Alexander J. Motyl's March 11 article "
Difficult
Task Defining Bandera's Historic Role" is a sugar-coated,
anti-Russian/Ukrainian nationalist commentary, with several questionable
views. His non-support of former Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko's
decision (when Yushchenko was president) to formally grant a "Hero" status to
World War II era Galician Ukrainian nationalist leader Stepan
Bandera, sympathizes with some core anti-Russian/Ukrainian nationalist
opinions. Motyl's emphasis on Russian qualms with Bandera
comparatively understates the opposition to Bandera in the Polish and
Jewish communities, as well as the European Union and a good number of
Ukrainians.
In his subjectivity, Motyl is objective enough to acknowledge that a
portion of his article does not offer a complete accounting, adding that
"one-sided readings are not unusual, especially among insecure nations
struggling to retain their newfound independence." His acknowledgement
serves to prompt a counterpoint to some of the views that he expresses.
Ukraine's standing as an independent state is not seen by many Ukrainians
as the positive result of Bandera's activity. Were that the case, it stands to
reason that the overall Ukrainian support for Bandera would be more
positive.
Motyl compares Bandera and his organization to the Algerian, Palestinian
and Jewish national independence movements. Another comparison comes to mind.
Somewhat like American Civil War period Confederate General Robert E. Lee,
Bandera is a regional figure. In parts of the American south, Lee is positively
viewed in a way that is not so evident in other areas of the United States.
Bandera's main base of support is in western Ukraine - especially in the
Galician region. (As is true with Motyl's comparisons, the one with Lee and
Bandera is not without differences.)
It is true that pro-Bandera advocates Yushchenko and his
wife have family origins east of Galicia. Their views on this subject
are not generally shared by Ukrainians from outside of western Ukraine.
Furthermore, some in western Ukraine (Rusyns in particular) are
not typically so fond of Bandera.
Motyl depicts extremist Russians mocking Ukrainian national identity with
the "Banderas" term. That term has also been used by some Russians and
Ukrainians to specifically express an opposition
to anti-Russian/Ukrainian nationalists; not inclusive of intending to
belittle Ukrainian national identity.
Motyl downplays the extremism within contemporary
anti-Russian/Ukrainian nationalist circles. The more extreme among them
have made comments like drowning the "Muscovites" in the blood of the Jews. (The
Muscovite term has been derisively used to describe Russians in
general, besides Moscow residents.) Some anti-Russian/Ukrainian
nationalists have utilized the "sovok" term to negatively label
Ukrainians, who are pro-Russian. (Sovok has been used to characterize
negative attitudes attributed with the Soviet era.)
Fortunately, the majority of Russians and Ukrainians do not fall in the
politically extreme category. Moreover, the
polling indicates
that most Ukrainians have a higher opinion of Russia than Motyl. In line with
Motyl's slant, this excerpt from his article reflects the rhetoric of the
anti-Russian/Ukrainian nationalist
Captive
Nations Committee:
"For many Russians, the quest for historical memory meant accepting
Stalin and Stalinism as qualified goods. For non-Russians, the quest for
historical memory became inextricably connected to the search for an anti-Soviet
identity. The former Soviet republics have focused on the violent, forced
conditions under which they were incorporated into the Russian Empire or the
Soviet Union, as well as the destruction they experienced under Lenin and
Stalin, the repression and stagnation they experienced under Nikita Khrushchev
and Leonid Brezhnev and the opportunity for freedom they seized under Mikhail
Gorbachev."
****
A noticeable number of non-Russians went along with Soviet policies. The
legacy of the Russian Empire includes it having many lead individuals
comprising non-Russian backgrounds. The Russian Empire's experience was not
exclusively a matter of forced incorporation, coupled by oppositionist
non-Russians. Like other empires of the period, the Russian Empire had instances
of support and resistance among its multiethnic inhabitants. Post-Soviet Russia
formally recognizes Ukraine's independence, inclusive of Ukraine's Communist
drawn boundaries.
Motyl provides a simplistically inaccurate depiction on how the current
Russian government treats Stalin. That treatment is nowhere near the level of
Yushchenko's adulation of Bandera. Moreover, there is a good deal of
Russian government and non-government criticism of Stalin. Russian
views on Stalin are by no means monolithic.
There has been considerable Russian opposition to the planned ten
Stalin
billboards on the
annual May 9 Victory Day
holiday,
observed
in Russia and some other countries. Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov, who expressed
support for the billboards, said that they are not intended to support Stalin,
but to reflect a reality of what had been evident (Stalin's wartime position as
Soviet leader). Someone communicated to me the thought that Luzhkov might have
received some misguided public relations advice.
Many Russians seem to take the view that Victory Day should be about
honoring the wartime heroism and patriotism of the population and not the role
of the dictator in question. The United Russia political party of President
Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin
opposes the
Stalin billboards.
In areas including the body politic, education and media, Russia at
large is taking a critical look at Stalin and other aspects of the Soviet past.
It is therefore academically irresponsible to suggest differently.