On Wed, Jun 8, 2011 at 1:00 PM, Barrett Brown <
barriticus@gmail.com> wrote:
> Congrats man. You in Vermont? al-Jazeera gave in on those changes but then I
> had to make a few more tweaks - including changes directly contradictory to
> the ones this radio goober was asking for - and now I'm still waiting to
> hear back from them. It's been the most ridiculous editorial process ever.
> If they don't end up running it, you think Rolling Stone would be
> interested? I want to get this program revealed in a way that will ensure
> attention, and even though I "retired" from Anon a few weeks back, editors
> still consider me a subject rather than a writer like I used to be.
>
> On Wed, Jun 8, 2011 at 10:46 AM, Michael Hastings <
mhastings@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>>
>> Hey dude--apologies for the delay. just got married and returned from
>> central america. did you find a home for it? i think it's great stuff.
>> don't get me started on editors. let's catch up soon if you have a
>> moment.
>>
>> On Fri, May 27, 2011 at 5:25 PM, Barrett Brown <
barriticus@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>> > I wrote this piece for al-Jazeera and it was set to go up on the site
>> > yesterday but then some other editor jumped in and asked me to rewrite
>> > it,
>> > "humanize" it, make it more "punchy," and do "at least four solid
>> > interviews," so I cancelled the three-part series I was supposed to do.
>> > I
>> > want to try to find a home for it, otherwise I'll just publish it myself
>> > on
>> > Daily Kos or some shit. Any ideas? Basically, I'm revealing the nature
>> > of a
>> > massive and unprecedented espionage program that targets the Arab world,
>> > and
>> > which I'm presenting after having pieced together details from a couple
>> > hundred leaked e-mails. I want to get this out soon without some other
>> > incompetent fucking editor trying to "humanize" the fucking thing. Let
>> > me
>> > know if know of anyone who might take it.
>> >
>> > ***
>> >
>> > For at least two years, the U.S. military has been conducting a
>> > sophisticated campaign of mass surveillance and “data mining” across the
>> > Arab world. And were it not for a scandal that led to his downfall, the
>> > ongoing operation may very well have been reorganized and even updated
>> > further by a collection of intelligence contractors assembled in large
>> > part
>> > by Aaron Barr – one of the major players in a conspiracy by which he and
>> > two
>> > other contractors sought to engage in unethical and potentially illegal
>> > attacks on a series of domestic targets on behalf of institutions like
>> > Bank
>> > of America and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.
>> >
>> > The nature and extent of the intelligence project, which was known as
>> > Romas/COIN and which is scheduled for replacement this year by a similar
>> > program known as Odyssey, may be determined in part by a close reading
>> > of
>> > hundreds of e-mails among the 70,000 that were stolen from Barr's
>> > federal
>> > contracting firm, HBGary Federal, as well as its parent company, HBGary.
>> > Other details may be gleaned by an examination of the various other
>> > firms
>> > and individuals that are referred to either as being among those who
>> > joined
>> > forces in order to win the contract from its current holder or merely
>> > noted
>> > in e-mail conversations as potential partners in the effort by virtue of
>> > possessing particular skills or capabilities.
>> >
>> > Compiling the numerous details with additional research and knowledge of
>> > the
>> > industry results in a disturbing picture, particularly when viewed in a
>> > wider context. Unprecedented surveillance capabilities are being
>> > produced by
>> > an industry that works in secret on applications that are nonetheless
>> > funded
>> > by the public. Their products are developed on demand for an
>> > intelligence
>> > community that is not subject to Congressional oversight and which has
>> > been
>> > repeatedly revealed as having misused its existing powers in ways that
>> > violate U.S. law and American ideals.
>> >
>> > Although the relatively well-known military contractor Northrop Grumman
>> > had
>> > long held the contract for Romas/COIN, such contracts are subject to
>> > regular
>> > recompetes by which other companies, or several working in tandem, can
>> > apply
>> > to take over. In early February, Aaron Barr - CEO of the
>> > increasingly-respected intelligence contracting firm HBGary Federal –
>> > wrote
>> > the following e-mail to Al Pisani, an executive at the much larger
>> > federal
>> > contractor TASC.
