by the practice of arming small and unaccountable groups of
> state and military personnel with a set of tools by which to achieve better
> and better situational awareness on entire populations while also being
> able to manipulate the information flow in such a way as to deceive those
> same populations. The idea that such power can be wielded without being
> misused is contradicted by even a brief review of history.
>
>
> History also demonstrates that the state will claim such powers as a
> necessity in fighting some considerable threat; the U.S. has defended its
> recent expansion of powers by claiming they will only be deployed to fight
> terrorism and will never be used against Ameerican civilians. This is cold
> comfort for those in the Arab world who are aware of the long history of
> U.S. material support for regimes they find convenient, including those of
> Saddam Hussein, Hosni Mubarak, and the House of Saud. Nor should Americans
> be comforted by such promises from a government that has no way of ensuring
> that they will be kept; it was just a few months ago that a U.S. general in
> Afghanistan ordered a military intelligence unit to use pysops on visiting
> senators in an effort to secure increased funding for the war, an illegal
> act; only a few days prior, CENTCOM spokesmen were confidently telling the
> public that such other psychological capabilities as persona management
> would never be used on Americans as that would be illegal. The fact is that
> such laws have been routinely broken by the military and intelligence
> community, who are now been joined in this practice by segments of the
> federal contracting industry.
>
>
> It is inevitable, then, that such capabilities as form the backbone of
> Romas/COIN and its replacement Odyssey will be deployed against a growing
> segment of the world's population. The powerful institutions that wield
> them
> will grow all the more powerful as they are provided better and better
> methods by which to monitor, deceive, and manipulate. The informed
> electorate upon which liberty depends will be increasingly misinformed. No
> tactical advantage conferred by the use of these programs can outweigh the
> damage that will be done to mankind in the process of creating them.
>
>
> *Barrett Brown*
>
> *Project PM*
>
>
>
>
>
> On Tue, Jun 21, 2011 at 3:04 PM, ADRIENNE TOSCANO, BLOOMBERG/ NEWSROOM: <
>
atoscano2@bloomberg.net> wrote:
>
> > Barrit, Per our conversation would you please send me details about your
> > announcement tomorrow. Thanks, Adrienne
> >
> > ------------------------------------------------------------
> > Adrienne Toscano
> > Segment Producer - Bloomberg TV
> >
212-617-2366
> >
atoscano2@bloomberg.net
>
>
>
>
> --
> Regards,
>
> Barrett Brown
>
512-560-2302
>
--
Regards,
Barrett Brown
512-560-2302