>> >
>> > "I met with [Mantech CEO] Bob Frisbie the other day to catch up. He is
>> > looking to expand a capability in IO related to the COIN re-compete but
>> > more
>> > for DoD. He told me he has a few acquisitions in the works that will
>> > increase his capability in this area. So just a thought that it might be
>> > worth a phone call to see if there is any synergy and strength between
>> > TASC
>> > and ManTech in this area. I think forming a team and response to compete
>> > against SAIC will be tough but doable." IO in this context stands for
>> > “information operations,” while COIN itself, as noted in an NDA attached
>> > to
>> > one of the e-mails, stands for “counter intelligence. SAIC is a larger
>> > intelligence contractor that was expected to pursue the recompete as
>> > well.
>> >
>> > Pisani agreed to the idea, and in conjunction with Barr and fellow TASC
>> > exec
>> > John Lovegrove, the growing party spent much of the next year working to
>> > create a partnership of firms capable of providing the “client” - a U.S.
>> > agency that is never specified in the hundreds of e-mails that follow –
>> > with
>> > capabilities that would outmatch those being provided by Northrop, SAIC,
>> > or
>> > other competitors.
>> >
>> > Several e-mails in particular provide a great deal of material by which
>> > to
>> > determine the scope and intent of Romas/COIN. One that Barr wrote to his
>> > own
>> > e-mail account, likely for the purpose of adding to other documents
>> > later,
>> > is entitled “Notes on COIN.” It begins with a list of entries for
>> > various
>> > facets of the program, all of which are blank and were presumably filled
>> > out
>> > later: “ISP, Operations, Language/Culture, Media Development, Marketing
>> > and
>> > Advertising, Security, MOE.” Afterwards, another list consists of the
>> > following: “Capabilities, Mobile Development, Challenges, MOE,
>> > Infrastructure, Security.” Finally, a list of the following websites is
>> > composed, many of which represent various small companies that provide
>> > niche
>> > marketing services pursuant to mobile phones.
>> >
>> > More helpful is a later e-mail from Lovegrove to Barr and some of his
>> > colleagues at TASC in which he announces the following:
>> >
>> > Our team consists of:
>> >
>> > - TASC (PMO, creative services)
>> >
>> > - HB Gary (Strategy, planning, PMO)
>> >
>> > - Akamai (infrastructure)
>> >
>> > - Archimedes Global (Specialized linguistics, strategy, planning)
>> >
>> > - Acclaim Technical Services (specialized linguistics)
>> >
>> > - Mission Essential Personnel (linguistic services)
>> >
>> > - Cipher (strategy, planning operations)
>> >
>> > - PointAbout (rapid mobile application development, list of strategic
>> >
>> > partners)
>> >
>> > - Google (strategy, mobile application and platform development - long
>> >
>> > list of strategic partners)
>> >
>> > - Apple (mobile and desktop platform, application assistance -long list
>> >
>> > of strategic partners)
>> >
>> > We are trying to schedule an interview with ATT plus some other small
>> > app
>> > developers.
>> >
>> > From these and dozens of other clues and references, the following may
>> > be
>> > determined about the nature of Romas/COIN:
>> >
>> > Mobile phone software and applications constitute a major component of
>> > the
>> > program.
>> >
>> > There's discussion of bringing in a “gaming developer,” apparently at
>> > the
>> > behest of Barr, who mentions that the team could make good use of “a
>> > social
>> > gaming company maybe like zynga, gameloft, etc.” Lovegrove elsewhere
>> > notes:
>> > “I know a couple of small gaming companies at MIT that might fit the
>> > bill.”
>> >
>> > Apple and Google were active team partners, and AT&T may have been as
>> > well.
>> > The latter is known to have provided the NSA free reign over customer
>> > communications (and was in turn protected by a bill granting them
>> > retroactive immunity from lawsuits). Google itself is the only company
>> > to
>> > have received a “Hostile to Privacy” rating from Privacy International.
>> > Apple is currently being investigated by Congress after the iPhone was
>> > revealed to compile user location data in a way that differs from other
>> > mobile phones; the company has claimed this to have been a “bug.”
>> >
>> > The program makes use of several providers of “linguistic services.” At
>> > one
>> > point, the team discusses hiring a military-trained Arabic linguist.
>> > Elsewhere, Barr writes: “I feel confident I can get you a ringer for
>> > Farsi
>> > if they are still interested in Farsi (we need to find that out). These
>> > linguists are not only going to be developing new content but also
>> > meeting
>> > with folks, so they have to have native or near native proficiency and
>> > have
>> > to have the cultural relevance as well.”
>> >
>> > Alterion and SocialEyez are listed as “businesses to contact.” The
>> > former
>> > specializes in “social media monitoring tools.” The latter uses
>> > “sophisticated natural language processing methodology” in order to
>> > “process
>> > tens of millions of multi-lingual conversations daily” while also
>> > employing
>> > “researchers and media analysts on the ground;” its website also notes
>> > that
>> > “Millions of people around the globe are now networked as never before -
>> > exchanging information and ideas, forming opinions, and speaking their
>> > minds
>> > about everything from politics to products.”
>> >
>> > At one point, TASC exec Chris Clair asks Aaron and others, “Can we name
>> > COIN
>> > Saif? Saif is the sword an Arab executioner uses when they decapitate
>> > criminals. I can think of a few cool brands for this.”
>> >
>> > A diagram attached to one of Barr's e-mails to the group
>> > (
http://imageshack.us/photo/my-images/7/pmo.png/) depicts Magpii as
>> > interacting in some unspecified manner with “Foreign Mobile” and
>> > “Foreign
>> > Web.” Magpii is a project of Barr's own creation which stands for
>> > “Magnify
>> > Personal Identifying Information,” involves social networking, and is
>> > designed for the purpose of storing personal information on users.
>> > Although
>> > details are difficult to determine from references in Barr's e-mails, he
>> > discusses the project almost exclusively with members of military
>> > intelligence to which he was pitching the idea.
>> >
>> > There are sporadic references such things as “semantic analysis,”
>> > “Latent
>> > Semantic Indexing,” “specialized linguistics,” and OPS, a programming
>> > language designed for solving problems using expert systems.
>> >
>> > Barr asks the team's partner at Apple, Andy Kemp (whose signature lists
>> > him
>> > as being from the company's Homeland Defense/National Programs
>> > division), to
>> > provide him “a contact at Pixar/Disney.”
>> >
>> > Altogether, then, a successful bid for the relevant contract was seen to
>> > require the combined capabilities of perhaps a dozen firms –
>> > capabilities
>> > whereby millions of conversations can be monitored and automatically
>> > analyzed, whereby a wide range of personal data can be obtained and
>> > stored
>> > in secret, and whereby some unknown degree of information can be
>> > released to
>> > a given population through a variety of means and without any hint that
>> > the
>> > actual source is U.S. military intelligence. All this is merely in
>> > addition
>> > to whichever additional capabilities are not evident from the limited
>> > description available, with the program as a whole presumably being
>> > operated
>> > in conjunction with other surveillance and propaganda assets controlled
>> > by
>> > the U.S. and its partners.
>> >
>> > Whatever the exact nature and scope of COIN, the firms that had been
>> > assembled for the purpose by Barr and TASC never got a chance to bid on
>> > the
>> > program's recompete. In late September, Lovegrove noted to Barr and
>> > others
>> > that he'd spoken to the “CO [contracting officer] for COIN.” “The
>> > current
>> > procurement approach is cancelled [sic], she cited changed
>> > requirements,” he
>> > reported. “They will be coming out with some documents in a month or
>> > two,
>> > most likely an updated RFI [request for information]. There will be a
>> > procurement following soon after. We are on the list to receive all
>> > information." On January 18th of next year, Lovegrove provided an
>> > update: “I
>> > just spoke to the group chief on the contracts side (Doug K). COIN has
>> > been
>> > replaced by a procurement called Odyssey. He says that it is in the
>> > formative stages and that something should be released this year. The
>> > contracting officer is Kim R. He believes that Jason is the COTR
>> > [contracting officer's technical representative].” Another clue is
>> > provided
>> > in the ensuing discussion when a TASC executive asks, “Does Odyssey
>> > combine
>> > the Technology and Content pieces of the work?”
>> >
>> > The unexpected change-up didn't seem to phase the corporate partnership,
>> > which was still a top contender to compete for the upcoming Odyssey
>> > procurement. Later e-mails indicate a meeting between key members of the
>> > group and the contracting officer for Odyssey at a location noted as
>> > “HQ,”
>> > apparently for a briefing on requirements for the new program, on
>> > February
>> > 3rd of 2011. But two days after that meeting, the servers of HBGary and
>> > HBGary Federal were hacked by a small team of Anonymous operatives in
>> > retaliation Barr's boasts to Financial Times that he had identified the
>> > movement's “leadership;” 70,000 e-mails were thereafter released onto
>> > the
>> > internet. Barr resigned a few weeks later.
>> >
>> > Along with clues as to the nature of COIN and its scheduled replacement,
>> > a
>> > close study of the HBGary e-mails also provide reasons to be concerned
>> > with
>> > the fact that such things are being developed and deployed in the way
>> > that
>> > they are. In addition to being the driving force behind the COIN
>> > recompete,
>> > Barr was also at the center of a series of conspiracies by which his own
>> > company and two others hired out their collective capabilities for use
>> > by
>> > corporations that sought to destroy their political enemies by
>> > clandestine
>> > and dishonest means, some of which appear to be illegal. None of the
>> > companies involved have been investigated; a proposed Congressional
>> > inquiry
>> > was denied by the committee chair, noting that it was the Justice
>> > Department's decision as to whether to investigate, even though it was
>> > the
>> > Justice Department itself that made the initial introductions. Those in
>> > the
>> > intelligence contracting industry who believe themselves above the law
>> > are
>> > entirely correct.
>> >
>> > That such firms will continue to target the public with advanced
>> > information
>> > warfare capabilities on behalf of major corporations is by itself an
>> > extraordinary danger to mankind as a whole, particularly insomuch as
>> > that
>> > such capabilities are becoming more effective while remaining largely
>> > unknown outside of the intelligence industry. But a far greater danger
>> > is
>> > posed by the practice of arming small and unaccountable groups of state
>> > and
>> > military personnel with a set of tools by which to achieve better and
>> > better
>> > “situational awareness” on entire populations while also being able to
>> > manipulate the information flow in such a way as to deceive those same
>> > populations. The idea that such power can be wielded without being
>> > misused
>> > is contradicted by even a brief review of history.
>> >
>> > History also demonstrates that the state will claim such powers as a
>> > necessity in fighting some considerable threat; the U.S. has defended
>> > its
>> > recent expansion of powers by claiming they will only be deployed to
>> > fight
>> > terrorism and will never be used against American civilians. This is
>> > cold
>> > comfort for those in the Arab world who are aware of the long history of
>> > U.S. material support for regimes they find convenient, including those
>> > of
>> > Saddam Hussein, Hosni Mubarak, and the House of Saud. Nor should
>> > Americans
>> > be comforted by such promises from a government that has no way of
>> > ensuring
>> > that they will be kept; it was just a few months ago that a U.S. general
>> > in
>> > Afghanistan ordered a military intelligence unit to use pysops on
>> > visiting
>> > senators in an effort to secure increased funding for the war; only a
>> > few
>> > days prior, CENTCOM spokesmen were confidently telling the public that
>> > such
>> > other psychological capabilities as persona management would never be
>> > used
>> > on Americans as that would be illegal. The fact is that such laws have
>> > been
>> > routinely broken by the military and intelligence community in the past
>> > and
>> > that they have now been joined in this practice by segments of the
>> > federal
>> > contracting industry.
>> >
>> > It is inevitable, then, that such capabilities as form the backbone of
>> > Romas/COIN and its replacement Odyssey will be deployed against a
>> > growing
>> > segment of the world's population for a variety of reasons. The powerful
>> > institutions that wield them will grow all the more powerful as they are
>> > provided better and better methods by which to monitor, deceive, and
>> > manipulate. The informed electorate upon which liberty depends will be
>> > increasingly misinformed. No tactical advantage conferred by the use of
>> > these programs can outweigh the damage that will be done to mankind in
>> > the
>> > process of creating them.
>> >
>> > --
>> > Regards,
>> >
>> > Barrett Brown
>> >
512-560-2302
>> >
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> Michael Hastings
>> Rolling Stone
>>
mhastings@gmail.com
>> International Mobile:
+1-212-945-8073
>
>
>
> --
> Regards,
>
> Barrett Brown
>
512-560-2302
>